Problems with Using Evolutionary Theory in Philosophy

Does science move toward truths? Are present scientific theories (approximately) true? Should we invoke truths to explain the success of science? Do our cognitive faculties track truths? Some philosophers say yes, while others say no, to these questions. Interestingly, both groups use the same scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory, to defend their positions. I argue that it begs the question for the former group to do so because their positive answers imply that evolutionary theory is warranted, whereas it is self-defeating for the latter group to do so because their negative answers imply that evolutionary theory is unwarranted

Designing Research

The aim of this chapter is to set out a process that researchers can follow to design a robust quantitative research study of occupant behavior in buildings. Central to this approach is an emphasis on intellectual clarity around what is being measured and why. To help achieve this clarity, researchers are encouraged to literally draw these relationships out in the form of a concept map capturing the theoretical model of the cause and effect between occupant motivations and energy use. Having captured diagrammatically how the system is thought to work, the next step is to formulate research questions or hypotheses capturing the relationship between variables in the theoretical model, and to start to augment the diagram with the measurands (things that can actually be measured) that are good proxies for each concept. Once these are identified, the diagram can be further augmented with one or more methods of measuring each measurand. The chapter argues that it is necessary to carefully define concepts and their presumed relationships, and to clearly state research questions and identify what the researcher intends to measure before starting data collection. The chapter also explains the ideas of reliability, validity, and uncertainty, and why knowledge about them is essential for any researcher

Interactive Realism

I investigate a new understanding of realism in science, referred to as ‘interactive realism’, and I suggest the ‘evolutionary progressiveness’ of a theory as novel criterion for this kind of realism. My basic claim is that we cannot be realists about anything except the progress affected by myriad science-reality interactions that are constantly moving on a continuum of increased ‘fitness’ determined according to empirical constraints. Moreover to reflect this movement accurately, there is a corresponding continuum of verdicts about the status of the knowledge conveyed by theories – ranging from stark instrumentalism to full-blown realism. This view may sound like a pessimistic inductivist's dream, but actually this is so only if one evaluates it from within a traditional context where the ‘truth’ of a single theory is the exclusive criterion for realism. I, on the other hand, want to redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that the units of assessment of realism are sequences of theories evaluated according to their ‘evolutionary progressiveness’. I unpack ‘interactive realism’ by defining my notion of ‘evolutionary progressiveness’, the notion of ‘truth-as-historied reference’ underpinning it, and the continuum of interaction between theories and aspects of reality it affects. I conclude that, although interactive realism is a radically non-standard kind of realism, it is at least more realistic about science as a fractured complex multi-faceted enterprise than most other kinds of realism on the block, because it shows coherence amidst fragmentation

Philosophy of science: Interfaces between logic and knowledge representation

In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science. I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today.South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 275-28

Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism

This Introduction has two foci: the first is a discussion of the motivation for and the aims of the 2014 conference on New Thinking about Scientific Realism in Cape Town South Africa, and the second is a brief contextualization of the contributed articles in this special issue of Synthese in the framework of the conference. Each focus is discussed in a separate section. © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media B.V