Towards a Proof Theory of G\"odel Modal Logics

Analytic proof calculi are introduced for box and diamond fragments of basic modal fuzzy logics that combine the Kripke semantics of modal logic K with the many-valued semantics of G\"odel logic. The calculi are used to establish completeness and complexity results for these fragments

A coalgebraic view of bar recursion and bar induction

We reformulate the bar recursion and induction principles in terms of recursive and wellfounded coalgebras. Bar induction was originally proposed by Brouwer as an axiom to recover certain classically valid theorems in a constructive setting. It is a form of induction on non- wellfounded trees satisfying certain properties. Bar recursion, introduced later by Spector, is the corresponding function defnition principle. We give a generalization of these principles, by introducing the notion of barred coalgebra: a process with a branching behaviour given by a functor, such that all possible computations terminate. Coalgebraic bar recursion is the statement that every barred coalgebra is recursive; a recursive coalgebra is one that allows defnition of functions by a coalgebra-to-algebra morphism. It is a framework to characterize valid forms of recursion for terminating functional programs. One application of the principle is the tabulation of continuous functions: Ghani, Hancock and Pattinson defned a type of wellfounded trees that represent continuous functions on streams. Bar recursion allows us to prove that every stably continuous function can be tabulated to such a tree where by stability we mean that the modulus of continuity is also continuous. Coalgebraic bar induction states that every barred coalgebra is well-founded; a wellfounded coalgebra is one that admits proof by induction

Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Anxious Adolescents: Developmental Influences on Treatment Design and Delivery

Anxiety disorders in adolescence are common and disruptive, pointing to a need for effective treatments for this age group. Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) is one of the most popular interventions for adolescent anxiety, and there is empirical support for its application. However, a significant proportion of adolescent clients continue to report anxiety symptoms post-treatment. This paper underscores the need to attend to the unique developmental characteristics of the adolescent period when designing and delivering treatment, in an effort to enhance treatment effectiveness. Informed by the literature from developmental psychology, developmental psychopathology, and clinical child and adolescent psychology, we review the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of developmentally appropriate CBT for anxious adolescents. ‘Why’ it is important to consider developmental factors in designing and delivering CBT for anxious adolescents is addressed by examining the age-related findings of treatment outcome studies and exploring the influence of developmental factors, including cognitive capacities, on engagement in CBT. ‘How’ clinicians can developmentally tailor CBT for anxious adolescents in six key domains of treatment design and delivery is illustrated with suggestions drawn from both clinically and research-oriented literature. Finally, recommendations are made for research into developmentally appropriate CBT for anxious adolescents

Between history and values: A study on the nature of interpretation in international law

My thesis discusses the place of evaluative judgements in the interpretation of general international law. It concentrates on two questions. First, whether it is possible to interpret international legal practices without making an evaluative judgement about the point or value that provides the best justification of these practices. Second, whether the use of evaluative judgements in international legal interpretation threatens to undermine the objectivity of international law, the neutrality of international lawyers or the consensual and voluntary basis of the international legal system. I answer both questions in the negative. As regards the first, I argue that international legal practice has an interpretive structure, which combines appeals to the history of international practice with appeals to the principles and values that these practices are best understood as promoting. This interpretive structure is apparent not only in the claims of international lawyers about particular rules of international law (here I use the rule of estoppel as an example) but also in the most basic intuitions of international theorists about the theory and sources of general international law. I then argue that some popular concerns to the effect that the exercise of evaluation in the interpretation of international law will undermine the coherence or the usefulness of the discipline are generally unwarranted. The fact that international legal practice has an interpretive structure does not entail that propositions of international law are only subjectively true, that the interpreter enjoys license to manipulate their meaning for self-serving purposes, or that international law will collapse under the weight of irresolvable disagreements, divisions and conflicts about its proper interpretation

Brentano et les parties du mental: Une approche méréologique de l'intentionnalité phénoménale

In this paper I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole-relations rather than as a supervenience- or identity-relation. To begin, I discuss some reasons for being a (neo )Brentanian about the mind and briefly introduce the main characteristics of Brentano’s internalist description program. Then, I turn to the current ‘inseparatist’ way of dealing with intentionality and phenomenality, focusing on the demand for unity coming from advocates of phenomenal intentionality. I suggest that the unity of the mind may be put in a new light if we put aside metaphysical-epistemological questions, go back to Brentano’s description program, and endorse his thesis that the mental is something unified in which various parts must be distinguished. In the last section, I draw some lessons from this approach, holding that, for any representational content R, R is (in Brentano’s terms) an abstractive or ‘distinctional’ part of the relevant state, and that, for any qualitative aspect Q, Q is an abstractive or ‘distinctional’ part of the relevant representational content R.Renaissance de la Philosophie au tournant du XXe siècle: L'école de Franz Brentano (1866-1955