Ergonomics and sustainability: Towards and embrace of complexity and emergence

Technology offers a promising route to a sustainable future, and ergonomics can serve a vital role. The argument of this article is that the lasting success of sustainability initiatives in ergonomics hinges on an examination of ergonomics' own epistemology and ethics. The epistemology of ergonomics is fundamentally empiricist and positivist. This places practical constraints on its ability to address important issues such as sustainability, emergence and complexity. The implicit ethical position of ergonomics is one of neutrality, and its positivist epistemology generally puts value-laden questions outside the parameters of what it sees as scientific practice. We argue, by contrast, that a discipline that deals with both technology and human beings cannot avoid engaging with questions of complexity and emergence and seeking innovative ways of addressing these issues.No Full Tex

A FRAM requirements analysis for Safety Differently investigations

The present study reports on the transition of a critical incident investigator group within a University Medical Center to a Safety Differently paradigm. The most salient findings of this transition relate to the requirements that investigators themselves identify for the success of Safety Differently investigations in their institution. We conducted a FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) analysis of the requirements related to inputs, outputs, time, control, preconditions and resources for a successful Safety Differently investigation. The findings are applicable to Safety Differently investigations independent of the domain in which they might take place. The results show a critical need of training, coaching, time, human resources and commitment of institutional leaders for the transition to Safety Differently investigations.Vascular Surger

‘Ladder’-based safety culture assessments inversely predict safety outcomes

There is little empirical evidence on the predictive value of safety culture assessments (SCAs) in relation to how accident-prone an organisation might be. Recently, Antonsen not just demonstrated how a quantitative SCA mispredicted future safety outcomes, but actually showed an inverse relationship between the assessment and subsequent critical incident investigation findings. To add to our understanding, this article presents research on whether a SCA has a predictive capacity for safety outcomes. Like in Antonsen's research, an opportunity emerged when a helicopter taxiing accident, resulting in a rotor strike occurred for a helicopter squadron that had just undergone a SCA. The assessment used ‘culture ladder’ rubrics for its findings, which allowed us to look for specific features in the subsequent independent accident investigation (in which the researchers were not involved). As with Antonsen's findings, our research shows that a ‘ladder’-based assessment has little predictive value. Any predictive value it has is in the inverse of the assessment findings. For instance, where the SCA showed that the safety culture was very mature regarding finding a balance between safety and the mission at hand or the breaking of rules, the accident investigation pointed these out as the causes of the accident.Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.Values Technology and Innovatio

Repentance as Rebuke: Betrayal and Moral Injury in Safety Engineering

Following other contributions about the MAX accidents to this journal, this paper explores the role of betrayal and moral injury in safety engineering related to the U.S. federal regulator’s role in approving the Boeing 737MAX—a plane involved in two crashes that together killed 346 people. It discusses the tension between humility and hubris when engineers are faced with complex systems that create ambiguity, uncertain judgements, and equivocal test results from unstructured situations. It considers the relationship between moral injury, principled outrage and rebuke when the technology ends up involved in disasters. It examines the corporate backdrop against which calls for enhanced employee voice are typically made, and argues that when engineers need to rely on various protections and moral inducements to ‘speak up,’ then the ethical essence of engineering—skepticism, testing, checking, and questioning—has already failed.Control & Simulatio

How deregulation can become overregulation: An empirical study into the growth of internal bureaucracy when governments take a step back

Over the past decades, government safety management regulation has been driven by deregulation, simplification and organization-level regimes of inspection. So-called functional rule-making requires organizations to implement safety management systems appropriate for their operations. The paradox that seems to have arisen is that overregulation is common in many organizations. Research has found over-proceduralization, safety clutter, bureaucratic overload, and procedures not at the service of safety. To explore the paradoxical relationship between governmental deregulatory measures and organizational overregulation, we analyze empirical data from Norwegian fish farming and coastal transport. The data confirms that practitioners experience a rapidly grown abundance of internal rules and protocols, ill-fitting procedures, and pervasive, exaggerated safety management. We trace three mechanisms that have driven internal overregulation: work auditability; managerial insecurity and liability; and audit practices. These mechanisms show how functional regulation can have unintended consequences when it meets other accountability expectations. Expectations of market doctrine, bureaucratic entrepreneurism and control can lead a company transforming simple governmental regulations into vastly overcomplicated safety management systems. We conclude our study with prescriptions of how this aspect of safety could be done differently.Control & Simulatio