Quantum Bayesian implementation

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world.Comment: 14 pages, 3 figure

On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers

In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid for an uncertain supply of excess resources. Standard market environments suggest that an optimal design uses just one type of market. We show the prevalence of a dual market system can be explained by heterogeneous risk attitudes of customers. In our stylized model, we consider unit demand risk-averse bidders. We show the model admits a unique equilibrium, with higher revenue and higher welfare than using only spot markets. Furthermore, as risk aversion increases, the usage of the on-demand market increases. We conclude that risk attitudes are an important factor in cloud resource allocation and should be incorporated into models of cloud markets.Comment: Appeared at WINE 201

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued

LP-based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy cannot be bounded by a constant (e.g. [6, 7, 11, 5, 2]). In particular, we describe a vertex cover game with a price of anarchy of 2. The rules of the games capture the structure of the linear programming relaxations of the underlying optimization problems, and our bounds are established by analyzing these relaxations. Furthermore, for linear costs we exhibit linear time best response dynamics that converge to these almost optimal Nash equilibria. These dynamics mimic the classical greedy approximation algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3]

Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

While auction research, including asymmetric auctions, has grown significantly in recent years, there is still little analytical solutions of first-price auctions outside the symmetric case. Even in the uniform case, Griesmer et al. (1967) and Plum (1992) find solutions only to the case where the lower bounds of the two distributions are the same. We present the general analytical solutions to asymmetric auctions in the uniform case for two bidders, both with and without a minimum bid. We show that our solution is consistent with the previously known solutions of auctions with uniform distributions. Several interesting examples are presented including a class where the two bid functions are linear. We hope this result improves our understanding of auctions and provides a useful tool for future research in auctions

Regulación de la expresión de acuaporina-4 por hormonas ováricas en el contexto de encefalopatía hiponatrémica

Las mujeres en edad reproductiva son un grupo de riesgo para el desarrollo de daño cerebral secundario a encefalopatía hiponatrémica. Este hallazgo se ha confirmado también en modelos animales. La acuaporina-4 (AQP4), isoforma más abundante en el cerebro, se considera como un modulador crítico de la homeostasis del agua y los iones en el cerebro. Previamente demostramos que la expresión de AQP4 en el cerebro muestra dimorfismo sexual. En un modelo experimental de encefalopatía hiponatrémica en ratas vimos que la expresión proteica de AQP4 aumentaba significativamente en ratas hembras hiponatremicas. Sin embargo no se conoce cuál es el mecanismo que produce este aumento.Facultad de Ciencias Médica

Regulación de la expresión de acuaporina-4 por hormonas ováricas en el contexto de encefalopatía hiponatrémica

Las mujeres en edad reproductiva son un grupo de riesgo para el desarrollo de daño cerebral secundario a encefalopatía hiponatrémica. Este hallazgo se ha confirmado también en modelos animales. La acuaporina-4 (AQP4), isoforma más abundante en el cerebro, se considera como un modulador crítico de la homeostasis del agua y los iones en el cerebro. Previamente demostramos que la expresión de AQP4 en el cerebro muestra dimorfismo sexual. En un modelo experimental de encefalopatía hiponatrémica en ratas vimos que la expresión proteica de AQP4 aumentaba significativamente en ratas hembras hiponatremicas. Sin embargo no se conoce cuál es el mecanismo que produce este aumento.Facultad de Ciencias Médica

Heterogeneity and the dynamics of technology adoption

We estimate the demand for a videocalling technology in the presence of both network effects and heterogeneity. Using a unique dataset from a large multinational firm, we pose and estimate a fully dynamic model of technology adoption. We propose a novel identification strategy based on post-adoption technology usage to disentangle equilibrium beliefs concerning the evolution of the network from observed and unobserved heterogeneity in technology adoption costs and use benefits. We find that employees have significant heterogeneity in both adoption costs and network benefits, and have preferences for diverse networks. Using our estimates, we evaluate a number of counterfactual adoption policies, and find that a policy of strategically targeting the right subtype for initial adoption can lead to a faster-growing and larger network than a policy of uncoordinated or diffuse adoption