3,194 research outputs found
The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation
Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection
that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection
Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange
Under what conditions do social preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: Each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the players’ preferences for the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto efficient. The results have implications for interpreting the rotten kid theorem, gift exchange in the laboratory, and gift exchange in the field
Evolutionary Roots of Property Rights; The Natural and Cultural Nature of Human Cooperation
Debates about the role of natural and cultural selection in the development of prosocial, antisocial and socially neutral mechanisms and behavior raise questions that touch property rights, cooperation, and conflict. For example, some researchers suggest that cooperation and prosociality evolved by natural selection (Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, De Waal 2013, 2014), while others claim that natural selection is insufficient for the evolution of cooperation, which required in addition cultural selection (Sterelny 2013, Bowles and Gintis 2003, Seabright 2013, Norenzayan 2013). Some scholars focus on the complexity and hierarchical nature of the evolution of cooperation as involving different tools associated with lower and the higher levels of competition (Nowak 2006, Okasha 2006); others suggest that humans genetically inherited heuristics that favor prosocial behavior such as generosity, forgiveness or altruistic punishment (Ridley 1996, Bowles and Gintis 2004, Rolls 2005). We argue these mechanisms are not genetically inherited; rather, they are features inherited through cultural selection. To support this view we invoke inclusive fitness theory, which states that individuals tend to maximize their inclusive fitness, rather than maximizing group fitness. We further reject the older notion of natural group selection - as well as more recent versions (West, Mouden, Gardner 2011) – which hold that natural selection favors cooperators within a group (Wynne-Edwards 1962). For Wynne-Edwards, group selection leads to group adaptations; the survival of individuals therefore depends on the survival of the group and a sharing of resources. Individuals who do not cooperate, who are selfish, face extinction due to rapid and over-exploitation of resources
Spatial prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering in Newman-Watts small-world networks
A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in
Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are
introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a
pure strategist and can only take one of three strategies (\emph {cooperator},
\emph {defector}, and \emph {loner}); its strategical transformation is
associated with both the number of strategical states and the magnitude of
average profits, which are adopted and acquired by its coplayers in the
previous round of play; a stochastic strategy mutation is applied when it gets
into the trouble of \emph {local commons} that the agent and its neighbors are
in the same state and get the same average payoffs. In the case of very low
temptation to defect, it is found that agents are willing to participate in the
game in typical small-world region and intensive collective oscillations arise
in more random region.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the
costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of
cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how
costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using
the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic
experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild
punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more
effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The
benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse
conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions.
If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to
higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented
results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from
imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do
wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the
paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be
utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate
collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By
peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do
depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of
unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other
hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large,
the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with
free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool"
from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized
sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is
sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and
to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition
leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order
free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Report
Benevolent characteristics promote cooperative behaviour among humans
Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly
observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments
with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they
should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own
individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects:
some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting
cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this
heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We
have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as
a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else
beyond one's own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous
Prisoner's dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity
aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of
people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with
cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and
cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour
makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think
malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more
Magnetized Iron Atmospheres for Neutron Stars
Using a Hartree-Fock formalism, we estimate energy levels and photon cross
sections for atomic iron in magnetic fields B ~ 10^13 G. Computing ionization
equilibrium and normal mode opacities with these data, we construct LTE neutron
star model atmospheres at 5.5 < Log(T_eff) < 6.5 and compute emergent spectra.
We examine the dependence of the emergent spectra on T_eff and B. We also show
the spectral variation with the angle between the magnetic field and the
atmosphere normal and describe the significant limb darkening in the X-ray
band. These results are compared with recent detailed computations of neutron
star H model atmospheres in high fields and with low field Fe and H model
atmospheres constructed from detailed opacities. The large spectral differences
for different surface compositions may be discernible with present X-ray data;
we also note improvements needed to allow comparison of Fe models with high
quality spectra.Comment: 18 pages with 5 eps figures, accepted for publication in ApJ Replaced
due to clerical error only: one more author, no new conten
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