How our belief in qualia evolved, and why we care so much : a reply to David H. Baßler

David Baßler’s commentary identifies five unasked questions in my work, and provides excellent answers to them. His explanation of the gradual evolution of higher-order intentionality via a Bayesian account leads to an explanation of the persistence of our deluded belief in qualia

Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems?

A re-expression of some of the troublesome features of my oft-caricatured theory of consciousness, with new emphases, brings out the strengths of the view and shows how it comports with and anticipates the recent introduction of Bayesian approaches to cognitive science

Haig’s ‘strange inversion of reasoning’ (Dennett) and Making sense: information interpreted as meaning (Haig)

David Haig (this issue) propounds and illustrates the unity of a radically revised set of definitions of the family of terms at the heart of philosophy of cognitive science and mind: information, meaning, interpretation, text, choice, possibility, cause. This biological re-grounding of much-debated concepts yields a bounty of insights into the nature of meaning and life. An interpreter is a mechanism that uses information in choice. The capabilities of the interpreter couple an entropy of inputs (uncertainty) to an entropy of outputs is dispelled by observation (input of information). The second entropy is dispelled (output of decision). I propose that an interpreter’s response to inputs meaning of the information for the interpreter. In this conceptual framework, the mechanisms of interpreters provide the much-debated link between Shannon information and semantics

What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?

Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken together, we argue that these considerations resolve the apparent conflict between our subjective impressions and empirical data on visual capacity, while also illuminating the nature of the representations underlying perceptual experience. Numerous empirical results highlight the limits of visual perception, attention, and working memory. However, it intuitively feels as though we have a rich perceptual experience, leading many to claim that conscious perception overflows these limited cognitive mechanisms.A relatively new field of study (visual ensembles and summary statistics) provides empirical support for the notion that perception is not limited and that observers have access to information across the entire visual world.Ensemble statistics, and scene processing in general, also appear to be supported by neural structures that are distinct from those supporting object perception. These distinct mechanisms can work partially in parallel, providing observers with a broad perceptual experience.Moreover, new demonstrations show that perception is not as rich as is intuitively believed. Thus, ensemble statistics appear to capture the entirety of perceptual experience.National Institutes of Health (U.S.). Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (F32EY024483)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant EY13455

Our vulnerable high streets – death by permitted development?

Ben Clifford, Adam Dennett, Bin Chi and Daniel Slade outline some of the key findings of research on the likely impacts of the latest expansion of permitted development rights

El Yo como centro de gravedad narrativa

El Yo como centro de gravedad narrativ

Response to De Caro, Lavazza, Lemos, and Pereboom

Author's reply to De Caro's, Lavazza's, Lemos', and Pereboom's comments on D.C. Dennett, Reflection on Sam Harris' "Free Will

Mémek: mítoszok, félreértések és félelmek

A mémek fogalmát Richard Dawkins használta először, Az önző gén című könyvében, 1976-ban. A kezdetben sok ellenérzéssel fogadott “mém” Dennett energikus propagandakampányának köszönhetően támogatókra talált, s számos- jóllehet gyakran változó minőségű - könyv és cikk íródott róla. Dennett szerint a kulturális entitások a kiválasztódás-rendszer alapján fejlődnek, ha a Cui bono (Ki jár jól)? kérdésre a “kulturális tárgy” a válasz. Csak ebből a szemszögből érthetjük meg, hogy nemcsak a kultúra őrzői és közvetítői, hanem kulturális entitások is vagyunk

Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question

We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates