This government has already lost the confidence of the House of Commons: the response should be to replace the government, not to neuter parliament

The government and Parliament cannot agree how to proceed with Brexit. For some, the solution is for the government to prorogue Parliament and implement its Withdrawal Agreement without the confidence of the Commons. David Howarth argues that given the Fixed Term Parliament Act means a general election will not necessarily follow from such a loss of confidence, a new government formed by MPs from across the Commons is a viable option

How to change the government without causing a general election

David Howarth explains how the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 has altered the options for no confidence motions in Parliament, and how an opposition party might form a government without there being a general election

NUISANCE, PLANNING AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THROWING AWAY THE EMERGENCY PARACHUTE

The idea that forms of legal control should not overlap has a considerable history. In the tort of negligence, for example, judges have long been fond of saying that the duty of care should not extend to situations covered by, for example. contract law, procedural law, financial regulation, and human rights. Similar issues arise in the tort of nuisance, particularly potential overlaps with environmental regulation, especially planning controls. The problem the idea raises is a difficult one: overlapping liability adds to the complexity of the law and risks public and professional incomprehension; but it can also help to prevent deserving cases slipping through the net by adding an element of what engineers call ‘redundancy’

Threat of prorogation: what can the commons do?

The Prime Minister has requested and received consent for the current parliament to be prorogued, and plans to introduce a new Queen’s Speech before the Brexit deadline of 31 October. David Howarth assesses the options available for those wishing to oppose this and enable the Commons to prevent a no deal Brexit

Trials of the State: Law and the Decline of Politics

An old adage about the difference between Oxford and Cambridge goes: 'In Oxford, they say, "That might be true but is it is interesting? But in Cambridge they say, "That might be interesting, but is it true?"' Recently retired UK Supreme Court judge Jonathan Sumption's short book, The Trials of the State: Law and the Decline of Politics, based on his 2019 Reith Lectures for the BBC, is certainly interesting. It contains, for example, Sumption's commentary on a number of leading Supreme Court cases (Unison, Evans, Miller no. 1 and Nicklinson among others, although not Privacy International, which was being decided as the lectures were being prepared) in the course of which he sets out his disagreements with some of the views of his former colleagues on the Court, especially those of Lady Hale, whose response, 'Law and Politics: A Reply to Reith' can be found on the Supreme Court's website. The question, however, is whether Sumption's claims are true

Investment in Sustainable Development: A UK Perspective on the Business and Academic Challenges

There are many legislative, stakeholder and supply chain pressures on business to be more ‘sustainable’. Universities have recognised the need for graduate knowledge and understanding of sustainable development issues. Many businesses and universities have responded and introduced Sustainable Development models into their operations with much of the current effort directed at climate change. However, as the current worldwide financial crisis slowly improves, the expectations upon how businesses operate and behave are changing. It will require improved transparency and relationships with all stakeholders, which is the essence of sustainable development. The challenges and opportunities for both business and universities are to understand the requirements of sustainable development and the transformation that is required. They should ensure that knowledge is embedded within the culture of the organisation and wider society in order to achieve a sustainable future

The Political Economy of the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Squaring the ‘Inconsistent Quartet’

This paper sets out to explain national preferences on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning: support for creating and participating in supranational banking supervision in the European Union; the division of competences between the European Central Bank and national banking supervisors; the nature of indirect supervision. It is argued that member states in the euro area faced a ‘financial inconsistent quartet’, whereby they could not secure at the same time: 1) financial stability, 2) financial integration, 3) national financial policies and 4) the single currency. The ‘financial inconsistent quartet’ reinforced the logic for euro area member states to create the SSM (and other elements of Banking Union) and those seeking to join the euro area to participate. However, the analytical usefulness of this concept to explain national preferences on the SSM relies upon its nuanced application to individual countries taking into account the distinct patterns in the internationalisation of national banking systems