A spectroscopic ruler for intermediate-zone FRET measurements

It is well known that Fluorescence Resonance Energy Transfer (FRET), the most common mechanism for electronic energy to migrate between molecular chromophores, has a predominantly inverse sixth power dependence on the rate of transfer as a function of the distance R between the chromophores. However, the unified theory of electronic energy transfer, derived from quantum electrodynamics, predicts an additional contribution with an R-4 dependence on distance. This intermediate-zone term becomes especially important when the chromophore spacing is similar in magnitude to the reduced wavelength (ƛ= λ 2π ) associated with the mediated energy. In previous theoretical studies we have suggested that inclusion of the intermediate term, through rate equation and quantum dynamical calculations, may be important for describing the exciton diffusion process in some circumstances, and in particular when the distance between the chromophores exceeds 5 nm. In this paper, we focus of the role of the intermediate-zone contribution to distance measurements between chromophores made through the application of spectroscopic ruler techniques. One of the major assumptions made in employing these experimental techniques is that the R−6dependence is valid. In this work, we reformulate the spectroscopic ruler principles for intermediate distances to include the inverse fourth power rate component, and compare the results of this reformulation to experimental FRET results from the literature. © (2015) COPYRIGHT Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE). Downloading of the abstract is permitted for personal use only

Reciprocity towards groups : a laboratory experiment on the causes

Field studies of conflict report cycles of mutual revenge between groups, often linked to perceptions of intergroup injustice. We test the hypothesis that people are predisposed to reciprocate against groups. In a computerized laboratory experiment, subjects who were harmed by a partner’s uncooperative action reacted by harming other members of the partner’s group. This group reciprocity was only observed when one group was seen to be unfairly advantaged. Our results support a behavioral mechanism leading from perceived injustice to intergroup conflict. We discuss the relevance of group reciprocity to economic and political phenomena including conflict, discrimination and team competition

Mesopelagic fishes dominate otolith record of past two millennia in the Santa Barbara Basin.

The mesopelagic (200-1000 m) separates the productive upper ocean from the deep ocean, yet little is known of its long-term dynamics despite recent research that suggests fishes of this zone likely dominate global fish biomass and contribute to the downward flux of carbon. Here we show that mesopelagic fishes dominate the otolith (ear bone) record in anoxic sediment layers of the Santa Barbara Basin over the past two millennia. Among these mesopelagic fishes, otoliths from families Bathylagidae (deep-sea smelts) and Myctophidae (lanternfish) are most abundant. Otolith deposition rate fluctuates at decadal to centennial time scales and covaries with proxies for upper ocean temperature, consistent with climate forcing. Moreover, otolith deposition rate and proxies for temperature and primary productivity show contemporaneous discontinuities during the Medieval Climate Anomaly and Little Ice Age. Mesopelagic fishes may serve as proxies for future climatic influence at those depths including effects on the carbon cycle

Reciprocity towards groups

People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against a person who harmed them, but against another person in that person's group. We tested for group reciprocity in laboratory experiments. Subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with partners from different groups. They then allocated money between themselves and other participants. In punishment games, subjects whose partner had defected punished participants from the partner's group more, compared to their punishment of participants from a third group. In dictator-style games, subjects did not exhibit group reciprocity. We examine possible correlates of group reciprocity, including group identification and cooperativeness