Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal Policy Choices?

According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.term limits, comparative politics, fiscal policy

Quinto Rapporto dell'Osservatorio della Congiuntura Turistica nella Provincia di Brescia: dicembre 2010

1openopenChiara Dalle NogareDALLE NOGARE, Chiar

Valorizzazione del patrimonio culturale e crescita del capitale creativo: il distretto culturale della Valle Camonica.

La Fondazione Cariplo dà vita, nel 2009, al progetto Distretti Culturali, con il quale si impegna a finanziare la crescita culturale di specifici ambiti territoriali con il fine dichiarato di promuoverne lo sviluppo anche economico. Dalla lettura dei documenti della Fondazione inerenti il progetto emerge come essa identifichi la creatività, e non in primis il turismo, come possibile cinghia di trasmissione tra crescita culturale ed economica. La creatività è intesa come fattore determinante al fine di migliorare la competitività di un territorio. Questo approccio dimostra come, a livello di indirizzi di politica culturale, il mondo delle fondazioni bancarie stia recependo le istanze della letteratura internazionale di Economia della Cultura ben prima della controparte pubblica. Si argomenta che tale circostanza è probabilmente legata al caratterizzarsi di tali enti per un orizzonte temporale lungo, in quanto essi sono meno sottoposti alle distorsioni tipiche dell’agire del policy maker pubblico, tra cui quelle legate alla pressione elettorale. Ma le caratteristiche di governance di tali enti non garantiscono che tale caratterizzazione si manterrà anche in futuro

El valor y la importancia de las marcas en el mercado y la historia de las marcas blancas y su crecimiento.

Las marcas de los productos juegan un papel muy importante para el desarrollo y crecimiento de estas mismas. En lo que vienen hacer las marcas de productos básicos (impulso o comodities) son muy influenciadas por la publicidad que viene hacer el reflejo del análisis intenso del marketing. Cada producto resulta clasificado en función de la necesidad que pretende satisfacer y es jerarquizada según el orden de prioridad de las necesidades. Los consumidores nos vemos en la libertad de escoger cualquier marca de producto que queramos en el mercado. La marca juega un papel muy importante entre la diferencia entre productos básicos y para esto hay que decidir bien cual es el target. No hay que olvidar que para gestionar una marca es muy importante saber comprenderla. El valor de las marcas ha evolucionado mucho en estos últimos años donde ahora el valor intangible es el valor más alto que tienen la marca ya que este representa el valor en la mente de los consumidores. Este valor de la marca se encuentra entre la comunicación del producto y las características inmateriales del producto

Promotion du dépistage des infections à Chlamydia Trachomatis auprès des adolescents: une revue de littératiure étoffée

Ce travail a pour but d’effectuer un état des lieux des connaissances et des méthodes actuelles sur la promotion du dépistage de la CT. De plus, il est intéressant de savoir quelle est l’investissement ainsi que le rôle de l’infirmier face à cette problématique ceci afin de trouver des stratégies permettant d’adapter le rôle et la pratique infirmière et d’intégrer de nouvelles approches pour le métier

Essays in fiscal policy: political determinants and effects on private consumption

The three essays in this study investigate a series of issues recently emerged in the literature on fiscal policy. The first two chapters are more related to each other and are contributions (theoretical the former, empirical the latter) to the Political Economy approach to fiscal policy that has emerged in the last two decades. The third chapter abandons that perspective to investigate fiscal policy no longer from the point of view of its determination, but from the point of view of its effects. The recent contributions investigating the relation between the degree of government fractionalisation and fiscal policy see the strategic interaction between coalition partners as a consequence of their incomplete information. In chapter 1 I propose a complete information model in which it is the lack of binding commitments that makes the decision-making process of a coalition difficult, which is related to the type of institutional environment. This also allows for a better insight into the welfare analysis of delayed stabilisations. I also consider the problem why coalition governments with conflicting fiscal goals exist. My answer is that this happens when economic agents care for some extra economic issue a great deal and there is a strong polarisation on the subject. Some empirical contributions have already answered affirmatively to the question whether the presence of coalition governments favours excessive public spending and fiscal deficits. In Chapter 2 I consider whether it is possible to do better by looking not at the type of government in charge (single party vs. coalition), but at its nature. I distinguish between homogeneous and non-homogeneous governments: the latter are held together only by extra- economic motives, while in the former there is also a common view on economic policy, as is the case not just with single party, but also with a number of coalition governments. By using cluster analysis on data regarding 11 OECD countries from 1960 to 1990 I come to the conclusion that treating homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalitions as two separate items makes more sense, as it isolates those coalitions where a strategic interaction over fiscal policy takes place between partners. Non-homogenous coalitions have a greater probability to be associated with strong positive fiscal impulses, but also with strong negative ones. I argue this is not in contrast with the conclusions of Chapter 1 and Alesina and Drazen (1991). As for Chapter 3, its focus is consumption. In recent years a number of works have considered the possible direct crowding out effect caused by government consumption and embedded it in the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy. The relevance of this effect, however, is debated, and though many have tried to assess empirically how much public consumption substitutes for private consumption, they have come to different conclusions. Here I follow the approach suggested by Darby and Malley (1996), who stress the importance of making a distinction between the various components (defence/nondefence) of government consumption. The regression results obtained using Italian annual data on the 1862-1996 sample confirm that composition matters: the direct crowding out effect is higher when the relative weight of government consumption in nondefence increases. The degree of substitutability has therefore followed an upward trend in the post WW2 period, reaching values as high as 0.67 in the most recent years