Operation 'Cerberus Action' and the 'Four Corners' Prosecution.

There is a generally accepted belief that a well publicised prosecution, which results in the conviction of the offenders will deter crime by sending out a ‘clear message’ to those intending to offend. Those who seek to enforce the legal protection of antiquities and archaeological sites will often decry the number of prosecutions brought, and urge a more aggressive prosecution policy against looters and traffickers in antiquities. However a prosecution may not always produce the anticipated outcome of deterrence. In this article a lawyer examines a recent high profile operation undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Land Management against looters and traffickers in the south west of the United States for breaches of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 and its outcome. It will begin with a short consideration of the context in which the prosecutions were brought: the scale of looting in the area; the difficulties facing those who have to enforce the law; the legal and historical background, and the belief of many in the area that they have a right to dig for artefacts and to collect or sell them. It will then consider ‘Operation Cerberus Action’ and its consequences in some detail, drawing on contemporaneous newspaper accounts and blog comments to illustrate that a prosecution, even where it results in conviction of all the defendants, may be counterproductive, serving only to entrench existing attitudes rather than encouraging behavioural change in intending looters and traffickers

Optimal redistributive tax and education policies in general equilibrium

This paper studies optimal linear and non-linear income taxes and education subsidies in two-type models with endogenous human capital formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous wage rates. Assuming constant human capital elasticities, human capital investment should be efficient under optimal linear policies, whether general equilibrium effects are present or not. Hence, education subsidies should not be used for distributional reasons. Due to general equilibrium effects, optimal linear income taxes may even become negative. Optimal non-linear policies exploit general equilibrium effects for redistribution. The high-skilled type optimally has a negative marginal income tax rate and a positive marginal education subsidy. The low-skilled type optimally faces a positive marginal income tax rate and a marginal tax on education. Simulations demonstrate that general equilibrium effects have only a modest effect on optimal non-linear policies

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed

Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A Survey

This paper provides an overview of the treatment of technological change in economic models of environmental policy. Numerous economic modeling studies have confirmed the sensitivity of mid- and long-run climate change mitigation cost and benefit projections to assumptions about technology costs. In general, technical progress is considered to be a noneconomic, exogenous variable in global climate change modeling. However, there is overwhelming evidence that technological change is not an exogenous variable but to an important degree endogenous, induced by needs and pressures. Hence, some environmenteconomy models treat technological change as endogenous, responding to socio-economic variables. Three main elements in models of technological innovation are: (i) corporate investment in research and development, (ii) spillovers from R&D, and (iii) technology learning, especially learning-by-doing. The incorporation of induced technological change in different types of environmental-economic models tends to reduce the costs of environmental policy, accelerates abatement and may lead to positive spillover and negative leakage

Active learning and optimal climate policy

This paper develops a climate-economy model with uncertainty, irreversibility, and active learning. Whereas previous papers assume learning from one observation per period, or experiment with control variables to gain additional information, this paper considers active learning from investment in monitoring, specifically in improved observations of the global mean temperature. We find that the decision maker invests a significant amount of money in climate research, far more than the current level, in order to increase the rate of learning about climate change. This helps the decision maker make improved decisions. The level of uncertainty decreases more rapidly in the active learning model than in the passive learning model with only temperature observations. As the uncertainty about climate change is smaller, active learning reduces the optimal carbon tax. The greater the risk, the larger is the effect of learning. The method proposed here is applicable to any dynamic control problem where the quality of monitoring is a choice variable, for instance, the precision at which we observe GDP, unemployment, or the quality of education