archy and mehitabel

Archy and Mehitabel are two inimitable characters — a philosophical cockroach who types out free verse correspondence by dive-bombing the keys and an insouciant feline dancer out to take life for all it is worth, ever the lady and “toujours gai.” Created by Don Marquis and popularized in the New York Sun and New York Herald-Tribune 1916–1922, their best-loved exploits and musings are captured in this marvellous collection of 48 episodes, and illustrated with 29 cartoon drawings by George Herriman. Archy sees the universe at an entirely different angle, and humanity is measured against its miniature insect reflections. We meet cats and rats, spiders and flies, toads, robins, worms, a merry flea, a dissipated hornet, a froward lady bug, plus ghosts and echoes of dramatists, poets, historical figures, and the nightly denizens of the underworlds and alleys of New York, London, and gay Paris. Humorist Don Marquis (1878–1937) was a novelist, poet, columnist, playwright, and author of more than 25 books. Cartoonist George Herriman (1880–1944) is best known as the creator of Krazy Kat. doi:10.32873/unl.dc.zea.1343https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/zeabook/1138/thumbnail.jp

Harming the Dead

This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381331?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.No abstract is available for this item

VERSTEHEN AND EXPLANATION

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A defence of the potential future of value theory

In this issue of the journal Mark Brown has offered a new argument against my potential future of value theory. I argue that even though the premises of this new argument are far more defensible than the premises of his old argument, the new argument does not show that the potential future of value theory of the wrongness of killing is false. If the considerations to which Brown appeals are used, not to show that the potential future of value theory is false, but to show that abortion is morally permissible, they are also unsuccessful. I also argue that Brown's clarified self-re presented future of value account and Simon Parsons's account of the wrongness of killing are both subject to major difficulties. Finally, I show, in an appendix, that Brown's assertion that my discussion of his views suffers from major logical errors is false.Journal of Medical Ethics http://jme.bmjjournals.com