Detecting Test Clones with Static Analysis

Large-scale software systems often have correspondingly complicated test suites, which are diffi cult for developers to construct and maintain. As systems evolve, engineers must update their test suite along with changes in the source code. Tests created by duplicating and modifying previously existing tests (clones) can complicate this task. Several testing technologies have been proposed to mitigate cloning in tests, including parametrized unit tests and test theories. However, detecting opportunities to improve existing test suites is labour intensive. This thesis presents a novel technique for etecting similar tests based on type hierarchies and method calls in test code. Using this technique, we can track variable history and detect test clones based on test assertion similarity. The thesis further includes results from our empirical study of 10 benchmark systems using this technique which suggest that test clone detection by our technique will aid test de-duplication eff orts in industrial systems

Incidence of childhood leukaemia in the vicinity of nuclear sites in France, 1990–1998

Overall, 670 cases (O) of childhood leukaemia were diagnosed within 20 km of the 29 French nuclear installations between 1990 and 1998 compared to an expected number (E) of 729.09 cases (O/E=0.92, 95% confidence interval (CI)=[0.85-0.99]). Each of the four areas defined around the sites showed non significant deficits of cases (0-5 km: O=65, O/E=0.87, CI=[0.67-1.10]; 5-10 km: O=165, O/E=0.95, CI=[0.81-1.10]; 10-15 km: O=220, O/E=0.88, CI=[0.77-1.00]; 15-20 km: O=220, O/E=0.96, CI=[0.84-1.10]). There was no evidence of a trend in standardised incidence ratio with distance from the sites for all children or for any of the three age groups studied. Similar results were obtained when the start-up year of the electricity-generating nuclear sites and their electric nuclear power were taken into account. No evidence was found of a generally increased risk of childhood leukaemia around the 29 French nuclear sites under study during 1990-1998

Tight Private Circuits: Achieving Probing Security with the Least Refreshing

Masking is a common countermeasure to secure implementations against side-channel attacks. In 2003, Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner introduced a formal security model, named t-probing model, which is now widely used to theoretically reason on the security of masked implementations. While many works have provided security proofs for small masked components, called gadgets, within this model, no formal method allowed to securely compose gadgets with a tight number of shares (namely, t + 1) until recently. In 2016, Barthe et al. filled this gap with maskComp, a tool checking the security of masking schemes composed of several gadgets. This tool can achieve provable security with tight number of shares by inserting mask-refreshing gadgets at carefully selected locations. However the method is not tight in the sense that there exists some compositions of gadgets for which it cannot exhibit a flaw nor prove the security. As a result, it is overconservative and might insert more refresh gadgets than actually needed to ensure t-probing security. In this paper, we exhibit the first tool, referred to as tightPROVE, able to clearly state whether a shared circuit composed of standard gadgets (addition, multiplication, and refresh) is t-probing secure or not. Given such a composition, our tool either produces a probing-security proof (valid at any order) or exhibits a security flaw that directly implies a probing attack at a given order. Compared to maskComp, tightPROVE can drastically reduce the number of required refresh gadgets to get a probing security proof, and thus the randomness requirement for some secure shared circuits. We apply our method to a recent AES implementation secured with higher-order masking in bitslice and we show that we can save all the refresh gadgets involved in the s-box layer, which results in an significant performance gain

Random Probing Security: Verification, Composition, Expansion and New Constructions

International audienceThe masking countermeasure is among the most powerful countermeasures to counteract side-channel attacks. Leakage models have been exhibited to theoretically reason on the security of such masked implementations. So far, the most widely used leakage model is the probing model defined by Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner at (CRYPTO 2003). While it is advantageously convenient for security proofs, it does not capture an adversary exploiting full leakage traces as, e.g., in horizontal attacks. Those attacks target the multiple manipulations of the same share to reduce noise and recover the corresponding value. To capture a wider class of attacks another model was introduced and is referred to as the random probing model. From a leakage parameter p, each wire of the circuit leaks its value with probability p. While this model much better reflects the physical reality of side channels, it requires more complex security proofs and does not yet come with practical constructions. In this paper, we define the first framework dedicated to the random probing model. We provide an automatic tool, called VRAPS, to quantify the random probing security of a circuit from its leakage probability. We also formalize a composition property for secure random probing gadgets and exhibit its relation to the strong non-interference (SNI) notion used in the context of probing security. We then revisit the expansion idea proposed by Ananth, Ishai, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2018) and introduce a compiler that builds a random probing secure circuit from small base gadgets achieving a random probing expandability property. We instantiate this compiler with small gadgets for which we verify the expected properties directly from our automatic tool. Our construction can tolerate a leakage probability up to 2 −8 , against 2 −25 for the previous construction, with a better asymptotic complexity

Unifying Leakage Models: From Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage

A recent trend in cryptography is to formally show the leakage resilience of cryptographic implementations in a given leakage model. One of the most prominent leakage models -- the so-called bounded leakage model -- assumes that the amount of leakage is a-priori bounded. Unfortunately, it has been pointed out that the assumption of bounded leakages is hard to verify in practice. A more realistic assumption is to assume that leakages are sufficiently noisy, following the engineering observation that real-world physical leakages are inherently noisy. While the noisy leakage assumption has first been studied in the seminal work of Chari et al. (CRYPTO 99), the recent work of Prouff and Rivain (Eurocrypt 2013) provides the first analysis of a full masking scheme under a physically motivated noise model. In particular, the authors show that a block-cipher implementation that uses an additive masking scheme is secure against noisy leakages. Unfortunately, the security analysis of Prouff and Rivain has three important shortcomings: (1) it requires leak-free gates, (2) it considers a restricted adversarial model (random message attacks), and (3) the security proof has limited application for cryptographic settings. In this work, we provide an alternative security proof in the same noisy model that overcomes these three challenges. We achieve this goal by a new reduction from noisy leakage to the important theoretical model of probing adversaries (Ishai et al~ -- CRYPTO 2003). Our work can be viewed as a next step of closing the gap between theory and practice in leakage resilient cryptography: while our security proofs heavily rely on concepts of theoretical cryptography, we solve problems in practically motivated leakage models

FourQ on Embedded Devices with Strong Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks

This work deals with the energy-efficient, high-speed and high-security implementation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication, elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange and elliptic curve digital signatures on embedded devices using FourQ and incorporating strong countermeasures to thwart a wide variety of side-channel attacks. First, we set new speed records for constant-time curve-based scalar multiplication, DH key exchange and digital signatures at the 128-bit security level with implementations targeting 8, 16 and 32-bit microcontrollers. For example, our software computes a static ECDH shared secret in 6.9 million cycles (or 0.86 seconds @8MHz) on a low-power 8-bit AVR microcontroller which, compared to the fastest Curve25519 and genus-2 Kummer implementations on the same platform, offers 2x and 1.4x speedups, respectively. Similarly, it computes the same operation in 496 thousand cycles on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller, achieving a factor-2.9 speedup when compared to the fastest Curve25519 implementation targeting the same platform. A similar speed performance is observed in the case of digital signatures. Second, we engineer a set of side-channel countermeasures taking advantage of FourQ\u27s rich arithmetic and propose a secure implementation that offers protection against a wide range of sophisticated side-channel attacks, including differential power analysis (DPA). Despite the use of strong countermeasures, the experimental results show that our FourQ software is still efficient enough to outperform implementations of Curve25519 that only protect against timing attacks. Finally, we perform a differential power analysis evaluation of our software running on an ARM Cortex-M4, and report that no leakage was detected with up to 10 million traces. These results demonstrate the potential of deploying FourQ on low-power applications such as protocols for the Internet of Things