38 research outputs found
A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? : Indiaâs Involvement in Nepal (2005â2008)
According to the theory of âdemocratic peace,â India, as the largest democracy in the
world and as South Asiaâs predominant regional power, should be expected to promote
democracy in neighboring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any official democracypromotion
policy, and its past record on democracy in the region is mixed at best. Against
this background, the paper analyzes the substantial role India came to play in the peace
and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005â2008, asking whether this constitutes
a departure from New Delhiâs traditional policy of noninterference in its neighborsâ
internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion.
The analysis shows that Indiaâs involvement in Nepal was the product of short‐term stability
concerns rather than being an indicator of a long‐term change in strategy with the intention
of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.Als gröĂte Demokratie der Welt und gleichzeitig als dominierende Regionalmacht in SĂŒdasien,
könnte man erwarten, dass Indien in seinen Nachbarstaaten Demokratieförderung
betreibt. Die Theorie des demokratischen Friedens geht davon aus, dass es im Interesse einer
Demokratie wie Indien liegt, von Demokratien umgeben zu sein, da somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit
von Kriegen sinkt. Dies ist jedoch bei Indien nicht der Fall: Neu‐Delhi geht
pragmatisch mit autoritÀren Staaten um und hat keine offizielle Politik der Demokratieförderung.
Das Papier geht der Frage nach, inwieweit Indiens substanzielles Engagement
im Friedens‐ und Demokratisierungsprozess in Nepal in den Jahren 2005‐2008 eine Abkehr
von Neu‐Delhis traditioneller Ablehnung von Demokratieförderung darstellt. Die
Untersuchung ideeller und zielorientierter Grundlagen in Indiens AuĂenpolitik und die
Analyse des indischen Engagements in Nepal fĂŒhren zu dem Schluss, dass wir es mit keinem
radikalen Wandel zu tun haben. Indiens BemĂŒhungen in Nepal sind nicht als langfristiger
Strategiewandel, sondern als reaktiver, kurzfristiger Politikwechsel zu verstehen,
der primÀr auf die Stabilisierung des Nachbarstaats abzielte
Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership
Regional powers are often conceived of as âregional leading powersâ, states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbours. The article argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The article is devoted to a theory-led distinction and clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of International Relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self- representation by the dominant state, the article outlines the essential traits of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies sub-types for better classifying hegemony and leadership
Reluctant powers? Rising powers' contributions to regional crisis management
Rising powers have often been characterised as 'reluctant' when it comes to their contributions to global governance. However, also within their regions they have sometimes pursued indecisive, muddling-through policies, including in the field of security. This paper addresses the puzzling issue of rising powers' reluctant approach to regional crisis management. It conceptualises reluctance as entailing the two constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance, and it seeks to approach a theorisation of reluctance that focuses on a combination of international expectations and domestic preference formation. The empirical analysis addresses instances of regional crisis management by the democratic rising powers India and Brazil during phases of domestic political stability under the Modi (2014â2018) and the Lula (2003â2011) governments, respectively. The analysis of India's crisis management efforts in Afghanistan and Nepal, and of Brazil's leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and its approach to the civil war in Colombia, reveal that reluctance emerges if a government is faced with (competing) expectations articulated by international actors as well as with a range of domestic factors that lead to unclear preference formation
Go South! India âDiscoversâ: Africa and Latin America
In August 2012, Indiaâs first dialogue with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC), founded
in 2010, took place in New Delhi. Following Indiaâs ârediscoveryâ of Africa, this
demonstrated Indiaâs interest in forging closer political ties with Latin America.
Since the 1990s, India has been globalizing its foreign policy. Having initially focused
on Southeast and East Asia, India has looked to extend its relationships with Africa
and Latin America in recent years. The driving force behind Indiaâs diversification of
foreign policy to the global South is, on the one hand, economic interests, and, on the
other,
the quest for recognition of Indiaâs ascent to great power status.
Indiaâs renewed engagement in Africa began with Indian businessesâ investments
in the raw material sector. Through a number of development activities and with
the participation of Indian soldiers in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,
the Indian government has been signaling to the international community its
readiness to act as a responsible (potential) great power. Security policy interests
are the reason for different kinds of security cooperation with East African states in
the Indian Ocean region â an area India considers to be part of its extended regional
neighborhood.
Indian-owned businesses have become increasingly active in Latin America since
the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is, however, not only due to the regionâs
resource wealth, but also to its potential as a market for Indian products and
as an investment location. Foreign policy has only recently started to follow the
economy, as shown by New Delhiâs hosting of the India-CELAC Foreign Ministersâ
Dialogue in 2012.
India remains, however, far behind China. Despite Indiaâs growing engagement in
Africa and Latin America, these regions are not of primary importance in the overall
context of Indian foreign policy, which is still very much focused on security threats
that spill over from the immediate regional vicinity
Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India
What kind of foreign policy do populists execute once in power? Based on the existing literature, we conceptualize populism as a set of ideas whose two core elements are anti-elitism and antipluralism. From this we develop a set of hypotheses regarding both substantive aspects of foreign policy as well as foreign policy-making processes of populist leaders in government. An analysis of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's foreign policy record serves as a first plausibility probe of our hypotheses. We find that our concept of populism carries most explanatory value in the procedural aspects of foreign policy making as well as in its communication, less so in those aspects relating to the goals or substance of foreign policy. Whereas foreign policy under Modi's populist leadership is highly centralized and personalized, the traditional foreign policy establishment, including most notably the Ministry of External Affairs, has lost some of its previous authority. Engaging the Indian diaspora abroad emerged as another characteristic of populist foreign policy making. By contrast, the case of India does not confirm our hypothesis regarding a preference of bilateralism over multilateralism, nor does populism necessarily preclude investing in global public goods
Nach dem BĂŒrgerkrieg - welche Zukunft fĂŒr Sri Lanka?
Am 19. Mai 2009 verkĂŒndete die srilankische Regierung ihren Sieg ĂŒber die Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) und den Tod des AnfĂŒhrers, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Damit ging der seit 26 Jahren andauernde BĂŒrgerkrieg in Sri Lanka vorerst zu Ende. Die srilankische Regierung von ExekutivprĂ€sident Mahinda Rajapaksa ist stĂ€rker denn je, nachdem sie nicht nur die LTTE besiegt hat, sondern auch auf der internationalen Ebene ihre Ziele erreichen konnte: Am 26. Mai lehnte der UN-Menschenrechtsrat die Forderung ab, mutmaĂliche Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch Regierungstruppen und LTTE aufzuklĂ€ren. Rajapaksa spielte verschiedene Staaten â vor allem China und Indien â erfolgreich gegeneinander aus und schaffte sich dadurch wĂ€hrend der militĂ€rischen Offensive und fĂŒr die Phase des Wiederaufbaus groĂe FreirĂ€ume. Die menschenrechtliche Lage in Sri Lanka ist weiterhin beunruhigend. Etwa 300.000 tamilische FlĂŒchtlinge sind in vom MilitĂ€r ĂŒberwachten Lagern untergebracht, zu denen internationale Hilfsorganisationen keinen Zugang haben. Eine Hexenjagd nach mutmaĂlichen UnterstĂŒtzern der LTTE hat eingesetzt. Die Regierung nutzt ihre gestĂ€rkte Position, um sich politischer Gegner zu entledigen.
Nach der Entscheidung im UN-Menschenrechtsrat haben westliche LĂ€nder noch geringere Einflussmöglichkeiten auf Sri Lanka. Das in dem Inselstaat einflussreichste Land bleibt China. Um sich nicht vollstĂ€ndig von diesem verdrĂ€ngen zu lassen, bemĂŒht sich die Regionalmacht Indien um gute Beziehungen zur srilankischen Regierung. Dazu ist sie zunehmend bereit, auf ihre traditionellen protamilischen Forderungen zu verzichten. Ein dauerhafter Frieden ist nur möglich, wenn es zu einer Versöhnung zwischen singhalesischer Mehrheit und tamilischer Minderheit kommt. Dazu mĂŒsste die Regierung die Aufarbeitung der jĂŒngsten Vergangenheit zulassen und im Rahmen einer Dezentralisierung den Tamilen breite Autonomie gewĂ€hren. Die bisherige singhalesisch-nationalistische Einstellung von PrĂ€sident Rajapaksa und die geringen Möglichkeiten der Tamilen, ihre Interessen angemessen zu vertreten, machen eine solche Lösung jedoch unwahrscheinlich
The ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan: perceptions and reactions of regional powers
At a conference in Tokyo on 8 July 2012, Afghanistan's donors pledged 16 billion USD
in reconstruction aid over the next four years. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May
2012, a comparable sum had been committed to supporting the Afghanistan National
Security Forces (ANSF). Analysis: The international community is anxious to reassure the Afghan government that it will not be left to fend for itself after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops are withdrawn at the end of 2014. Nevertheless, the fear remains that a power vacuum and another takeover by the Taliban could throw the country into turmoil once again. The destabilization of Afghanistan would most affect the neighboring countries. Yet despite sharing similar threat perceptions, these states are pursuing very different goals in Afghanistan that impede effective regional cooperation. The US, which would like to see its influence in Afghanistan maintained, curbs all initiatives that are not in line with its interests. The US is pursuing the vision of an economically integrated region in which Afghanistan will be the central stretch of a new âSilk Roadâ between Central and
South Asia, and the Middle East and East Asia. The implicit notion is that economic
integration will lead to increased stability in the security sector, but at best, that
would only be attainable in the long term. In the short term, it is more likely that
political differences between the regional states will hinder economic cooperation. China and India are aiming to more closely incorporate Afghanistan in regional organizations within their own spheres of influence. Both nations fear a post-2014 destabilization of Afghanistan that would directly affect their security â especially
through the strengthening of Islamist terror groups. Other states are also concerned about the developments in Afghanistan. Iran, for example, is pursuing an ambivalent policy, fearing both the continuation of American influence after 2014 and a Taliban takeover
Demokratischer Wandel in SĂŒdasien und die Rolle der Regionalmacht Indien
"Das Jahr 2008 brachte tief greifende VerĂ€nderungen in der politischen Landschaft SĂŒdasiens mit sich: In Nepal fanden freie Wahlen statt und die seit 238 Jahren bestehende Monarchie wurde abgeschafft; auf den Malediven wurde der seit drei Jahrzehnten autokratisch regierende PrĂ€sident abgewĂ€hlt; nach der EinfĂŒhrung demokratischer Reformen wurde Bhutan zur konstitutionellen Monarchie; Pakistan kehrte zu einer zivilen Regierung zurĂŒck; und Ende des Jahres fanden in Bangladesch freie Wahlen statt. Die Einflussnahme der Regionalmacht Indien auf den demokratischen Wandel in den Nachbarstaaten fĂ€llt jeweils unterschiedlich aus: Indien spielte eine zentrale, wenn auch ambivalente Rolle im Friedens- und Demokratisierungsprozess in Nepal, da mit diesem Land traditionell enge Beziehungen bestehen; in Bhutan und auf den Malediven war Indiens Einfluss auf den demokratischen Reformprozess eher indirekt, wĂ€hrend in den FĂ€llen Pakistan und Bangladesch die angespannten Beziehungen eine Einflussnahme unmöglich machten. Indiens vorrangiges regionalpolitisches Ziel lautet StabilitĂ€t. Obwohl das indische Establishment ideell StabilitĂ€t mit Demokratie verbindet, hat Indien oft autoritĂ€re Regime aufgrund ihrer StabilitĂ€t unterstĂŒtzt. Indien verfolgt keine aktive Politik der Demokratieförderung. GrĂŒnde dafĂŒr sind Neu- Delhis begrenzte Einflussmöglichkeiten auf einige Nachbarstaaten, die indische Ablehnung des durch die Politik der Regierung Bush belasteten Begriffes 'Demokratieförderung' und Indiens Wunsch, sein Image als 'regionaler Tyrann' zu verbessern. Aufgrund der eingeschrĂ€nkten Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die Nachbarstaaten gilt Indien zwar als Regionalmacht, aber kaum als regionale FĂŒhrungsmacht. Indien ist auch nicht in der Lage, die eigenen Ordnungsvorstellungen in der Region durchzusetzen." (Autorenreferat