Uplifting manhood to wonderful heights? News coverage of the human costs of military conflict from world war I to Gulf war Two

Domestic political support is an important factor constraining the use of American military power around the world. Although the dynamics of war support are thought to reflect a cost-benefit calculus, with costs represented by numbers of friendly war deaths, no previous study has examined how information about friendly, enemy, and civilian casualties is routinely presented to domestic audiences. This paper establishes a baseline measure of historical casualty reporting by examining New York Times coverage of five major wars that occurred over the past century. Despite important between-war differences in the scale of casualties, the use of conscription, the type of warfare, and the use of censorship, the frequency of casualty reporting and the framing of casualty reports has remained fairly consistent over the past 100 years. Casualties are rarely mentioned in American war coverage. When casualties are reported, it is often in ways that minimize or downplay the human costs of war

Wars, Presidents and Popularity: The Political Cost(s) of War Re-Examined

Extensive research demonstrates that war casualties depress incumbent popularity. The present study argues that analyses of the political costs of warfare should also account for the financial toll of wars since a) financial costs of wars are substantial, b) these costs are publicly observed and understood and c) fiscal policy affects incumbents' approval ratings. Empirical evidence based on US data for the 1948-2008 period supports this theoretical claim: pecuniary costs of warfare either directly affect presidential popularity (e.g., in the Korean War) or their inclusion affects the predicted political cost of war casualties (e.g., in the Korean and Iraq/Afghanistan Wars). Interestingly, the adverse effect of war-spending is strongest under favourable economic conditions (i.e. low unemployment).Umfangreiche Forschungen zeigen, dass Kriegsopfer der Popularität des Amtsinhabers schaden. Die vorliegende Studie liefert Argumente dafür, dass Analysen der politischen Kosten der Kriegsführung in die Berechnung der finanziellen Kriegsausgaben miteinbezogen werden sollten, da a) die finanziellen Kosten von Kriegen beträchtlich sind, b) diese Kosten von der Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommen und verstanden werden, c) Fiskalpolitik die Umfragewerte des Amtsinhabers beeinflusst. Basierend auf US-Daten über den Zeitraum 1948-2008 wird dieser theoretische Anspruch empirisch unterstützt: pekuniäre Kosten der Kriegsführung haben entweder direkt eine Auswirkung auf die Popularität des Präsidenten (z. B. Koreakrieg) oder deren Einbeziehung beeinflusst die vorhergesagten politischen Kosten durch Kriegsopfer (z. B. Korea- und Irak/-Afghanistankrieg). Interessanterweise sind die negativen Auswirkungen der Kriegsausgaben am stärksten, wenn die wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen günstig (d.h. niedrige Arbeitslosigkeit) sind

Investigating the president: Committee probes and presidential approval, 1953-2006

Members of Congress have long sought to combat assertions of presidential power and alleged executive misconduct through committee investigations. But are such investigations mere political theater, or do they have systematic effects on the course of politics? We argue that congressional investigations of the executive branch damage the president's support among the public, making investigations a useful tool in interbranch battles. Marshaling an original data set of more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion data, we show that increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases the president's job approval rating. A survey experiment both confirms our assertion that investigations decrease public support for the White House and shows that committee-led charges of misconduct have a greater influence on public opinion than identical charges not attributed to a congressional actor. Copyright © Southern Political Science Association 2014

Resistance to COVID-19 vaccination and the social contract: evidence from Italy

Abstract Confronted with stalled vaccination efforts against COVID-19, many governments embraced mandates and other measures to incentivize vaccination that excluded the unvaccinated from aspects of social and economic life. Even still, many citizens remained unvaccinated. We advance a social contract framework for understanding who remains unvaccinated and why. We leverage both observational and individual-level survey evidence from Italy to study the relationship between vaccination status and social context, social trust, political partisanship, and adherence to core institutional structures such as the rule of law and collective commitments. We find that attitudes toward the rule of law and collective commitments outside the domain of vaccination are strongly associated with compliance with vaccine mandates and incentives. Partisanship also corresponds with vaccine behaviors, as supporters of parties whose leaders criticized aggressive policies to incentivize or mandate vaccination and emphasized individual liberty are least likely to comply. Our findings suggest appeals emphasizing individual benefits may be more effective than appeals emphasizing collective responsibility