Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

There is increasing evidence that imagination relies on similar neural mechanisms as externally triggered perception. This overlap presents a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: deciding what is real and what is imagined. Here, we explore how perceptual reality monitoring might be implemented in the brain. We first describe sensory and cognitive factors that could dissociate imagery and perception and conclude that no single factor unambiguously signals whether an experience is internally or externally generated. We suggest that reality monitoring is implemented by higher-level cortical circuits that evaluate first-order sensory and cognitive factors to determine the source of sensory signals. According to this interpretation, perceptual reality monitoring shares core computations with metacognition. This multi-level architecture might explain several types of source confusion as well as dissociations between simply knowing whether something is real and actually experiencing it as real. We discuss avenues for future research to further our understanding of perceptual reality monitoring, an endeavour that has important implications for our understanding of clinical symptoms as well as general cognitive function

Fundamental constraints on distinguishing reality from imagination

Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagination overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here we capitalised on the ability to conduct large-scale, one-trial-per-participant psychophysics via online platforms combined with computational modelling and neuroimaging to investigate perceptual reality monitoring failures in the general population. We find striking evidence for a subjective intermixing of imagination and reality – both behaviourally and neurally. Our data are best explained by a model that evaluates the total strength of intermixed imagined and perceived signals against a “reality threshold” to determine whether it reflects reality. These findings suggest that imagined and perceived signals are not kept separate, nor is the intention to imagine used to identity and discount self-generated signals. Instead, a judgment of reality is based on the intensity of the intermixture between imagination and reality. A striking consequence of this account is that it predicts when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become indistinguishable from reality

Perceptual reality monitoring: Neural mechanisms dissociating imagination from reality

There is increasing evidence that imagination relies on similar neural mechanisms as externally triggered perception. This overlap presents a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: deciding what is real and what is imagined. Here, we explore how perceptual reality monitoring might be implemented in the brain. We first describe sensory and cognitive factors that could dissociate imagery and perception and conclude that no single factor unambiguously signals whether an experience is internally or externally generated. We suggest that reality monitoring is implemented by higher-level cortical circuits that evaluate first-order sensory and cognitive factors to determine the source of sensory signals. According to this interpretation, perceptual reality monitoring shares core computations with metacognition. This multi-level architecture might explain several types of source confusion as well as dissociations between simply knowing whether something is real and actually experiencing it as real. We discuss avenues for future research to further our understanding of perceptual reality monitoring, an endeavor that has important implications for our understanding of clinical symptoms as well as general cognitive function

Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality

Perceptual reality monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish internally triggered imagination from externally triggered reality. Such monitoring can take place at perceptual or cognitive levels – for example, in lucid dreaming perceptual experience feels real but is accompanied by a cognitive insight that it is not real. We recently developed a paradigm to reveal perceptual reality monitoring errors during wakefulness in the general population, showing that imagined signals can be erroneously attributed to perception during a perceptual detection task. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether people have insight into perceptual reality monitoring errors by additionally measuring perceptual confidence. We used hierarchical Bayesian modelling of confidence criteria to characterize metacognitive insight the effects of imagery on detection. Over two experiments, we found that confidence criteria moved in tandem with the decision criterion shift, indicating a failure of reality monitoring not only at a perceptual, but also at a metacognitive level. These results further show that such failures have a perceptual rather than a decisional origin. Interestingly, offline queries at the end of the experiment revealed global, task-level insight, which was uncorrelated with local, trial-level insight as measured with confidence ratings. Taken together, our results demonstrate that confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality during perceptual detection. Future research should further explore the different cognitive dimensions of insight into reality judgements and how they are related

Shared neural mechanisms of visual perception and imagery

For decades, the extent to which visual imagery relies on similar neural mechanisms as visual perception has been a topic of debate. Here, we review recent neuroimaging studies comparing these two forms of visual experience. Their results suggest that there is large overlap in neural processing during perception and imagery: neural representations of imagined and perceived stimuli are similar in visual, parietal and frontal cortex. Furthermore, perception and imagery seem to rely on similar top-down connectivity. The most prominent difference is the absence of bottom-up processing during imagery. These findings fit well with the idea that imagery and perception rely on similar emulation or prediction processes

No overlap between unconscious and imagined representations

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any overlap could be due to overlap in feedback processes. In the current study we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category-representations during imagery, conscious perception and unconscious processing using fMRI. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were only observed between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, PPI-analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing neural overlap between purely feedforward and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations caused by feedback, either stimulus-driven (perception) or internally-driven (imagery), are however relatively similar

Holocene Refreshening and Reoxygenation of a Bothnian Sea Estuary Led to Enhanced Phosphorus Burial

Salinity variations in restricted basins like the Baltic Sea can alter their vulnerability to hypoxia (i.e., bottom water oxygen concentrations <2 mg/l) and can affect the burial of phosphorus (P), a key nutrient for marine organisms. We combine porewater and solid-phase geochemistry, micro-analysis of sieved sediments (including XRD and synchrotron-based XAS), and foraminiferal δ18O and δ13C analyses to reconstruct the bottom water salinity, redox conditions, and P burial in the Ångermanälven estuary, Bothnian Sea. Our sediment records were retrieved during the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) Baltic Sea Paleoenvironment Expedition 347 in 2013. We demonstrate that bottom waters in the Ångermanälven estuary became anoxic upon the intrusion of seawater in the early Holocene, like in the central Bothnian Sea. The subsequent refreshening and reoxygenation, which was caused by gradual isostatic uplift, promoted P burial in the sediment in the form of Mn-rich vivianite. Vivianite authigenesis in the surface sediments of the more isolated part of the estuary ultimately ceased, likely due to continued refreshening and an associated decline in productivity and P supply to the sediment. The observed shifts in environmental conditions also created conditions for post-depositional formation of authigenic vivianite, and possibly apatite formation, at ∼8 m composite depth. These salinity-related changes in redox conditions and P burial are highly relevant in light of current climate change. The results specifically highlight that increased freshwater input linked to global warming may enhance coastal P retention, thereby contributing to oligotrophication in both coastal and adjacent open waters

Immunohistochemical investigation of cells expressing CD21, membrane IgM, CD32 and a follicular dendritic cell marker in the lymphoid tissues of neonatal calves

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