7 research outputs found

    A novel performance monitoring framework for health research systems: experiences of the National Institute for Health Research in England.

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    RIGHTS : This article is licensed under the BioMed Central licence at http://www.biomedcentral.com/about/license which is similar to the 'Creative Commons Attribution Licence'. In brief you may : copy, distribute, and display the work; make derivative works; or make commercial use of the work - under the following conditions: the original author must be given credit; for any reuse or distribution, it must be made clear to others what the license terms of this work are.BACKGROUND: The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) was established in 2006 with the aim of creating an applied health research system embedded within the English National Health Service (NHS). NIHR sought to implement an approach for monitoring its performance that effectively linked early indicators of performance with longer-term research impacts. We attempted to develop and apply a conceptual framework for defining appropriate key performance indicators for NIHR. METHOD: Following a review of relevant literature, a conceptual framework for defining performance indicators for NIHR was developed, based on a hybridisation of the logic model and balanced scorecard approaches. This framework was validated through interviews with key NIHR stakeholders and a pilot in one division of NIHR, before being refined and applied more widely. Indicators were then selected and aggregated to create a basket of indicators aligned to NIHR's strategic goals, which could be reported to NIHR's leadership team on a quarterly basis via an oversight dashboard. RESULTS: Senior health research system managers and practitioners endorsed the conceptual framework developed and reported satisfaction with the breadth and balance of indicators selected for reporting. CONCLUSIONS: The use of the hybrid conceptual framework provides a pragmatic approach to defining performance indicators that are aligned to the strategic aims of a health research system. The particular strength of this framework is its capacity to provide an empirical link, over time, between upstream activities of a health research system and its long-term strategic objectives

    Financing of International Collective Action for Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness.

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    The global pandemic response has typically followed cycles of panic followed by neglect. We are now, once again, in a phase of neglect, leaving the world highly vulnerable to massive loss of life and economic shocks from natural or human-made epidemics and pandemics. Quantifying the size of the losses caused by large-scale outbreaks is challenging because the epidemiological and economic research in this field is still at an early stage. Research on the 1918 influenza H1N1 pandemic and recent epidemics and pandemics has shown a range of estimated losses (panel).1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 ; 7 A limitation in assessing the economic costs of outbreaks is that they only capture the impact on income. Fan and colleagues8 recently addressed this limitation by estimating the “inclusive” cost of pandemics: the sum of the cost in lost income and a dollar valuation of the cost of early death. They found that for Ebola and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the true (“inclusive”) costs are two to three times the income loss. For extremely serious pandemics such as that of influenza in 1918, the inclusive costs are over five times income loss. The inclusive costs of the next severe influenza pandemic could be US570billioneachyearor07570 billion each year or 0·7% of global income (range 0·4–1·0%)8—an economic threat similar to that of global warming, which is expected to cost 0·2–2·0% of global income annually. Given the magnitude of the threat, we call for scaled-up financing of international collective action for epidemic and pandemic preparedness. Two planks of preparedness must be strengthened. The first is public health capacity—including human and animal disease surveillance—as a first line of defence.9 Animal surveillance is important since most emerging infectious diseases with outbreak potential originate in animals. Rigorous external assessment of national capabilities is critical; WHO developed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool specifically for this purpose.10 Financing for this first plank will largely be through domestic resources, but supplementary donor financing to low-income, high-risk countries is also needed. The second plank is financing global efforts to accelerate research and development (R&D) of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics for outbreak control, and to strengthen the global and regional outbreak preparedness and response system. These two international collective action activities are underfunded.11 Medical countermeasures against many emerging infectious diseases are currently missing. We need greater investment in development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics to prevent potential outbreaks from becoming humanitarian crises. The new Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which aims to mobilise 1 billion over 5 years, is developing vaccines against known emerging infectious diseases as well as platforms for rapid development of vaccines against outbreaks of unknown origin. The WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics12 is a new mechanism for coordinating and prioritising the development of drugs and diagnostics for emerging infectious diseases. Consolidating and enhancing donor support for these new initiatives would be an efficient way to channel resources aimed at improving global outbreak preparedness and response. Crucial components of the global and regional system for outbreak control include surge capacity (eg, the ability to urgently deploy human resources); providing technical guidance to countries in the event of an outbreak; and establishing a coordinated, interlinked global, regional, and national surveillance system. These activities are the remit of several essential WHO financing envelopes that all face major funding shortfalls. The Contingency Fund for Emergencies finances surge outbreak response for up to 3 months. The fund has a capitalisation target of 100millionofflexiblevoluntarycontributions,whichneedstobereplenishedwithabout100 million of flexible voluntary contributions, which needs to be replenished with about 25–50 million annually, depending on the extent of the outbreak in any given year. However, as of April 30, 2017, only 3765millionhadbeencontributed,withanadditional37·65 million had been contributed, with an additional 4 million in pledges.13 The WHO Health Emergencies and Health Systems Preparedness Programmes face an annual shortfall of 225millioninfundingtheirepidemicandpandemicpreventionandcontrolactivities.14Previoushealthemergencieshaveshownthatitcantaketimetoorganiseglobalcollectiveactionandprovidefinancingtothenationalandlocallevel.Insuchsituations,aglobalmechanismshouldofferarapidinjectionofliquiditytoaffectedcountries.TheWorldBank2˘7sPandemicEmergencyFinancingFacility(PEF)isaproposedglobalinsurancemechanismforpandemicemergencies.15Itaimstoprovidesurgefundingforresponseeffortstohelprespondtorare,highburdendiseaseoutbreaks,preventingthemfrombecomingmoredeadlyandcostlypandemics.ThePEFcurrentlyproposesacoverageof225 million in funding their epidemic and pandemic prevention and control activities.14 Previous health emergencies have shown that it can take time to organise global collective action and provide financing to the national and local level. In such situations, a global mechanism should offer a rapid injection of liquidity to affected countries. The World Bank\u27s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) is a proposed global insurance mechanism for pandemic emergencies.15 It aims to provide surge funding for response efforts to help respond to rare, high-burden disease outbreaks, preventing them from becoming more deadly and costly pandemics. The PEF currently proposes a coverage of 500 million for the insurance window; increasing the current coverage will require additional donor commitments. In addition, the PEF has a $50–100 million replenishable cash window. As the world\u27s health ministers meet this month for the World Health Assembly, we propose five key ways to help prevent mortality and economic shocks from disease outbreaks. First, to accelerate development of new technologies to control outbreaks, donors should expand their financing for CEPI and support the WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics. Second, funding gaps in the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies and the WHO Health Emergencies Programme should be urgently filled and the PEF should be fully financed. Third, all nations should support their own and other countries\u27 national preparedness efforts, including committing to the JEE process. Fourth, we believe it would be valuable to create and maintain a regional and country-level pandemic risk and preparedness index. This index could potentially be used as a way to review preparedness in International Monetary Fund article IV consultations (regular country reports by staff to its Board). Finally, we call for a new global effort to develop long-term national, regional, and global investment plans to create a world secure from the threat of devastation from outbreaks. This article summarises the recommendations of a workshop held at the National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA, co-hosted by the Center for Policy Impact in Global Health at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo, Norway. Participants\u27 travel and accommodation were supported by the Center for Policy Impact in Global Health. BO is a consultant to Metabiota, a private company engaged in infectious disease risk modelling and analytical services. In this capacity, he has led the development of an index measuring national capacity to respond to epidemic and pandemic disease outbreaks

    'Replication data for: Overweight and Overburdened: Race and Gender Disparities in the Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity

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    Abstract The incidence of medical costs of obesity disproportionately falls on women and racial minorities. Prior research has shown that when employers provide health insurance coverage to workers, the additional healthcare costs associated with obesity are passed through to obese workers in the form of reduced wages, relative to their non-obese counterparts. However, estimation of a population-level wage penalty of obesity obscures substantial variation in the relative impact of these wage differences by race and gender. We partition the 1979 NLSY data by race and gender, and find that while the dollar-denominated wage penalty borne by obese workers with health insurance is borne predominantly by white women, these wage offsets disproportionately impact blacks and white women when modeled as a percentage of income. Upload includes data, R code, and write-u

    One Health Economics to confront disease threats

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    Global economic impacts of epidemics suggest high return on investment in prevention and One Health capacity. However, such investments remain limited, contributing to persistent endemic diseases and vulnerability to emerging ones. An interdisciplinary workshop explored methods for country-level analysis of added value of One Health approaches to disease control. Key recommendations include: 1. systems thinking to identify risks and mitigation options for decision-making under uncertainty; 2. multisectoral economic impact assessment to identify wider relevance and possible resource-sharing, and 3. consistent integration of environmental considerations. Economic analysis offers a congruent measure of value complementing diverse impact metrics among sectors and contexts
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