Better No Longer to Be

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism. This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’. Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s ro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be

The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief

We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere

Regularity Properties and Pathologies of Position-Space Renormalization-Group Transformations

We reconsider the conceptual foundations of the renormalization-group (RG) formalism, and prove some rigorous theorems on the regularity properties and possible pathologies of the RG map. Regarding regularity, we show that the RG map, defined on a suitable space of interactions (= formal Hamiltonians), is always single-valued and Lipschitz continuous on its domain of definition. This rules out a recently proposed scenario for the RG description of first-order phase transitions. On the pathological side, we make rigorous some arguments of Griffiths, Pearce and Israel, and prove in several cases that the renormalized measure is not a Gibbs measure for any reasonable interaction. This means that the RG map is ill-defined, and that the conventional RG description of first-order phase transitions is not universally valid. For decimation or Kadanoff transformations applied to the Ising model in dimension $d \ge 3$, these pathologies occur in a full neighborhood $\{ \beta > \beta_0 ,\, |h| < \epsilon(\beta) \}$ of the low-temperature part of the first-order phase-transition surface. For block-averaging transformations applied to the Ising model in dimension $d \ge 2$, the pathologies occur at low temperatures for arbitrary magnetic-field strength. Pathologies may also occur in the critical region for Ising models in dimension $d \ge 4$. We discuss in detail the distinction between Gibbsian and non-Gibbsian measures, and give a rather complete catalogue of the known examples. Finally, we discuss the heuristic and numerical evidence on RG pathologies in the light of our rigorous theorems.Comment: 273 pages including 14 figures, Postscript, See also ftp.scri.fsu.edu:hep-lat/papers/9210/9210032.ps.

Regional differences in multidimensional aspects of health: findings from the MRC cognitive function and ageing study

BACKGROUND: Differences in mortality and health experience across regions are well recognised and UK government policy aims to address this inequality. Methods combining life expectancy and health have concentrated on specific areas, such as self-perceived health and dementia. Few have looked within country or across different areas of health. Self-perceived health, self-perceived functional impairment and cognitive impairment are linked closely to survival, as well as quality of life. This paper aims to describe regional differences in healthy life expectancy using a variety of states of health and wellbeing within the MRC Cognitive Function and Ageing Study (MRC CFAS). METHODS: MRC CFAS is a population based study of health in 13,009 individuals aged 65 years and above in five centres using identical study methodology. The interviews included self-perceived health and measures of functional and cognitive impairment. Sullivan's method was used to combine prevalence rates for cognitive and functional impairment and life expectancy to produce expectation of life in various health states. RESULTS: The prevalence of both cognitive and functional impairment increases with age and was higher in women than men, with marked centre variation in functional impairment (Newcastle and Gwynedd highest impairment). Newcastle had the shortest life expectancy of all the sites, Cambridgeshire and Oxford the longest. Centre differences in self-perceived health tended to mimic differences in life expectancy but this did not hold for cognitive or functional impairment. CONCLUSION: Self-perceived health does not show marked variation with age or sex, but does across centre even after adjustment for impairment burden. There is considerable centre variation in self-reported functional impairment but not cognitive impairment. Only variation in self-perceived health relates to the ranking of life expectancy. These data confirm that quite considerable differences in life experience exist across regions of the UK beyond basic life expectancy