53 research outputs found
Spectrum Reallocation and the National Broadband Plan
Of the several significant changes in United States telecommunications policy proposed by the National Broadband Plan, none are more substantial than its proposals for spectrum policy. In particular, the Plan proposes to reallocate 500 MHz of spectrum from broadcast television, mobile satellite, government and other current uses to mobile broadband through the use of innovative incentive auctions and other voluntary, market-oriented mechanisms. The Plan\u27s spectrum proposals have the potential to be a major step forward in the decades-long, bipartisan effort to replace command-and-control spectrum allocation with a more flexible, dynamic and market-oriented approach. Considerable work remains to be done, however, and only time and future developments will tell whether the Plan signals a significant step towards a more market-oriented policy
Irrational Expectations: Can a Regulator Credibly Commit to Removing an Unbundling Obligation?
There is a large empirical literature that investigates the effects of unbundling requirements on broadband operators' incentives to invest in infrastructure. To date, that literature has generally relied on industry-wide data as an indicator of how the representative operator reacts to the imposition of mandatory unbundling. In this paper, we present original findings on how specific firms reacted to the removal of an unbundling obligation that is, an act of "regulatory forbearance"either for an existing access technology or for a new access technology. We rely on three case studies to evaluate the impact of regulatory forbearance on specific incumbents and entrants that were directly affected by the regulator's decision. Our findings from the first case study appear to undermine the so-called "stepping stone" justification for unbundling an existing access technology (for example, the copper loop). In particular, there is a large discontinuity in the investment by entrants around the date of forbearance, in contrast to the steady movement up the ladder of investment predicted by the stepping stone hypothesis. Such a discontinuity suggests that either (1) the regulator failed to signal its deregulatory intentions to entrants, or (2) that the signal was clear but the entrant did not react according to the theory. We also find that incumbent investment increases significantly in response to forbearance from regulating a new access technology (for example, fiber loops). When forbearing from regulating an existing access technology, regulators can signal their future intentions to entrants by slowly increasing the regulated wholesale rate. In the case of forbearing from regulating a new technology, however, there is no equivalent mechanism by which regulators can signal their deregulatory intentions to incumbents. Because a regulator cannot credibly signal its commitment to industry participants, and because such a commitment is critical to the practical success of the stepping stone theory, the best policy for maximizing investment is to accelerate the date of forbearance for existing and new access technologies.Technology and Industry
The Sound Recording Performance Rights at a Crossroads: Will Market Rates Prevail?
Starting in the 1990s, Federal policy has moved in the direction of a market-oriented approach towards sound recording rights, beginning with Congressâ decision to create a sound recording performance copyright in 1995. In 1998, Congress provided that most statutory royalty rates, including the rates paid by webcasters like Pandora Radio, would be set using a market-based âwilling buyer, willing sellerâ (âWBWSâ) standard. Since then, the WBWS standard has been applied in several rate setting proceedings, but complaints from webcasters that the rates were âtoo highâ have led to Congressional intervention and, ultimately, to adoption of rates below market levels. Now, as a new rate setting cycle is about to get underway, webcasters have begun lobbying Congress to replace the WBWS standard with a new version of the so-called 801(b) standard, which promises copyright users a right of ânon-disruption.â Adoption of the 801(b) standard â and the other changes favored by the webcasters â would result in rates below economically efficient levels, thereby distorting markets, slowing innovation and harming consumers. This paper examines the market for sound recording performance rights, concluding that Congress should resist webcastersâ pleas for regulatory favoritism and instead continue moving towards a market-oriented approach, starting with extending the sound performance right to terrestrial radio
Vertical Separation of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence from Five Countries
The widespread adoption of mandatory unbundling in telecommunications markets has led to growing interest in mandatory functional separation, i.e., separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail operations. Since 2002, vertical separation has been implemented in five OECD countries: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2008, the International Telecommunications Union noted a tremendous amount of interest in functional separation around the world; and, in April 2009, the European Parliament held its second reading on a new regulatory framework that embraces functional separation as an exceptional measure. While the U.S. does not currently require unbundling of broadband telecommunications networks, at least one influential group is advocating both unbundling and vertical separation for U.S. network operators. In this context, this study examines mandatory vertical separation in telecommunications markets from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The theoretical case against vertical separation is very strong, predicting in particular that mandated separation will discourage innovation and investment in new technologies. The empirical evidence tends to confirm these predictions, suggesting that overall, vertical separation is likely to impose significant costs without measurably increasing broadband penetration
Vertical Separation of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence from Five Countries
The widespread adoption of mandatory unbundling in telecommunications markets has led to growing interest in mandatory functional separation, i.e., separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail operations. Since 2002, vertical separation has been implemented in five OECD countries: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2008, the International Telecommunications Union noted a tremendous amount of interest in functional separation around the world; and, in April 2009, the European Parliament held its second reading on a new regulatory framework that embraces functional separation as an exceptional measure. While the U.S. does not currently require unbundling of broadband telecommunications networks, at least one influential group is advocating both unbundling and vertical separation for U.S. network operators. In this context, this study examines mandatory vertical separation in telecommunications markets from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The theoretical case against vertical separation is very strong, predicting in particular that mandated separation will discourage innovation and investment in new technologies. The empirical evidence tends to confirm these predictions, suggesting that overall, vertical separation is likely to impose significant costs without measurably increasing broadband penetration
An Event Analysis Study of the Economic Implications of the FCC\u27s UNE Decision: Backdrop for Current Network Sharing Proposals
An Event Analysis Study of the Economic Implications of the FCC\u27s UNE Decision: Backdrop for Current Network Sharing Proposals
Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs Mobile Networks
Ensuring transparency and minimization of methodologic bias in preclinical pain research:PPRECISE considerations
Acknowledgements The authors thank Allison Lin, Dan Mellon, and LiSheng Chen for their help throughout the process of writing this article.Peer reviewedPublisher PD
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