Social Value of Marine and Coastal Protected Areas in England and Wales.

The U.K. government is committed to establishing a coherent network of marine protected areas by 2012 and the recentMarine and Coastal Access Act, 2009 will designate marine conservation zones and provide wider access rights to the coast. To fulfill these goals, this article argues the need for a clearer, shared understanding of the social value of protected areas in creating new designations and managing existing ones. Although marine and coastal environments attract many people and are vitally important in terms of realized and potential social value, the majority of the public in the United Kingdom lacks understanding and awareness regarding them. Combined with this, the social value of marine and coastal protected areas (MCPAs) have been largely ignored relative to conservation and economics, with the latter invariably taking precedence in environmental policymaking. Social value reflects the complex, individual responses that people experience in a given place. Many reasons determine why one area is valued above another, and this research investigates the social value of MCPAs from a practitioner’s perspective through a series of interviews. Understanding why we “socially” value MCPAs will ultimately equip managers with an informed understanding of these spaces, influence management decisions, and, potentially, policymaking. This article defines social value in the context of MCPAs in England and Wales from a practitioner perspective, explores key concepts, and suggests possible improvements in decision-making

'Full spectrum dominance': Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense, and US irregular warfare strategy 2001-2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake

Personal Papers (MS 80-0002)

Weekly newsletter describing war bond drives and updates on the ongoing war. The issue also discusses campaigns to boost stamp sales, as well as updates on news and radio stations

Defense Savings Staff Poster 185

A neatly-dressed man looks at the viewer as he steps up into a tractor. To the left of the photo there is an extended text where he describes himself as an American son of immigrants "born on the other side" and tells of his family's dream to live in peace and prosperity. At the bottom of the poster is a box that lists the financiers of the advertisement

How to last alone at the top : US strategic planning for the unipolar era

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the 'peace shock' they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the 'age of uncertainty' demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional 'Third World' adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets