Political Institutions, Voter Turnout and Policy Outcomes

We question whether the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes (Persson and Tabellini, 2004) is direct. We show that voter turnout is a channel through which forms of government affect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relationships: the first links constitutions to voter turnout; the second connects voter turnout to policy outcomes. Presidential regimes are found to induce less voter participation in national elections. We then analyze the impact of constitutional variables and voter participation in shaping fiscal policies. Forms of governments lose their explanatory power once participation is accounted for. Higher participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total revenues and welfare state spending. We conclude that forms of government affect policy outcomes through electoral participation.

Sequential cross-border mergers

This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly with a cost structure à la Perry and Porter [Perry, M. and Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219–227.].We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger

Integration of electricity markets in Europe: Relevant issues for Italy

In this paper, we analyze the current trend towards a higher degree of market integration in Europe and identify those aspects that are particularly relevant for Italy. The Italian involvement in this process appears comparatively modest. A welfare analysis, which focuses specifically on the integration of the Italian market, will certainly be a useful support to any policy decision. We argue that, given the peculiarities of the Italian market design, a volume coupling solution could avoid, at the moment, the costs of what could be a significant harmonization effort and, in the end, it might constitute the best short-term strategy. This proposal should be adequately considered, taking into account the complexity of designing an efficient volume-only coordination procedure

Integration of electricity markets in Europe: Relevant issues for Italy

In this paper, we analyze the current trend towards a higher degree of market integration in Europe and identify those aspects that are particularly relevant for Italy. The Italian involvement in this process appears comparatively modest. A welfare analysis, which focuses specifically on the integration of the Italian market, will certainly be a useful support to any policy decision. We argue that, given the peculiarities of the Italian market design, a volume coupling solution could avoid, at the moment, the costs of what could be a significant harmonization effort and, in the end, it might constitute the best short-term strategy. This proposal should be adequately considered, taking into account the complexity of designing an efficient volume-only coordination procedure.Wholesale electricity markets Market integration Congestion management

Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge

Merger policy is a permission-granting activity by government in which there may be disincentives to seek permission because of the benefit from having other firms merge. We set up a sequential merger game with endogenized antitrust policy to study one aspect of these disincentives. In particular, we delineate a pill-sweetening motive for waiting to merge: a small firm may choose to let other bigger firms move first, in order to get more mergers approved by government. We report the prevalence of pill sweetening to occur in equilibrium and find it to hinge on efficiency gains from a merger, differently sized firms, firms’ production technology, the presence of an antitrust authority, the alignment of interests between antitrust authorities and firms, and the number of firms in the industry

Cross-Border Merger Waves

This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game with cost synergies to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between domestic and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger. We also analyze how the equilibrium market structures are affected by the presence of lobbying efforts.endogenous mergers; merger waves; tariff-jumping FDI

Political Institutions, Voter Turnout and Policy Outcomes

The impact of political institutions on policy outcomes has gained much attention in the literature over the last years. The aim of this paper is to test whether the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes is direct. By introducing citizens' political participation, rather than politicians' incentives, as the driving force connecting institutions to policy outcomes, we empirically show that voter turnout is the channel through which forms of government affect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relationships. First, presidential regimes appear to be related to lower voter participation in national elections. Second, higher voter participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total revenues, welfare state spending, and budget deficit. We conclude that forms of government affect policy outcomes only through voter turnout.Electoral rule, form of government, voter participation, policy outcomes

Waiting to Merge

We set up a sequential merger to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an anthitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three dstinctive motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.Mergers; merger incentives;

Price-Cost Margins and Firm Size under Monopolistic Competition: The Case of IES Preferences

We introduce a class of “increasing elasticity of substitution” preferences in a monopolistic competition setting à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Contrary to the standard view, we find that a market which is widening, as a result of, for example, international trade, increases price-cost margins and reduces firm sizes. However, even if prices are higher (with constant marginal costs), consumers benefit from the market expansion because of higher product diversity (the free-entry equilibrium has a sub-optimal number of varieties). Our results might contribute to explain the puzzle posed by the movements of markups following globalisation. They could also help explaining the cyclical behaviour of prices