Automated plotting of equipotentials

By substitution of resistance paper for normal plotting paper, an x-y plotter can be used to draw automatically the equipotential lines between components represented in planar form on the paper. This technique is used for high voltage electronic components of complex configuration for the prediction of stress in the intervening insulation

Lake Attitash Management Plan; 2010

Management Plan and Comprehensive Lake Inventory of Lake Attitash in Amesbury/ Merrimac, M

Cases on Suretyship

A casebook with selected cases to aid the teaching of suretyship.https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/1020/thumbnail.jp

The Judicial Code of March 3, 1911

Near the close of its last session, the Sixty-first Congress passed an act entitled An Act to codify, revise and amend the laws relating to the judiciary. Approved March 3, 1911, which, by its own terms, Sec. 296, is to be designated and cited as THE JUDICIAL CODE. This act is to become operative on and after Jan. 1, 1912

The Negotiable Instruments Law With Annotations

The Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted by the Legislature of Michigan at its 1905 session and on this 16th day of September, 1905, becomes a law of the State. Soon after the approval of the Act -- June 16, 1905, -- I undertook the work of annotating the statute and of explaining its origin, scope and purpose in such particulars as seemed to invite explanation.... I submit the result of my work -- undertaken in the hope that it might help the profession and the bankers and the business men in dealing with this statute -- to all who may find occasion to make use of it ...https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/1068/thumbnail.jp

The Judicial Code of March 3, 1911

Near the close of its last session, the Sixty-first Congress passed an act entitled An Act to codify, revise and amend the laws relating to the judiciary. Approved March 3, 1911, which, by its own terms, Sec. 296, is to be designated and cited as THE JUDICIAL CODE. This act is to become operative on and after Jan. 1, 1912

Sane Procedural Reform

In these later days much is said about reforming the procedure of our courts, about recalllng our judges, at arbitrarily appointed times, and about reversing their decisions by popular vote. Most of what is said about these matters is said by those who have least reason to say it. It is no exaggeration to assert that those who are most severe in their criticism of the courts and of their procedure and most lavish in their suggestions of reform are they who know little, beyond the most general, about the courts and nothing about their procedure from personal contact with it. From such a class of self-constituted reformers lawyers and judges are not the only sufferers. All kinds of professions, all sorts of people have to submit to their pretentions and endure their intermeddling. Courts are not perfect. Law is not an exact science. It goes without saying that different men chosen to decide controversies among their fellows may reach, in the economy of nature will reach, different conclusions in respect to such controversies and the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, and that too, whether they be judges appointed by the law or arbitrators chosen by the parties, whether they be referees or jurors; and in reaching their separate but different conclusions each will be governed by no motive other than to pronounce a righteous judgment. The human element was a large factor in the controversy when it began; it became a larger factor as the controversy proceeded and increased in intensity until the controversy was finally determined. In the administration of the law, the human element is and ought to be present. There is the man first, the judge next. But the judges of our courts, susceptible to the suggestions of the human element, as they must necessarily be, yield to its appeals less than any other body of men. Our better nature would revolt, it in the judgments of our courts, justices were not sometimes tempered with mercy. We all know that the quality of the judge depends in a very large degree upon his ability to subordinate the feelings, the sympathy, the unconscious bias of the man to the duty of the magistrate. All of us, I dare say, have been surprised to observe, at times, how fully some judges are able to merge the man into the magistrate when they are exercising their judicial functions. It is a rare gift, an exceptional quality, and happy is he, fortunate is he, great is he, who has it. No reasonable being pretends that the decisions of our courts will be just, sound or reasonable in every case. The limitations upon human wisdom and upon the virtue common to mankind forbid that. I want to emphasize my belIef that the overwhelming majority of our intelligent, observing, thoughtful, well-meaning citizens--laymen and lawyers alike, rest secure in the conviction that, in the main and with comparatively few exceptions, the decisions of our courts are just and proper and their judgments righteous altogether; that they are conceived in reason and founded on sound principles; that they enforce the rights of parties to controversies as they should be enforced and impose liabilities in accordance with right and justice, as right and justice are understood, interpreted and practiced by fair-minded, honest men. Altogether, the great controlling body of our decisions is such as would have been made by intelligent, fair-minded men, capable men of affairs. Without impairment of their general soundness, it may be admitted that decisions sometimes proceed upon technical rather than logical considerations, that sometimes they are arbitrary rather than reasonable, sometimes radically opposed without apparent cause

Recent Legal Literature

Sohm: The Institutes--A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law; Childs: Handbook of the Law of Suretyship and Guarant

The New Federal Equity Rules

On November 4, 1912 the Supreme Court of the United States, by formal order, adopted and established a code of rules for the courts of equity of the United States, which should take the place of all rules theretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court and then in force. Rule 81 provides: These rules shall be in force on and after February 1, 1913, and shall govern all proceedings in cases then pending or thereafter brought, save that where in any then pending cause an order has been made or act done which cannot be changed without doing substantial injustice, the court may give effect to such order or act to the extent necessary to avoid any such injustice. All rules theretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court, regulating the practice in suits in equity, shall be abrogated when these rules take effect. In pursuance of said order the rules so promulgated now regulate the procedure in the federal courts of equity. Yielding to a request which he is willing to regard as a demand for the discharge of an obligation, the writer ventures to submit some observations on the authority for making said rules, the occasion of their making, the manner in which the work was done, and the changes wrought by them in the equity procedure of the federal courts