Bericht zur Lage der europäischen Wirtschaft: Ein neuer Krisenmechanismus für die Eurozone

Am 22. Februar 2011 stellte die European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG) at CESifo ihren nunmehr zehnten Report on the European Economy in Brüssel vor (EEAG Report on the European Economy 2011). Die Gruppe von internationalen Ökonomen thematisiert insbesondere die Verschuldungskrise in Europa als Folge der Finanzkrise. Im Fokus des diesjährigen Berichts stehen Länderstudien zu Griechenland und Spanien sowie das Design eines Krisenmechanismus für die Eurozone. Darüber hinaus werden Wege zur Regulierung des Finanzsektors aufgezeigt. Wie in den vergangenen Jahren liefert die EEAG auch eine Konjunkturprognose für die europäische Wirtschaft. In diesem Artikel werden die fünf Kapitel des Reports zusammengefasst. Der gesamte EEAG Report kann unter http://www.cesifo-group.de/eeag heruntergeladen werden.Finanzmarktkrise Schulden Euromarkt Krisenmanagement Wirtschaftslage Wirtschaftspolitik Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse Wirtschaftspolitische Beratung EU-Staaten

Are Private Equity Investors Good or Evil?

The paper investigates the motives of activity (entry and exit) of Private Equity (PE) investors in European companies. Investment of a PE firm is not viewed unambiguously. First, it is claimed that PE investment is made for the sake of seeking short-term gains by taking control and utilizing the company's resources. Second, a PE firm invests because of prior identification of chances to add value to the company. We attempt to resolve these two conflicting conjectures. We use the Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database of very large, large and medium-sized European companies. Our major results can be summarized as follows. First, PE firms are less willing to enter the firm if there is already a blocking majority, and they are more likely to leave the firm if control cannot be overtaken. Second, less mature firms are less able to lure a PE firm to invest, thus indicating a safe strategy of PE investors. Third, we do not find empirical evidence that a PE investor comes in to strip a firm of its equity. On the other hand, PE investors are likely to leave the company if it deteriorates in terms of returns and cash. Finally, when comparing the activity of PE and other financial investors, we find essential differences in choosing the field and environment of activity

Has the Financial Crisis Eroded Citizens’ Trust in the European Central Bank? Panel Data Evidence for the Euro Area 1999-2011

In the aftermath of the financial crisis trust, in the European Central Bank (ECB) has reached an historical low. Taking panel data and using a fixed effects DFGLS estimation for a 12–country sample over the time period 1999 to 2011 with a total of 312 observations, this paper detects a structural break in citizens’ trust in the ECB. The paper confirms that during the pre-crisis period, citizens’ trust in the ECB was driven by economic growth. In crisis time, however, trust in the ECB is both driven by inflation and unemployment

The Long-run Determinants of Australian Income Inequality

Recent interest has been stimulated by the growth of income inequality in most developed countries during the 1980s and 1990s. However, considerable uncertainty still exists as to which factors have been the most important causes of this development. This article uses a measure of income inequality derived from taxation statistics and a recently proposed method for testing long-run Granger non-causality to examine the key determinants of Australia’s inequality for the years 1970–2001. In line with popular concern, we find that globalisation and technological progress – defined as the global flow of information – has increased income inequality. In contrast, improved terms of trade have been equity-enhancing. Of the institutional determinants, de-unionisation has had an adverse effect on income inequality, where as higher minimum wages have reduced it

Asymmetric Labor Market Institutions in the EMU and the Volatility of Inflation and Unemployment Differentials

How does the asymmetry of labor market institutions affect the adjustment of a currency union to shocks? To answer this question, this paper sets up a dynamic currency union model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, hiring frictions and real wage rigidities. In our analysis, we focus on the differentials in inflation and unemployment between countries, as they directly reflect how the currency union responds to shocks. We highlight the following three results: First, we show that it is important to distinguish between different labor market rigidities as they have opposite effects on inflation and unemployment differentials. Second, we find that asymmetries in labor market structures tend to increase the volatility of both inflation and unemployment differentials. Finally, we show that it is important to take into account the interaction between different types of labor market rigidities. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks

Employment protection versus flexicurity : on technology adoption in unionised tirms

We analyse how different labour-market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour-saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour-saving technology.COMPETE; QREN; FEDERFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT