81 research outputs found
Age-Based Differences in Strategy Use in Choice Tasks
We incorporated behavioral and computational modeling techniques to examine age-based differences in strategy use in two four-choice decision-making tasks. Healthy older (aged 60–82 years) and younger adults (aged 18–23 years) performed one of two decision-making tasks that differed in the degree to which rewards for each option depended on the choices made on previous trials. In the choice-independent task rewards for each choice were not affected by the sequence of previous choices that had been made. In contrast, in the choice-dependent task rewards for each option were based on how often each option had been chosen in the past. We compared the fits of a model that assumes the use of a win-stay–lose-shift (WSLS) heuristic to make decisions, to the fits of a reinforcement-learning (RL) model that compared expected reward values for each option to make decisions. Younger adults were best fit by the RL model, while older adults showed significantly more evidence of being best fit by the WSLS heuristic model. This led older adults to perform worse than younger adults in the choice-independent task, but better in the choice-dependent task. These results coincide with previous work in our labs that also found better performance for older adults in choice-dependent tasks (Worthy et al., 2011), and the present results suggest that qualitative age-based differences in the strategies used in choice tasks may underlie older adults’ advantage in choice-dependent tasks. We discuss possible factors behind these differences such as neurobiological changes associated with aging, and increased use of heuristics by older adults
Zoonotic realism, computational cognitive science and pandemic prevention
Using animals in food and food production systems is one of many drivers of novel zoonoses. Moving toward less dependence on animal proteins is a possible avenue for reducing pandemic risk, but we think that Wiebers & Feigin’s proposed change to food policy (phasing out animal meat production) is unrealistic in its political achievability and its current capacity to feed the world in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. We suggest that improvements in communication strategies, precipitated by developments in computational cognitive neuroscience, can lead the way to a safer future and are feasible now
Zoonotic realism, computational cognitive science and pandemic prevention
Using animals in food and food production systems is one of many drivers of novel zoonoses. Moving toward less dependence on animal proteins is a possible avenue for reducing pandemic risk, but we think that Wiebers & Feigin’s proposed change to food policy (phasing out animal meat production) is unrealistic in its political achievability and its current capacity to feed the world in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. We suggest that improvements in communication strategies, precipitated by developments in computational cognitive neuroscience, can lead the way to a safer future and are feasible now
Effects of emotion on prospection during decision-making
In two experiments we examined the role of emotion, specifically worry, anxiety, and mood, on prospection during decision-making. Worry is a particularly relevant emotion to study in the context of prospection because high levels of worry may make individuals more aversive toward the uncertainty associated with the prospect of obtaining future improvements in rewards or states. Thus, high levels of worry might lead to reduced prospection during decision-making and enhance preference for immediate over delayed rewards. In Experiment 1 participants performed a two-choice dynamic decision-making task where they were required to choose between one option (the decreasing option) which provided larger immediate rewards but declines in future states, and another option (the increasing option) which provided smaller immediate rewards but improvements in future states, making it the optimal choice. High levels of worry were associated with poorer performance in the task. Additionally, fits of a sophisticated reinforcement-learning model that incorporated both reward-based and state-based information suggested that individuals reporting high levels of worry gave greater weight to the immediate rewards they would receive on each trial than to the degree to which each action would lead to improvements in their future state. In Experiment 2 we found that high levels of worry were associated with greater delay discounting using a standard delay discounting task. Combined, the results suggest that high levels of worry are associated with reduced prospection during decision-making. We attribute these results to high worriers' aversion toward the greater uncertainty associated with attempting to improve future rewards than to maximize immediate reward. These results have implications for researchers interested in the effects of emotion on cognition, and suggest that emotion strongly affects the focus on temporal outcomes during decision-making.The open access fee for this work was funded through the Texas A&M University Open Access to Knowledge (OAK) Fund
Decomposing the roles of perseveration and expected value representation in models of the Iowa gambling task
Models of human behavior in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) have played a pivotal role in accounting for behavioral differences during decision-making. One critical difference between models that have been used to account for behavior in the IGT is the inclusion or exclusion of the assumption that participants tend to persevere, or stay with the same option over consecutive trials. Models that allow for this assumption include win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) models and reinforcement learning (RL) models that include a decay learning rule where expected values for each option decay as they are chosen less often. One shortcoming of RL models that have included decay rules is that the tendency to persevere by sticking with the same option has been conflated with the tendency to select the option with the highest expected value because a single term is used to represent both of these tendencies. In the current work we isolate the tendencies to perseverate and to select the option with the highest expected value by including them as separate terms in a Value-Plus-Perseveration (VPP) RL model. Overall the VPP model provides a better fit to data from a large group of participants than models that include a single term to account for both perseveration and the representation of expected value. Simulations of each model show that the VPP model's simulated choices most closely resemble the decision-making behavior of human subjects. In addition, we also find that parameter estimates of loss aversion are more strongly correlated with performance when perseverative tendencies and expected value representations are decomposed as separate terms within the model. The results suggest that the tendency to persevere and the tendency to select the option that leads to the best net payoff are central components of decision-making behavior in the IGT. Future work should use this model to better examine decision-making behavior
Dissociating self-generated volition from externally-generated motivation.
Insight into motivational processes may be gained by examining measures of willingness to exert effort for rewards, which have been linked to neuropsychiatric symptoms of anhedonia and apathy. However, while much work has focused on the development of models of motivation based on classic tasks of externally-generated levels of effort for reward, there has been less focus on the question of self-generated motivation or volition. We developed a task that aims to capture separate measures of self-generated and externally-generated motivation, with two task variants for physical and cognitive effort, and sought to test and validate this measure in two populations of healthy volunteers (N = 27 and N = 28). Similar to previous reports, a sigmoid function represented a better overall fit to the effort-reward data than a linear or Weibull model. Individual sigmoid function shapes were governed by two free parameters: bias (the amount of reward needed for effort initiation) and reward insensitivity (the amount of increase in reward needed to accelerate effort expenditure). For both physical and cognitive effort, bias was higher in the self-generated condition, indicating reduced self-generated volitional effort initiation, compared to externally-generated effort initiation, across effort domains. Bias against initial effort initiation in the self-generated condition was related to a specific dimensional measure of anticipatory anhedonia. For physical effort only, reward insensitivity was also higher in the self-generated condition compared to the externally-generated motivation condition, indicating lower self-generated effort acceleration. This work provides a novel objective measure of self-generated motivation that may provide insights into mechanisms of anhedonia and related symptoms
An Examination of the Effects of Eye-Tracking on Behavior in Psychology Experiments
Eye-tracking is emerging as a tool for researchers to better understand cognition and behavior. However, it is possible that experiment participants adjust their behavior when they know their eyes are being tracked. This potential change would be considered a type of Hawthorne effect, in which participants alter their behavior in response to being watched, and could potentially compromise the outcomes and conclusions of experimental studies that use eye tracking. We examined whether eye-tracking produced Hawthorne effects in six commonly used psychological scales and five behavioral tasks. The dependent measures were selected because they are widely used and cited and because they involved measures of sensitive topics, including gambling behavior, racial bias, undesirable personality characteristics, or because they require working memory or executive attention resources, which might be affected by Hawthorne effects. The only task where Hawthorne effects manifested was the mixed gambles task, in which participants accepted or rejected gambles involving a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing different monetary amounts. Participants in the eye-tracking condition accepted fewer gambles that were low in expected value, and they also took longer to respond for these low-value gambles. These results suggest that eye-tracking is not likely to produce Hawthorne effects in most common psychology laboratory tasks, except for those involving risky decisions where the probability of the outcomes from each choice are known
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