27 research outputs found
On the Computational Complexity of Non-dictatorial Aggregation
We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an
algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes
cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that the
collective outcome is not simply the choices made by a single member of the
society. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a
position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several
different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong
to a given set of allowable voting patterns. Such a set is called a
possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates
separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on
each issue. We design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a set
of voting patterns, whether or not is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if
is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time
such a non-dictatorial aggregator for . We then show that the question of
whether a Boolean domain is a possibility domain is in NLOGSPACE. We also
design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether is a uniform
possibility domain, that is, whether admits an aggregator that is
non-dictatorial even when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in
the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial
time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists. Then, we turn our
attention to the case where is given implicitly, either as the set of
assignments satisfying a propositional formula, or as a set of consistent
evaluations of an sequence of propositional formulas. In both cases, we provide
bounds to the complexity of deciding if is a (uniform) possibility domain.Comment: 21 page
Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue
We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set
of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several
positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is
restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to
be supportive, i.e. for every issue the corresponding component of
every aggregator on every issue should satisfy . We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial
aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if
either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members
or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue is a majority
operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies , or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e.
the corresponding component satisfies We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial
aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when
restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue,
differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets
of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator.
Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint
satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial
complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns has a
uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted
conservative constraint satisfaction problem on , in the sense introduced by
Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable;
otherwise it is NP-complete
Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions under Voters' Hierarchy
International audienceSimilar to Arrowâs impossibility theorem for preference aggregation, judgment aggregation has also an intrinsic impossibility for generating consistent group judgment from individual judgments. Removing some of the pre-assumed conditions would mitigate the problem but may still lead to too restrictive solutions. It was proved that if completeness is removed but other plausible conditions are kept, the only possible aggregation functions are oligarchic, which means that the group judgment is purely determined by a certain subset of participating judges. Instead of further challenging the other conditions, this paper investigates how the judgment from each individual judge affects the group judgment in an oligarchic environment. We explore a set of intuitively demanded conditions under abstentions and design a feasible judgment aggregation rule based on the agentsâ hierarchy. We show this proposed aggregation rule satisfies the desirable conditions. More importantly, this rule is oligarchic with respect to a subset of agenda instead of the whole agenda due to its literal-based characteristics
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case
In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility and the space between, 2002), Nehring (Oligarchies in judgment aggregation: a characterization, 2006), Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 29(1):19-33, 2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (J Econ Theory 145(2):495-511, 2010a)
Group deliberation and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result
While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is relatively little formal work on the transformation of individual judgments in group deliberation. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility result: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible condition is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility result and argue that successful group deliberation must be âholisticâ: individuals cannot generally revise their judgments on a proposition based on judgments on that proposition alone but must take other propositions into account too. I discuss the significance of these findings for democratic theory
The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers who are new to the field of judgment aggregation a sense of this rapidly growing research area