615 research outputs found
A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising
Sponsored search advertising is ascendant Jupiter Research reports
expenditures rose 28% in 2007 to 22 retail price of the software products advertised on the considered
search engine, this implies a conversion rate (sales per click) of about
1.1%, well within common estimates of 1-2% (gamedaily.com). Hence our
approach appears to yield valid estimates of advertiser click
valuations. Another finding is that customers appear to be segmented by
their clicking frequency, with frequent clickers placing a greater
emphasis on the position of the sponsored advertising link. Estimation
of the policy simulations is in progress
Who Benefits from Online Privacy?
When firms can identify their past customers, they may use information
about purchase histories in order to price discriminate. We present a
model with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers,
where consumers can opt out from being identified, possibly at a cost.
We find that when consumers can costlessly opt out, they all
individually choose privacy, which results in the highest profit for the
monopolist. In fact, all consumers are better off when opting out is
costly. When valuations are uniformly distributed, social surplus is
non-monotonic in the cost of opting out and is highest when opting out
is prohibitively costly. We introduce the notion of a privacy gatekeeper
— a third party that is able to act as a privacy conduit and set
the cost of opting out. We prove that the privacy gatekeeper only
charges the firm in equilibrium, making privacy costless to consumers
500 Tips for Open and Online Learning
Review of 500 Tips for Open and Online Learning
Phil Race
London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2nd revised edition, 2005, 188pp. ISBN-13: 978-0415342773 (pbk
INVESTING IN WORK: WILKES AS AN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE
This Article begins by introducing the doctrine of employment at-will and its contemporary operation, and applying the doctrine to the facts in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. The point of the exercise is making clear the impact of Wilkes from the standpoint of employment law. The Article next turns to scholarship examining the at-will rule as a default rule and the circumstances under which a default rule may become sticky. Against this background, the Article concludes by reexamining the holding in Wilkes along with subsequent developments in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions. These include the implications of buy-sell and comparable provisions in shareholder agreements. In the situations to which the Wilkes doctrine applies in Massachusetts and elsewhere, at-will is more likely to be a sticky default than in many other employment relationships. Several factors contribute to this conclusion, perhaps most strongly the imponderable (or un-pondered) question of how effective control over the corporation’s decision-making may shift in the future
Who Benefits from Online Privacy?
When firms can identify their past customers, they may use information
about purchase histories in order to price discriminate. We present a
model with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers,
where consumers can opt out from being identified, possibly at a cost.
We find that when consumers can costlessly opt out, they all
individually choose privacy, which results in the highest profit for the
monopolist. In fact, all consumers are better off when opting out is
costly. When valuations are uniformly distributed, social surplus is
non-monotonic in the cost of opting out and is highest when opting out
is prohibitively costly. We introduce the notion of a privacy gatekeeper
— a third party that is able to act as a privacy conduit and set
the cost of opting out. We prove that the privacy gatekeeper only
charges the firm in equilibrium, making privacy costless to consumers
INVESTING IN WORK: WILKES AS AN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE
This Article begins by introducing the doctrine of employment at-will and its contemporary operation, and applying the doctrine to the facts in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. The point of the exercise is making clear the impact of Wilkes from the standpoint of employment law. The Article next turns to scholarship examining the at-will rule as a default rule and the circumstances under which a default rule may become sticky. Against this background, the Article concludes by reexamining the holding in Wilkes along with subsequent developments in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions. These include the implications of buy-sell and comparable provisions in shareholder agreements. In the situations to which the Wilkes doctrine applies in Massachusetts and elsewhere, at-will is more likely to be a sticky default than in many other employment relationships. Several factors contribute to this conclusion, perhaps most strongly the imponderable (or un-pondered) question of how effective control over the corporation’s decision-making may shift in the future
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