Reliability for Degrees of Belief

We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, high reliability leads to high levels of truth-possession. However, when it comes to degrees of belief, reliability and truth-possession part ways. The natural answer thus fails to be a good way to evaluate degrees of belief for reliability. I propose and develop an alternative method based on the notion of calibration, suggested by Frank Ramsey, which does not have this problem and consider why we should care about such assessments of reliability even if they are not tied directly to truth-possession

A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker\u27s main targets—survives Berker\u27s arguments unscathed

Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules

Suppose that beliefs come in degrees. How should we then measure the accuracy of these degrees of belief? Scoring rules are usually thought to be the mathematical tool appropriate for this job. But there are many scoring rules, which lead to different ordinal accuracy rankings. Recently, Fallis and Lewis (2016) have given an argument that, if sound, rules out many of the many popular scoring rules, including the Brier score, as genuine measures of accuracy. I respond to this argument, in part by noting that the argument fails to account for verisimilitude that certain false hypotheses might be closer to the truth than other false hypotheses. Oddie (forthcoming), however, has argued that no member of a very wide class of scoring rules (the so- called proper scores) can appropriately handle verisimilitude. I explain how to respond to Oddie\u27s argument and recommend a class of weighted scoring rules that, I argue, genuinely measure accuracy while escaping the arguments of Fallis and Lewis as well as Oddie

Group Epistemic Value

Sometimes we are interested in how groups are doing epistemically in aggregate. For instance, we may want to know the epistemic impact of a change in school curriculum or the epistemic impact of abolishing peer review in the sciences. Being able to say something about how groups are doing epistemically is especially important if one is interested in pursuing a consequentialist approach to social epistemology of the sort championed by Goldman (Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). According to this approach we evaluate social practices and institutions from an epistemic perspective based on how well they promote the aggregate level of epistemic value across a community. The aim of this paper is to investigate this concept of group epistemic value and defend a particular way of measuring it

Lessons Learned from Closing Three Major Landfills – the Devil Really is in the Details

During the past 30 years the author has been involved in a number of landfill closure projects. No two were ever the same, and all were interesting. Three closure projects stand out for the level of effort involved, the rigor of regulatory review, and the issues that occurred during construction, a number of which could have been headed off during design. One site was a major hazardous waste disposal facility and Superfund site; the second, the Fresno Sanitary Landfill, was the oldest sanitary landfill for municipal solid waste in the United States, having opened in 1937 and is also a Superfund site; and the third the San Marcos Landfill in San Diego County underwent final closure with a monolithic evapotranspirative cover composed of blended soils and planted with native plants under a strict court ordered revegetation plan. All three facilities have now undergone final closure and are performing satisfactorily. However, in hindsight there are lessons to be learned and there could have been significant cost savings both in design and in construction

Group epistemic value

Sometimes we are interested in how groups are doing epistemically in aggregate. For instance, we may want to know the epistemic impact of a change in school curriculum or the epistemic impact of abolishing peer review in the sciences. Being able to say something about how groups are doing epistemically is especially important if one is interested in pursuing a consequentialist approach to social epistemology of the sort championed by Goldman (Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). According to this approach we evaluate social practices and institutions from an epistemic perspective based on how well they promote the aggregate level of epistemic value across a community. The aim of this paper is to investigate this concept of group epistemic value and defend a particular way of measuring it.publishedVersionPaid Open Acces

The multi-disciplinary art and science of cancer care: integrating psycho-oncology

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