2,207 research outputs found

    A critique of Paulo Freire’s perspective on human nature to inform the construction of theoretical underpinnings for research

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    From Crossref via Jisc Publications RouterHistory: epub 2020-04-20, issued 2020-04-20Article version: VoRKate Sanders - ORCID 0000-0003-3516-7030 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3516-7030This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical perspective on human nature in the context of a doctoral research study to explore “muchness” or nurses’ subjective experience of well‐being; and demonstrates how this critique has informed the refinement of the theoretical principles used to inform research methodology and methods. Engaging in philosophical groundwork is essential for research coherence and integrity. Through this groundwork, largely informed by Freire's critical pedagogy and his ideas on humanization, I recognized the need to clarify my understanding of the concepts of persons and personhood and how this related to Freire's use of the term human beings. This clarification process is essential to ensure congruence between the theoretical principles that I draw from his work and my beliefs about persons, personhood and person‐centredness. The article begins with a brief introduction to the research, followed by an overview of Freire's philosophical perspectives, and subsequently, the critique process is presented and discussed. This process involved engaging with the vast literature and debates about what it means to be a person, to make sense of the often complex and contradictory arguments. Eventually, three headings emerged that helped me to frame my evolving understanding: Our species: human beings ; The kind that we are: human nature ; and This person that I am: personhood. Through this process of exploration, I recognized that Freire's perspective on human nature (a) foregrounded cognitive rationality, which presented itself as a limitation when considering my ontological beliefs and the focus of my research, leading me to draw on the work of Mark Johnson and his ideas about embodiment to help me to further develop my theoretical principles; (b) focused on the “collective” rather than individuals, which is a shortcoming in relation to person‐centred research that acknowledges the uniqueness of participants.21pubpub

    On the functional anatomy of the urge-for-action

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    Several common neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette syndrome (TS), autistic spectrum disorder) are associated with unpleasant bodily sensations that are perceived as an urge for action. Similarly, many of our everyday behaviors are also characterized by bodily sensations that we experience as urges for action. Where do these urges originate? In this paper, we consider the nature and the functional anatomy of “urges-for-action,” both in the context of everyday behaviors such as yawning, swallowing, and micturition, and in relation to clinical disorders in which the urge-for-action is considered pathological and substantially interferes with activities of daily living (e.g., TS). We review previous frameworks for thinking about behavioral urges and demonstrate that there is considerable overlap between the functional anatomy of urges associated with everyday behaviors such as swallowing, yawning, and micturition, and those urges associated with the generation of tics in TS. Specifically, we show that the limbic sensory and motor regions—insula and mid-cingulate cortex—are common to all of these behaviors, and we argue that this “motivation-for-action” network should be considered distinct from an “intentional action” network, associated with regions of premotor and parietal cortex, which may be responsible for the perception of “willed intention” during the execution of goal-directed actions

    Emotions and Digital Well-being. The rationalistic bias of social media design in online deliberations

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    In this chapter we argue that emotions are mediated in an incomplete way in online social media because of the heavy reliance on textual messages which fosters a rationalistic bias and an inclination towards less nuanced emotional expressions. This incompleteness can happen either by obscuring emotions, showing less than the original intensity, misinterpreting emotions, or eliciting emotions without feedback and context. Online interactions and deliberations tend to contribute rather than overcome stalemates and informational bubbles, partially due to prevalence of anti-social emotions. It is tempting to see emotions as being the cause of the problem of online verbal aggression and bullying. However, we argue that social media are actually designed in a predominantly rationalistic way, because of the reliance on text-based communication, thereby filtering out social emotions and leaving space for easily expressed antisocial emotions. Based on research on emotions that sees these as key ingredients to moral interaction and deliberation, as well as on research on text-based versus non-verbal communication, we propose a richer understanding of emotions, requiring different designs of online deliberation platforms. We propose that such designs should move from text-centred designs and should find ways to incorporate the complete expression of the full range of human emotions so that these can play a constructive role in online deliberations

    Elevated arousal at time of decision-making is not the arbiter of risk avoidance in chickens

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    The somatic marker hypothesis proposes that humans recall previously experienced physiological responses to aid decision-making under uncertainty. However, little is known about the mechanisms used by non-human animals to integrate risk perception with predicted gains and losses. We monitored the behaviour and physiology of chickens when the choice between a high-gain (large food quantity), high-risk (1 in 4 probability of receiving an air-puff) option (HGRAP) or a low-gain (small food quantity), no-risk (of an air-puff) (LGNAP) option. We assessed when arousal increased by considering different stages of the decision-making process (baseline, viewing, anticipation, reward periods) and investigated whether autonomic responses influenced choice outcome both immediately and in the subsequent trial. Chickens were faster to choose and their heart-rate significantly increased between the viewing and anticipation (post-decision, pre-outcome) periods when selecting the HGRAP option. This suggests that they responded physiologically to the impending risk. Additionally, arousal was greater following a HGRAP choice that resulted in an air-puff, but this did not deter chickens from subsequently choosing HGRAP. In contrast to human studies, we did not find evidence that somatic markers were activated during the viewing period, suggesting that arousal is not a good measure of avoidance in non-human animals

    Under pressure: Response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

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    When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency

    Agency, qualia and life: connecting mind and body biologically

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    Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental, biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses. In exchange for this entropic benefit, phenomenal energy is spent as and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia

    A Neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness

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    A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritises the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which its objects are inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not a cognitive representation, not a memory trace. Cognitive representations are ‘mental solids,’ embedded within subjective consciousness, and their tangible and visible (etc.) properties are projected onto reality. It is important to recognise that mental solids (e.g. the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are represented in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, ‘wakefulness’. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Some implications of this frame of reference are discussed here, in broad brush strokes. This is an electronic version of an article published as Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 173-185. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219635214400032, © World Scientific Publishing Company, http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/jin

    Modulation of emotional appraisal by false physiological feedback during fMRI

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    BACKGROUND James and Lange proposed that emotions are the perception of physiological reactions. Two-level theories of emotion extend this model to suggest that cognitive interpretations of physiological changes shape self-reported emotions. Correspondingly false physiological feedback of evoked or tonic bodily responses can alter emotional attributions. Moreover, anxiety states are proposed to arise from detection of mismatch between actual and anticipated states of physiological arousal. However, the neural underpinnings of these phenomena previously have not been examined. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS We undertook a functional brain imaging (fMRI) experiment to investigate how both primary and second-order levels of physiological (viscerosensory) representation impact on the processing of external emotional cues. 12 participants were scanned while judging face stimuli during both exercise and non-exercise conditions in the context of true and false auditory feedback of tonic heart rate. We observed that the perceived emotional intensity/salience of neutral faces was enhanced by false feedback of increased heart rate. Regional changes in neural activity corresponding to this behavioural interaction were observed within included right anterior insula, bilateral mid insula, and amygdala. In addition, right anterior insula activity was enhanced during by asynchronous relative to synchronous cardiac feedback even with no change in perceived or actual heart rate suggesting this region serves as a comparator to detect physiological mismatches. Finally, BOLD activity within right anterior insula and amygdala predicted the corresponding changes in perceived intensity ratings at both a group and an individual level. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Our findings identify the neural substrates supporting behavioural effects of false physiological feedback, and highlight mechanisms that underlie subjective anxiety states, including the importance of the right anterior insula in guiding second-order "cognitive" representations of bodily arousal state

    Modulation of emotional appraisal by false physiological feedback during fMRI

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    BACKGROUND James and Lange proposed that emotions are the perception of physiological reactions. Two-level theories of emotion extend this model to suggest that cognitive interpretations of physiological changes shape self-reported emotions. Correspondingly false physiological feedback of evoked or tonic bodily responses can alter emotional attributions. Moreover, anxiety states are proposed to arise from detection of mismatch between actual and anticipated states of physiological arousal. However, the neural underpinnings of these phenomena previously have not been examined. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS We undertook a functional brain imaging (fMRI) experiment to investigate how both primary and second-order levels of physiological (viscerosensory) representation impact on the processing of external emotional cues. 12 participants were scanned while judging face stimuli during both exercise and non-exercise conditions in the context of true and false auditory feedback of tonic heart rate. We observed that the perceived emotional intensity/salience of neutral faces was enhanced by false feedback of increased heart rate. Regional changes in neural activity corresponding to this behavioural interaction were observed within included right anterior insula, bilateral mid insula, and amygdala. In addition, right anterior insula activity was enhanced during by asynchronous relative to synchronous cardiac feedback even with no change in perceived or actual heart rate suggesting this region serves as a comparator to detect physiological mismatches. Finally, BOLD activity within right anterior insula and amygdala predicted the corresponding changes in perceived intensity ratings at both a group and an individual level. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Our findings identify the neural substrates supporting behavioural effects of false physiological feedback, and highlight mechanisms that underlie subjective anxiety states, including the importance of the right anterior insula in guiding second-order "cognitive" representations of bodily arousal state
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