Business as a Regulatory Leader for Risk Governance? The Compact Initiative for Liability and Redress under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

In March 2008, the six world leading agro-biotechnology companies, presented a private, international instrument for liability and redress to cover the environmental damage caused by genetically modified organisms. The proposal was rejected by governments, who instead adopted a binding supplementary liability and redress protocol to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, with no content transfer from the business initiative. Elaborating on this case study, it is explained how powerful business proposals can turn into a policy failure. Business conflicts are identified as one major explanatory factor. The fragmentation of business interests and the lackof business support for the six major firms’ initiative have discredited the role of corporations as regulatory leaders. Business unity is found to be a decisive, necessary condition for the endorsement of corporate proposals by policymakers

Smoke and mirrors: some reflections on the science and politics of geoengineering

This article identifies and explores some of the political issues that will need to be addressed in the governance of geoengineering. It is argued that the diversity of different possible geoengineering techniques—encompassing solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), and further divided into territorial techniques and commons-based techniques—rules out a single mode of geoengineering governance. Whereas some geoengineering techniques may be effective when implemented by a small number of countries, others would need to be implemented around the globe and involve most countries of the world, with different countries having different comparative advantages in the various geoengineering techniques. Such an enterprise would generate collective action problems related to implementation and disagreements over who should pay for the financial and nonfinancial costs of geoengineering. Nonetheless, a more coherent system of geoengineering governance is possible and is necessary if international conflict is to be avoided and the risks of unintended consequences are to be minimized. Any new international institutional design on geoengineering will need to address some pressing political and scientific questions, including the desired mean temperature of the world’s climate, the possible role of CDR technologies in carbon offsets and emissions-trading schemes, and whether there should be differentiated obligations between different groups of states