Climate Change: A Newly Established Contributor to Terrorist Actions

Although climate change and terrorism are two terms that are mostly analyzed separately, they tend to be two global threats in a feedback loop relationship. Climate change causes fragility and instability because of the lack of natural resources and the vulnerability of human security. Considering this situation, NSAGs (Non-State Armed Groups) take advantage of this fragility and proliferate. In order to be established, they even attempt to earn the support of the local population. Food insecurity, water/land scarcities caused by climate change lead to intense poverty of the local population. As a result, they are more vulnerable to the recruitment of NSAGs, which promise them economic incentives. Various case studies demonstrate that NSAGs, such as Boko Haram in Lake Chad, exploit and manipulate the local population to impose their regime. For this purpose, NSAGs use strategically natural resources such as water, by using them as weapons or by forbidding access to these vital resources. Governments have attempted to control this exacerbation of terrorist actions in the environmental framework but the solution of the problem demands the collaboration of multiple actors. Policy makers will be able to address these challenges by building resilient societies that engage people with their problems

Information Reliability in supply chains: The case of multiple retailers

En esta tesis doctoral abordamos el estudio relativo al intercambio de información sobre la demanda dentro de una cadena de suministro cuando las partes interactúan de una forma estratégica. Los distribuidores minoristas forman una agrupación y delegan la gestión del inventario (los pedidos y la asignación) a un planificador central benévolo (CP, por sus siglas en inglés). Cada uno de los minoristas debe enfrentarse a una demanda incierta y dispone de información privada sobre ella como consecuencia de su proximidad al mercado; nos centramos en determinar si entre los minoristas y el CP se produce un intercambio fiable de información sobre la demanda. En primer lugar estudiamos el impacto de diversos mecanismos de asignación sobre el comportamiento en materia de pedidos de los minoristas, cuando la cantidad de inventario total en el almacén central es fija. Los minoristas efectúan los pedidos después conocer de manera privada su demanda. Demostramos analíticamente que los minoristas comunicarán sus necesidades reales, es decir, sus demandas realizadas, de acuerdo a una norma de asignación uniforme pero no de acuerdo a otras normas comunes como, por ejemplo, la noma proporcional o lineal; posteriormente, estudiamos una configuración donde la cantidad de inventario agrupado no es fija, sino más bien una variable de decisión, determinada por el CP después de haber solicitado información de demanda prevista de los minoristas. Las asignación del inventario total, en este caso también, se efectúa después de conocerse las realizaciones de demanda final, pero las demandas finales son de conocimiento común. Entonces, los minoristas pueden influir su asignación solo a través de la cantidad de inventario total. Mediante modelos teóricos asociados a tácticas podemos ver que el reconocimiento de la verdad y la confianza no se encuentran en una situación de equilibrio. A continuación, en un entorno de laboratorio controlado que simula la configuración de la cadena de suministro objeto de consideración, estudiamos el impacto de a) la competencia por el inventario común y b) la incertidumbre del mercado sobre la distorsión de la información, la confianza y la eficacia de la cadena de suministro. Nuestros resultados sugieren que existe una confianza continua cuando los incentivos pecuniarios están alineados y cuando no lo están, lo que viene a desmentir los casos teóricos extremos de minoristas completamente dignos de confianza o que no son fiables en absoluto; incluso aunque la información no sea totalmente fiable, el valor de la comunicación es importante. En última instancia, estudiamos el impacto de la propiedad del inventario sobre las motivaciones de las partes implicadas de cara a compartir de manera honrada sus previsiones de demanda; los inventarios específicos tampoco inducen a decir la verdad. Comparamos los inventarios resultantes y los beneficios de acuerdo con la toma de decisiones a nivel local con información más precisa con respecto a la toma de decisiones centralizada, mediante la cual se logra la coordinación de los pedidos

Fairness ideals in inventory allocation

We study fairness ideals in distribution systems where inventory is allocated to multiple retailers and there is supply–demand mismatch. In particular, we focus on (a) what is considered fair inventory allocation by retailers (e.g., equal profit, same fill rate, equal share of supply–demand mismatch?) and (b) how the supply chain context affects fairness perceptions. We consider an integrated supply chain setting where total inventory is allocated at the retail level and retailers may face either shortage or surplus, and a disintegrated supply chain where retailers may face supply scarcity when total demand exceeds available inventory. Our experimental data suggest that subjects, taking on the role of retailers in the same supply chain, are often motivated by fairness considerations: they claim for themselves inventory that is not exactly equal to their needs in more than one-third of the instances. Across settings, “fair” allocations depend on retail demands rather than on profit comparisons, even when these are facilitated by a decision support tool. However, in cases of surplus, the most prevalent fairness ideal is that of equal split of inventory–demand mismatch, while in cases of shortage, the most prevalent fairness ideal is that of equal fill rates. Follow-up experiments suggest that retailers under both cases of shortage and surplus are more likely to evaluate an allocation as fair when it is based on realized demands, and this is independent of whether it was determined by a rule or a human decision maker

Behavior in rationing inventory across retail channels

When demand exceeds available inventory, suppliers ration their inventory among customers (e.g., retail channels). While there are quantitative methods to facilitate these choices, in practice, humans play an important role in making final decisions that affect allocation efficiency. How do inventory risk and contractual differences (i.e. payment schemes) behaviorally affect allocation decisions when there is scarcity? We study inventory allocations between two retail channels: a high value channel with risk, and a low value channel without risk. The retail channels may also differ in terms of the timing and type of payments that take place. We develop theoretical predictions from behavioral models based on risk aversion, loss aversion, and mental accounting and test these through incentivized controlled laboratory experiments. When profit differences between channels are medium to large, subjects allocate significantly less inventory than the expected–profit–maximizing quantity to the risky, yet more profitable, channel and subjects with stronger risk appetite allocate larger quantities to the risky channel. More interestingly, risk appetite moderates the effect of the timing and type of payments on allocations in these settings. When profit differences between channels are small, the effect of risk appetite depends on the timing of payments. Overall, the possibility of experiencing negative payments (e.g., through buy–backs) reduces allocated quantities across settings. Our insights can inform planner assignment to tasks but also the design of support systems that provide information to planners who make allocation decisions

Behavior in rationing inventory across retail channels

When demand exceeds available inventory, suppliers ration their inventory among customers (e.g., retail channels). While there are quantitative methods to facilitate these choices, in practice, humans play an important role in making final decisions that affect allocation efficiency. How do inventory risk and contractual differences (i.e. payment schemes) behaviorally affect allocation decisions when there is scarcity? We study inventory allocations between two retail channels: a high value channel with risk, and a low value channel without risk. The retail channels may also differ in terms of the timing and type of payments that take place. We develop theoretical predictions from behavioral models based on risk aversion, loss aversion, and mental accounting and test these through incentivized controlled laboratory experiments. When profit differences between channels are medium to large, subjects allocate significantly less inventory than the expected–profit–maximizing quantity to the risky, yet more profitable, channel and subjects with stronger risk appetite allocate larger quantities to the risky channel. More interestingly, risk appetite moderates the effect of the timing and type of payments on allocations in these settings. When profit differences between channels are small, the effect of risk appetite depends on the timing of payments. Overall, the possibility of experiencing negative payments (e.g., through buy–backs) reduces allocated quantities across settings. Our insights can inform planner assignment to tasks but also the design of support systems that provide information to planners who make allocation decisions

Impact of vaccine stockouts on immunization coverage in Nigeria

Improving immunization coverage requires creating reliable supply of vaccines and immunization supplies; trained and incentivized health workers; and strategies to improve the demand for immunization. Yet, the interplay of demand and supply side factors on immunization coverage has not been evaluated in literature with data. We use data from Nigeria and a mixed-effects general linear model to estimate the effect of vaccine availability on routine immunization coverage and to identify demand and health system factors which affect this relationship. We find that when vaccine stockouts occur at Local Government Area stores in Nigeria, they significantly decrease the number of children immunized, and for most vaccines, the effect lasts for several months after a stockout. Some of the demand lost when a stockout occurs is recovered over the following six months as children catch up with the regimen. The magnitude of the impact varies across different vaccines

Impact of vaccine stockouts on immunization coverage in Nigeria

Improving immunization coverage requires creating reliable supply of vaccines and immunization supplies; trained and incentivized health workers; and strategies to improve the demand for immunization. Yet, the interplay of demand and supply side factors on immunization coverage has not been evaluated in literature with data. We use data from Nigeria and a mixed-effects general linear model to estimate the effect of vaccine availability on routine immunization coverage and to identify demand and health system factors which affect this relationship. We find that when vaccine stockouts occur at Local Government Area stores in Nigeria, they significantly decrease the number of children immunized, and for most vaccines, the effect lasts for several months after a stockout. Some of the demand lost when a stockout occurs is recovered over the following six months as children catch up with the regimen. The magnitude of the impact varies across different vaccines