2,459 research outputs found

    Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games

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    We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period. Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of opponents' play, but believe that opponents never choose conditionally dominated strategies. Agents engage in active learning and update beliefs based on personal observations. Payoff information can refine or expand learning predictions, since patient young senders' experimentation incentives depend on which receiver responses they deem plausible. We show that with payoff knowledge, the limiting set of long-run learning outcomes is bounded above by rationality-compatible equilibria (RCE), and bounded below by uniform RCE. RCE refine the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and include all divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Uniform RCE sometimes but not always exists, and implies universally divine equilibrium.Comment: This material was previously part of a larger paper titled "Type-Compatible Equilibria in Signalling Games," which split into two smaller papers: "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games" and "Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games.

    Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games

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    Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments. Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver's off-path beliefs based on "type compatibility" and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection

    Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events

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    We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or a red die is tossed. The two dice land on side 11 with unknown probabilities p1p_1 and q1q_1, which can be arbitrarily low. Given a data-generating process where p1≥cq1p_1\ge c q_1, we are interested in how much data is required to guarantee that with high probability the observer's Bayesian posterior mean for p1p_1 exceeds (1−δ)c(1-\delta)c times that for q1q_1. If the prior densities for the two dice are positive on the interior of the parameter space and behave like power functions at the boundary, then for every ϵ>0,\epsilon>0, there exists a finite NN so that the observer obtains such an inference after nn periods with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon whenever np1≥Nnp_1\ge N. The condition on nn and p1p_1 is the best possible. The result can fail if one of the prior densities converges to zero exponentially fast at the boundary

    Collaboration and separation : how news companies find innovation

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    This research examines issues arising when employees at news media companies attempt to collaborate with each other to create, develop and execute strategies intended to enhance the organization's financial standing. The study involves a qualitative content analysis of interviews with individuals working in the editorial and various business (e.g., advertising, marketing) departments at various news organizations, including traditional (companies whose roots lie in print or broadcast) and new (digital-only) media. The research builds on the latest scholarship that examines how to create a culture within a news company that fosters innovation, be it process or product, and the dynamics at play between different departments at such companies. The findings support previous research that shows the age and type of news organization (traditional versus start-up) affect collaboration. The research also provides a pathway for developing a "best-practices" strategy to help foster change. The idea of creating "intrepreneurial" thinking -- entrepreneurial attitudes within a company -- is an emerging area in journalism scholarship and this work represents only a step that offers more research opportunities in the best collaborative practices

    SDSU Cow-Calf Teaching and Research Unit

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    The SDSU Cow/Calf Teaching and Research Unit serves as a resource for teaching, research, extension and student organizations. In addition to use in the classroom, cattle are used for the annual SDSU Little International, Block & Bridle activities, field days, and numerous 4-H, FFA, and other educational events. Recent research projects at the Unit include studies on estrus synchronization, winter supplementation, and absorption of colostrum. For teaching purposes, cattle that vary in calving ease, growth rate, mature size, and maternal value are maintained. It is not feasible to maintain all of the breeds that are important in this region. The herd consists of 100 purebred Angus and Simmental x Angus cows and their calves. Tables 1 and 2 show the average expected progeny differences for the current sires, replacement heifers and the 2002 calf cro

    DataGM:Curating an Environment for Change

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