Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds

The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective ‘components’ of thinking systems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intriguing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to include abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experiments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoretical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence

Personal and sub-personal: a defence of Dennett's early distinction

Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used ‘sub‐personal’ very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit‐’ ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti‐physicalistic, anti‐dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub‐personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level. People lose sight of Dennett’s personal/sub-personal distinction because they free it from its philosophical moorings. A distinction that serves a philosophical purpose is typically rooted in doctrine; it cannot be lifted out of context and continue to do its work. So I shall start from Dennett’s distinction as I read it in its original context. And when I speak of ‘the distinction’, I mean to point not only towards the terms that Dennett first used to define it but also towards the philosophical setting within which its work was cut out

Asymmetry of jets, lobe size and spectral index in radio galaxies and quasars

We investigate the correlations between spectral index, jet side and extent of the radio lobes for a sample of nearby FRII radio galaxies. In Dennett-Thorpe et al. (1997) we studied a sample of quasars and found that the high surface brightness regions had flatter spectra on the jet side (explicable as a result of Doppler beaming) whilst the extended regions had spectral asymmetries dependent on lobe length. Unified schemes predict that asymmetries due to beaming will be much smaller in narrow-line radio galaxies than in quasars: we therefore investigate in a similar manner, a sample of radio galaxies with detected jets. We find that spectral asymmetries in these objects are uncorrelated with jet sidedness at all brightness levels, but depend on relative lobe volume. Our results are not in conflict with unified schemes, but suggest that the differences between the two samples are due primarily to power or redshift, rather than to orientation. We also show directly that hotspot spectra steepen as a function of radio power or redshift. Whilst a shift in observed frequency due to the redshift may account for some of the steepening, it cannot account for all of it, and a dependence on radio power is required.Comment: accepted for publication in MNRAS, 10 pages; typos/minor correctio

Beyond persons: extending the personal / subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals and artificial agents

The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centered concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered

The evolution of misbelief

From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting "culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of "forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious - but doxastically1 noncommittal - action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteri

Relativistic and slowing down: the flow in the hotspots of powerful radio galaxies and quasars

Pairs of radio emitting jets with lengths up to several hundred kiloparsecs emanate from the central region (the `core') of radio loud active galaxies. In the most powerful of them, these jets terminate in the `hotspots', compact high brightness regions, where the jet flow collides with the intergalactic medium (IGM). Although it has long been established that in their inner ($\sim$parsec) regions these jet flows are relativistic, it is still not clear if they remain so at their largest (hundreds of kiloparsec) scales. We argue that the X-ray, optical and radio data of the hotspots, despite their at-first-sight disparate properties, can be unified in a scheme involving a relativistic flow upstream of the hotspot that decelerates to the sub-relativistic speed of its inferred advance through the IGM and viewed at different angles to its direction of motion. This scheme, besides providing an account of the hotspot spectral properties with jet orientation, it also suggests that the large-scale jets remain relativistic all the way to the hotspots.Comment: to appear in ApJ

A synthetic Longitudinal Study dataset for England and Wales

This article describes the new synthetic England and Wales Longitudinal Study ‘spine’ dataset designed for teaching and experimentation purposes. In the United Kingdom, there exist three Census-based longitudinal micro-datasets, known collectively as the Longitudinal Studies. The England and Wales Longitudinal Study (LS) is a 1% sample of the population of England and Wales (around 500,000 individuals), linking individual person records from the 1971 to 2011 Censuses. The synthetic data presented contains a similar number of individuals to the original data and accurate longitudinal transitions between 2001 and 2011 for key demographic variables, but unlike the original data, is open access

Understanding housing affordability to determine the best property search areas for homeowners moving out of London

In this paper we created a novel framework for understanding housing affordability in England using a linked house price dataset. Regional house price studies revealed that after the global economic crisis, there was an unprecedented regional house price divergence driven by faster price increases in London from 2009 onwards. To ease England’s resulting housing affordability issues, we consider the scenario of a typical London homeowner to offer a new insight into local housing affordability by different property type in England and explore the best property search areas for homeowners moving out of London

Delineating the spatio-temporal pattern of local authority house prices variation in England between 2009 and 2016

Most spatio-temporal studies of house price in the UK are carried out at national or regional scale, but house prices differences could be better understood at finer spatial scales. Since England’s house prices, standardised by the size of the property (£/m2), have been shown to be somewhat clustered at local authority level and highly clustered at Middle Layer Super Output (MSOA) level, in the period 2009 to 2016, this research aims to further explore the nature of spatial and temporal variation in house prices at local authority level in England. Growth curve modelling offers a model-based description of the spatio-temporal patterns of local authority house price variation. This research explores local authority effects and three different time effects (quarter, half-year and year) on house price spatio-temporal variation. Results show that these three time effects are essentially identical and are extremely small, in comparison with local authority effects. Since annual effects provide the best fit, local authority annual house price trajectories between 2009 and 2016 are further explored. Local authorities with higher house prices in 2009 are found to have faster growing prices over the eight-year period than local authorities with lower house prices. Moreover, two clear geographic hubs of house price change over the period are observed, one centred on London, the other on Brist