SEC filings, regulatory deadlines, and capital market consequences

SYNOPSIS: Timely disclosure of financial statement information is a critical requirement for firms and wellfunctioning capital markets. Yet, every quarter or year, a non-trivial number of firms are late in filing their financial statements. This paper identifies and probes various capital market consequences for late filings of quarterly and annual financial statements. It examines the short- and long-window reaction to late filings, as well as how equity investors process statements accompanying late filing announcements, such as managers declaring intentions to file within/outside the SEC’s allowed grace periods. This paper documents that delayed quarterly filings have distinctly different valuation implications than delayed annual filings over the short and long run, and that accounting problems play a unique role in signaling the seriousness of the delay. It also shows that investors do not accept management’s delay-related assertions at face value, and that delayed filing announcements signal continued poor performance that is not fully reflected in stock prices at the time the announcements are made. Overall, this paper sheds new light on important capital market consequences of filing financial statements late

Paleoseismic History of the Dead Sea Fault Zone

International audienceThe aim of this entry is to describe the DSF as a transform plate boundary pointing out the rate of activedeformation, fault segmentation, and geometrical complexities as a control of earthquake ruptures. Thedistribution of large historical earthquakes from a revisited seismicity catalogue using detailedmacroseismic maps allows the correlation between the location of past earthquakes and fault segments.The recent results of paleoearthquake investigations (paleoseismic and archeoseismic) with a recurrenceinterval of large events and long-term slip rate are presented and discussed along with the identification ofseismic gaps along the fault. Finally, the implications for the seismic hazard assessment are also discussed

The ability of analysts’ recommendations to predict optimistic and pessimistic forecasts

Previous researches show that buy (growth) companies conduct income increasing earnings management in order to meet forecasts and generate positive forecast Errors (FEs). This behavior however, is not inherent in sell (non-growth) companies. Using the aforementioned background, this research hypothesizes that since sell companies are pressured to avoid income increasing earnings management, they are capable, and in fact more inclined, to pursue income decreasing Forecast Management (FM) with the purpose of generating positive FEs. Using a sample of 6553 firm-years of companies that are listed in the NYSE between the years 2005–2010, the study determines that sell companies conduct income decreasing FM to generate positive FEs. However, the frequency of positive FEs of sell companies does not exceed that of buy companies. Using the efficiency perspective, the study suggests that even though buy and sell companies have immense motivation in avoiding negative FEs, they exploit different but efficient strategies, respectively, in order to meet forecasts. Furthermore, the findings illuminated the complexities behind informative and opportunistic forecasts that falls under the efficiency versus opportunistic theories in literature

Fair Value Measurement Under Level 2 Inputs: Do Market and Transaction Multiples Catch Firm-Specific Risk Factors?

This paper focuses on fair value measurement under the IFRS 13 assumptions and the reliability of the market and transaction multiples evaluations (\u201cLevel 2\u201d methods). We test the reliability of multiples evaluation approaches in different economic sectors, by comparing the fair value of 1678 companies estimated by multiples with the effective market capitalization over 15 years. Multiples\u2019 fair value does not provide a reliable measure of a company\u2019s value, with a gap that varies depending upon portfolios and time. In the case of observable Level 2 fair value indicators for a market, such as market multiples, the company\u2019s fair value is not consistent with the real market value. Thus, whenever Level 2 indicators are not observable, the method is increasing volatility and intrinsic evaluation risk