The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court Has Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges

This Article explores the practical impacts of the Court’s class-action jurisprudence from 30,000 feet, observing that, with some notable exceptions, the Court has nibbled away at the rough edges of class-action procedure while passing on chances to dictate more drastic reform. Part II is a chronological summary of notable Roberts Court cases that have come to define its approach toward class litigation. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court eased its way to this point, neglecting to grant certiorari in any significant class-action cases for the first four years after the swearing in of Chief Justice Roberts in 2005. That changed in 2009 when the Court began to grant certiorari over a group of cases that are widely perceived as changing the landscape of class litigation. In Part III, the Article examines the practical impacts of the Court’s class-action decisions and its certiorari denials, concluding that the Court seems to be focused on fine-tuning class-action procedure rather than ending it. The Court’s restrained attitude is reflected by a hesitancy to make broad pronouncements in the class action cases it decides and in its selectivity in choosing cases to begin with. Also in Part III, the Article explores how the Court’s reluctance to issue broad landscape-changing rulings has left breathing room for lower courts to fill in the doctrinal gaps. The Court has undeniably dictated a large amount of change in a few specific areas, especially in the arena of arbitration and class waivers. But the impact of change has been just as overstated regarding topics such as standard of review, federalism, merits consideration, employment, and overbroad classes—all areas that remain friendly enough to class actions that the procedure continues to thrive. Indeed, activity among the lower courts on class-action jurisprudence has often enabled the Court to approve of standards already in place, rather than write new class-action rules. In Part IV, the Article examines the areas of class-action opportunities that the Court either has not addressed yet or simply has overlooked. In some cases, the Court’s lack of action has enabled classaction practice to thrive, whereas in other areas, the Court’s guidance may be needed to provide clearer guidelines, much in the way the Court has done with respect to class waivers in arbitration agreements. The Article concludes by pointing out that this is not a Court that seems intent on ending class litigation or even significantly culling it. Instead, the Court appears quite comfortable pulling, tugging, and shaping the edges of class-action practice. Remarkably, though aggregate litigation looks different in many ways now than it did before the Roberts Court era, much of that change has come from the lower courts. The Supreme Court’s influence is reflected mainly in its endorsement of lower court

High Throughput Method to Quantify Anterior-Posterior Polarity of T-Cells and Epithelial Cells

The virologic synapse (VS), which is formed between a virus-infected and uninfected cell, plays a central role in the transmission of certain viruses, such as HIV and HTLV-1. During VS formation, HTLV-1-infected T-cells polarize cellular and viral proteins toward the uninfected T-cell. This polarization resembles anterior-posterior cell polarity induced by immunological synapse (IS) formation, which is more extensively characterized than VS formation and occurs when a T-cell interacts with an antigen-presenting cell. One measure of cell polarity induced by both IS or VS formation is the repositioning of the microtubule organizing center (MTOC) relative to the contact point with the interacting cell. Here we describe an automated, high throughput system to score repositioning of the MTOC and thereby cell polarity establishment. The method rapidly and accurately calculates the angle between the MTOC and the IS for thousands of cells. We also show that the system can be adapted to score anterior-posterior polarity establishment of epithelial cells. This general approach represents a significant advancement over manual cell polarity scoring, which is subject to experimenter bias and requires more time and effort to evaluate large numbers of cells

Effect of cytomegalovirus infection on breastfeeding transmission of HIV and on the health of infants born to HIV-infected mothers

Cytomegalovirus (CMV) infection can be acquired in utero or postnatally through horizontal transmission and breastfeeding. The effect of postnatal CMV infection on postnatal HIV transmission is unknown

Plasma Micronutrient Concentrations Are Altered by Antiretroviral Therapy and Lipid-Based Nutrient Supplements in Lactating HIV-Infected Malawian Women

Background: Little is known about the influence of antiretroviral therapy with or without micronutrient supplementation on the micronutrient concentrations of HIV-infected lactating women in resource-constrained settings

Adherence to extended postpartum antiretrovirals is associated with decreased breast milk HIV-1 transmission

Estimate association between postpartum antiretroviral adherence and breastmilk HIV-1 transmissio

The Unambiguous Supremacy Clause

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence has reached a confusing junction. The Court recently declined to say whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action for federal court litigants. As a result, lower courts and litigants are caught between conflicting doc-trines: one that suggests and one that denies that the Supremacy Clause confers causes of action. Neither line of cases definitively answers the question. A cause of action is necessary for a federal court plaintiff to bring suit. This Note explores whether potential plaintiffs should be able to rely on the Supremacy Clause when applicable federal law does not otherwise confer a cause of action. Navigating the history of the Supremacy Clause, the contours of dueling lines of precedent, and policy ramifications, the Note concludes that, in the midst of the confusion, state defendants have a strong argument that the Supremacy Clause does not confer plaintiffs a cause of action