Sequential Bilateral Bargaining and the Shapley value

We extend Ilya Segal's work on bilateral contracting in the presence of externalities to the case of bilateral bargaining in the presence of externalities. Similarly to Segal's work, we prove our results for highly general settings, and provide examples of applications.Bargaining, Non-cooperative foundations of cooperative game theory

Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition

We analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent (i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure – namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength of downstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easily be the case.vertical integration, foreclosure

Atmospheric Tau Neutrinos in a Multi-kiloton Liquid Argon Detector

An ultra-large Liquid Argon Time Projection Chamber-based neutrino detector will have the uncommon ability to detect atmospheric tau neutrino events. This paper discusses the most promising modes for identifying charged current tau neutrino interactions, and shows that, with simple kinematic cuts, ~30 tau neutrinos can be isolated in a 100 kt*yr exposure, with greater than 4 sigma significance. This sample is sufficient to perform flux-averaged total cross-section and cross-section shape parameterization measurements -- the first steps toward using tau neutrinos to search for physics beyond the Standard Model.Comment: 14 pages, 11 figure

Peaks of Otter Salamander (Plethodon hubrichti) Condition Declines along an Elevational Gradient

Undergraduate Basi

Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition

We analyze vertical integration in the case of upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent (i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure – namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified, non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also consider the potential for integration to internalize competitive externalities in a manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration; i.e., by favouring internal over external supply. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength of downstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easily be the case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L42vertical integration, foreclosure, monopolization, bargaining,competition.