On the prediction of stationary functional time series

This paper addresses the prediction of stationary functional time series. Existing contributions to this problem have largely focused on the special case of first-order functional autoregressive processes because of their technical tractability and the current lack of advanced functional time series methodology. It is shown here how standard multivariate prediction techniques can be utilized in this context. The connection between functional and multivariate predictions is made precise for the important case of vector and functional autoregressions. The proposed method is easy to implement, making use of existing statistical software packages, and may therefore be attractive to a broader, possibly non-academic, audience. Its practical applicability is enhanced through the introduction of a novel functional final prediction error model selection criterion that allows for an automatic determination of the lag structure and the dimensionality of the model. The usefulness of the proposed methodology is demonstrated in a simulation study and an application to environmental data, namely the prediction of daily pollution curves describing the concentration of particulate matter in ambient air. It is found that the proposed prediction method often significantly outperforms existing methods

Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities

In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-buildingExperimental Economics; Financial Transactions; Investment Game; Objective Risk; Trust

Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation : experimental evidence

Published in Revue économique, novembre 2019This paper reports results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax policies. We compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system with an ex-post taxation system in which payroll taxes are collected at the end of the fiscal year. Dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in an ex-post taxation system compared with the PAYE system. However, in anticipation of the higher sanction, the "tax authority" will not apply lower taxes in the former system. Communication does not decrease dissatisfaction in a significant manner, and it is not used extensively by participants.L’article présente les résultats d’une expérience basée sur une variante du jeu « power-to-take » avec des implications concernant les modalités de prélèvement de l’impôt sur le revenu. L’étude compare le système d’impôt à la source avec un système a posteriori, dans lequel l’impôt est prélevé bien après le moment où le contribuable a perçu le revenu brut. Dans cette seconde situation, les contribuables peuvent développer un sentiment de propriété du revenu total, et ressentir un mécontentement plus important, à taux d’imposition identique. Nos résultats indiquent que l’insatisfaction associée à l’impôt, mesurée par la sanction imposée sur l’agent qui prélève, est signi…cativement plus importante dans le système a posteriori comparée au prélèvement à la source. La communication vers le contribuable permet de réduire le taux de sanction, mais les participants n’exploitent pas vraiment cette opportunité

Trust and financial trades : lessons from an investment game wher reciprocators can hide behind probabilities

ESSEC Working paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC / Centre de recherche de l'ESSEC ISSN : 1291-9616 DR 10007This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive the reward for his investment, "bad luck" might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust

Can Rumors and Other Uninformative Messages Cause Illiquidity ?

In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors believe that the message has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a typical global game and would present a threshold equilibrium. If not, in theory both an equilibrium where all invest and an equilibrium where no one invests can occur. In a Lab experiment, a large number of subjects adopt switching strategies consistent with the threshold equilibrium and appear to respond to the orientation of the message. Insights apply to contagion and market manipulation episodes

The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information

Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy within a variant of the ultimatum game. The first player gets an endowment, and the second player can impose a tax on it. The former can reject the allocation submitted by the tax-setter. A third party is then allowed to levy its own tax, and its intake is private information to the tax-setter. In a frameless experiment, 65% of the subjects in the tax-setter role overstate the tax levied by the third party in order to manipulate taxpayer's expectations and submit less advantageous offers; on average, for every additional currency unit of lie, measured by the gap between the claimed and the actual tax, they would reduce their offer by 0.43 currency units

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections should increase. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment

Une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique et résultats d'une enquête menée en décembre 2009

Cette étude propose une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique avec une orientation macroéconomique et politique économique. Une enquête sur Internet a été effectuée en novembre/décembre 2009. Elle a permis de collecter 1542 questionnaires complets. Le taux moyen de bonnes réponses est relativement élevé, à 71%. Le niveau d¿études, une formation en économie, l¿utilisation des concepts économiques dans le cadre de l¿activité professionnelle ainsi que l¿intérêt porté à l¿actualité économique semblent être positivement corrélés avec le taux de bonnes réponses.

Une échelle de mesure de la connaissance en raisonnement économique et résultats d'une enquête menée en décembre 2009

We worked out a scale of economic reasoning skills with a macroeconomic and economic policy orientation. The test was administered via Internet in December 2009, and led to collection of 1542 complete questionnaires. The average rate of correct answers is relatively high, to 71%. The knowledgability of economic principles is positively related to general education, training in economics, personal interest for economics and recourse to economics in professional life.Economic Policy; Economics; France; Scale of Economic Knowledge; Test of Knowledge in Economics

Trust and financial trades : lessons from an investment game wher reciprocators can hide behind probabilities

This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive the reward for his investment, "bad luck" might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust.Trust ; Financial transactions ; Experimental economics ; Investment game ; External randomness