Endogenous Timing and Quality Standards in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The consequences of the adoption of quality standards on the endogenous timing of moves are investigated in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We obtain two main results. First, we prove that, when the low-quality firm is Stackelberg leader in the quality stage, the related MQS is ineffective. Second, the timing game in the quality space has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, involving simultaneous moves. The related optimal MQS is time consistent, although suboptimal from the viewpoint of the regulator.Minimum Quality Standard, extended game, endogenous timing

Microcredito: un'opportunità

Il Microcredito: profili tecnici ed operativ

Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation

We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that infl uence the decision by the large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the fi rm to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees. We suggest that agency problems between the controller and other investors and holdup problems between shareholders and employees are connected if the controller bears private costs of “expropriating” these groups. Corporate law and employment law may therefore somethimes be substitutes; employees may benefi t from better corporate law intended to protect minority shareholder, and vice versa. Our model has implications for the domestic and comparative study of corporate governance structure and addresses, among other things, the question whether large shareholders are better able to “bond” with employees than dispersed ones, or whether the separation of ownership facilitates longterm relationships with labor

Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation

We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that influence the decision by the large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the firm to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees. We suggest that agency problems between the controller and other investors and holdup problems between shareholders and employees are connected if the controller bears private costs of “expropriating” these groups. Corporate law and employment law may therefore somethimes be substitutes; employees may benefit from better corporate law intended to protect minority shareholder, and viceversa. Our model has implications for the domestic and comparative study of corporate governance structure and addresses, among other things, the question whether large shareholders are better able to “bond” with employees than dispersed ones, or whether the separation of ownership facilitates longterm relationships with labor.

Minimum Quality Standards in Hedonic Markets with Environmental Externalities

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically differentiated duopoly with an environmental externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is sufficiently strong. Then, we illustrate an underlying tradeoff between the beneficial effects of quality enhancement on prices and the associated undesirable increase in the environmental externality.

Informal rural credit markets in late Ottoman Palestine: an analysis of bay-wafa, salam and muzaraah contracts in the District of Haifa (1890-1912)

The paper examines the role of the informal rural credit markets in the palestinian agricultural development at the end of the Ottoman Empire. The analysis starts from the long term effects of the legal reforms, particularly the Ottoman Land Code, on the performance of these markets. Such effects are evident in the evolution of bay-wafa, salam and muzaraah contracts, typical of the rural credit markets, that are recorded in the acts of the Public Notary of Haifa during the years 1890-1915. These contracts show an emerging network of interlinked credit markets, managed by the local notables, at the core of the agricultural growth of late Ottoman Palestine.Ottoman Palestine; informal rural credit markets; Ottoman Land Code

Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The existence of a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost. The alternative cases of partial and full market coverage are considered. It is shown that there exists a parameter range where the incentive to decrease differentiation arises for the high-quality firm, preventing firms to reach a pure-strategy duopoly equilibrium