Alien Registration- Pasqua, Esther (Portland, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/25773/thumbnail.jp

Alien Registration- Pasqua, Esther (Portland, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/25773/thumbnail.jp

When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement

In this paper I study two methods often used in public procurement to deal with the risk that the winning bidder may default on his bid: augmenting the standard first price auction with an ex-post verification of the responsiveness of the bids and using an average bid auction. I show that when penalties for defaulting are asymmetric across bidders and when their valuations are characterized by a predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer when the costs due to the winner's bankruptcy are high enough. Depending on the cost of the ex-post verification, the average bid auction can be dominated by the first price with monitoring. I use a new dataset of Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions.auctions, public procurement, collusion, structural estimation

Economic Effects of Democracy. An Empirical Analysis

This research analyses through the use of instrumental variables estimation whether democracy has an effect on variables belonging to three different categories: fiscal policy, inequality in income distribution and political instability. It shows there is no stable relation between democracy and fiscal policy variables between countries of the sample in the 1978-1988 period. Democracy, on the other hand, significantly affects the difference in middle class income share (positively) and in changes at the top of the executive (negatively).

Alien Registration- Pasqua, Esther (Portland, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/25773/thumbnail.jp

What to expect from a greater geographic dispersion of wind farms? - A risk portfolio approach

The UK, like many other industrialised countries, is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. To achieve this goal the UK is increasingly turning towards wind power as a source of emissions free energy. However, the variable nature of wind power generation makes it an unreliable energy source, especially at higher rates of penetration. Likewise the aim of this paper is to measure the potential reduction in wind power variability that could be realised as a result of geographically dispersing the location of wind farm sites. To achieve this aim wind speed data will be used to simulate two scenarios. The first scenario involves locating a total of 2.7 gigawatts (GW) of wind power capacity in a single location within the UK while the second scenario consists of sharing the same amount of capacity amongst four different locations. A risk portfolio approach as used in financial appraisals is then applied in the second scenario to decide upon the allocation of wind power capacity, amongst the four wind farm sites, that succeeds in minimising overall variability for a given level of wind power generation. The findings of this paper indicate that reductions in the order of 36% in wind power variability are possible as a result of distributing wind power capacity

The Ability to Change or the Willingness to Change: Stakeholder Interpretation of Adversity

Firms often face adverse environmental events which have the potential to destroy the value the firm has created. This study focuses on the occurrence of adverse events. In particular, we address the research question of what organizational and managerial characteristics impact shareholder interpretation of the severity of the adverse event. Building on insights from the resource based and upper echelon theories, we propose that bundles of firm capabilities and top management team composition signal to shareholders the ability of the firm to handle the adverse event and to engage in strategic change. We test our model in the biotechnology industry, and operationalize an adverse event as a drug terminated during a clinical trial. Our results indicate the importance of the top management team on shareholder perception of event severity

Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency

The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors

Despite successive reforms, public procurement in Italy is still highly fragmented and vulnerable to collusion, corruption and ex-post renegotiation. Other defects are found in the planning stages of the works. These problems are due in part to the regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest a series of possible improvements: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities, with an increase in the surety guarantees provided by the winner, to reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) stronger anti-corruption measures; iv) more standardized planning and, for the more complex auctions, competitive dialogue.infrastructure, auctions, regulation