Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization’s stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization’s decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions

The dodgy realm of conventionality : on the occasion of the founding of the journal of the European association for Chinese studies

Written on the occasion of the launching of the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies, this article develops from the fundamental difference the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (ca.480–ca.540) made between the world of perception and the world of language, and the ramifications this philosophical distinction has for how concepts as ‘China’ and ‘journal’ are understood. Further referring to Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 6th or 7th century), a hierarchical structure is suggested within the domain of academic publications and the position of the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies within this hierarchy is reflected upon. The latter is discussed through the angle of Zhu Xi (1130–1200) daoxue thinking, as well as from the perspective of the contemporary state of the field of academic publishing

The Dodgy Realm of Conventionality: On the Occasion of the Founding of the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies

Written on the occasion of the launching of the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies, this article develops from the fundamental difference the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (ca.480–ca.540) made between the world of perception and the world of language, and the ramifications this philosophical distinction has for how concepts as ‘China’ and ‘journal’ are understood. Further referring to Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 6th or 7th century), a hierarchical structure is suggested within the domain of academic publications and the position of the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies within this hierarchy is reflected upon. The latter is discussed through the angle of Zhu Xi (1130–1200) daoxue thinking, as well as from the perspective of the contemporary state of the field of academic publishing. 本文撰寫於«歐洲漢學學會雜志» 建刊之際，試從印度佛教哲學家陳那Dignāga (約480 – 約540) 關於感知世界和語言世界之間根本差異以及這種哲學上的差別對於'中國' 和'雜志' 等概念的影響出發，運用法稱Dharmakīrti (約六、七世紀) 在所有概念領域內提出的一種層次結構，來考量«歐洲漢學學會雜志» 作為學術出版物的角色，並結合朱熹(1130–1200) 道學思想的角度以及學術出版領域的現狀進行探討。本文撰寫於«歐洲漢學學會雜志» 建刊之際，試從印度佛教哲學家陳那Dignāga (約480 – 約540) 關於感知世界和語言世界之間根本差異以及這種哲學上的差別對於'中國' 和'雜志' 等概念的影響出發，運用法稱Dharmakīrti (約六、七世紀) 在所有概念領域內提出的一種層次結構，來考量«歐洲漢學學會雜志» 作為學術出版物的角色，並結合朱熹(1130–1200) 道學思想的角度以及學術出版領域的現狀進行探討

Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design

In a repeated interaction between and a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Organizational design of multi-product multi-market firms

In this paper, we seek to understand how a multi-product multi-market firm (for example, a multinational firm) designs its organizational structure and compensation scheme when its profitability is conditioned by how market information flows within the company. By modifying its organizational structure–centralizing or decentralizing decision making–and changing the weights of its compensation scheme, the firm can shape how information flows and is represented, changing the firm’s profitability. We find that, when being multi-product (having to allocate a scarce resource between markets), the headquarters links the organizational design of decision rights between different product markets. The headquarters decentralizes decision rights in products with higher returns to product differentiation while it centralizes decision rights in products with lower returns to product differentiation. As centralization is complementary with product standardization and decentralization is complementary with product differentiation, the organizational design conditions the firm’s market policy. The relation among product’s decision rights remains even when the headquarters cannot control how local managers allocate resources in their own local divisions. Our results are robust to different generalizations. Our paper therefore, contributes to the literature on organizational design by analyzing the case of multi-product multi-market firms.: Multinational, Multi-product, Organization Design, Resource Scarcity, Cheap Talk