Crowdsourcing hypothesis tests: Making transparent how design choices shape research results

To what extent are research results influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design studies? Fifteen research teams independently designed studies to answer fiveoriginal research questions related to moral judgments, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Participants from two separate large samples (total N > 15,000) were then randomly assigned to complete one version of each study. Effect sizes varied dramatically across different sets of materials designed to test the same hypothesis: materials from different teams renderedstatistically significant effects in opposite directions for four out of five hypotheses, with the narrowest range in estimates being d = -0.37 to +0.26. Meta-analysis and a Bayesian perspective on the results revealed overall support for two hypotheses, and a lack of support for three hypotheses. Overall, practically none of the variability in effect sizes was attributable to the skill of the research team in designing materials, while considerable variability was attributable to the hypothesis being tested. In a forecasting survey, predictions of other scientists were significantly correlated with study results, both across and within hypotheses. Crowdsourced testing of research hypotheses helps reveal the true consistency of empirical support for a scientific claim.</div

Exploring the determinants of reinvestment decisions: Sense of personal responsibility, preferences, and loss framing

Two potentially costly errors are common in sequential investment decisions: sticking too long to a failing course of action (escalation of commitment), and abandoning a successful course of action prematurely. Past research has mostly focused on escalation of commitment, and identified three critical determinants: personal responsibility, preferences for prior decisions, and decision framing. We demonstrate in three studies using an incentivized poker inspired task that these determinants of escalation reliably lead decision makers to keep investing even when real money is on the line. We observed in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 that reinvestments were more likely when decision makers were personally responsible for prior decisions. This likelihood was also increased when the decision makers had indicated a preference for initial investments (Experiments 2 and 3), and when outcomes were framed in terms of losses as compared to gains (Experiment 3). Both types of decision errors – escalation of commitment and prematurely abandoning a course of action – could be traced to the same set of determinants. Being personally responsible for prior decisions, having a preference for the initial investment, and loss framing did increase escalation, whereas lacking personal responsibility, having no preference for the initial investment, and gain framing increased the likelihood of prematurely opting out. Finally, personal responsibility had a negative effect on decision quality, as decision-makers were still more likely to reinvest when they were personally responsible for prior decisions, than when prior decisions were assigned optimally by an algorithm (Experiments 2 and 3)

Emotion emphasis effects in moral judgment are moderated by mindsets

In two studies, emotion emphasis effects on moral judgment are demonstrated. The studies indicate that emphasizing negative consequences in trolley-type dilemmas with emotional language produces more utilitarian responses if such emphasis is on the consequences of the deontological option, and more deontological responses if it is on the consequences of the utilitarian option. This effect was moderated by action-phase related mindsets. Individuals in an implemental mindset were less susceptible to the emotion emphasis effect than individuals in a deliberative mindset (Studies 1, 2). By also using an eye-tracking task in Study 2, we demonstrated that our implemental mindset participants’ visual attention was more focused—in particular on goal-directed means—than that of the deliberative mindset participants.publishe

Ethics of genetic technologies

A questionnaire to elicit ethical opinions about genetic technologies from laypeopl

Planning to deliberate thoroughly : If-then planned deliberation increases the adjustment of decisions to newly available information

Planning our actions in advance is an important means of action control and increases the likelihood of initiating intended actions at critical points in time (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2016). In the current research, we investigate whether planning to deliberate thoroughly can also increase the likelihood of deliberation when it is needed. As an increase in deliberation is often associated with more thorough use of available information, we predict that planning to deliberate causes people to adjust their current course of action more closely to newly available information. We test this prediction in three experiments in which the participants are faced with the decision to continue with or disengage from a chosen course of action after new information has become available. The first experiment uses an established escalation of commitment paradigm (Study 1); the second and third experiment use a more naturalistic task based on the card game of poker (Studies 2 & 3). In all three studies, planning to deliberate at a critical point in time by forming implementation intentions reduced the tendency to stick to a failing course of action, suggesting that plans to deliberate can be used to increase the likelihood of deliberation and thereby the effective processing of newly available information.publishe

Deliberation Decreases the Likelihood of Expressing Dominant Responses

Deliberation is commonly assumed to be a central characteristic of humans’ higher cognitive functions, and the responses following deliberation are attributed to mechanisms that are qualitatively different from lower-level associative or affectively driven responses. In contrast to this perspective, the current article’s aim is to draw attention to potential issues with making inferences about mechanisms of deliberation based on characteristics of the observed decision outcomes. We propose that a consequence of deliberation is to simply reduce the likelihood of expressing immediately available (dominant) responses. We illustrate how this consequence of deliberation can provide a parsimonious explanation for a broad range of prior research on decision-making. Furthermore, we discuss how the present perspective on deliberation relates to the question of how the cognitive system implements nondominant responses based on associative learning and affective prioritization rather than voluntary decisions. Beyond the present article’s theoretical focus, for illustrative purposes, we provide some empirical evidence (three studies, N = 175) that is in line with our proposal. In sum, our theoretical framework, prior empirical evidence, and the present studies suggest that deliberation reduces the likelihood of expressing dominant responses. Although we do not argue that this is the only consequence or mechanism regarding deliberation, we aim to highlight that it is worthwhile considering this minimal consequence of deliberation as compared with certain higher cognitive functions in the interpretation of deliberation outcomes