79 research outputs found
The Growing Blockâs past problems
The Growing-Block view of time has some problems with the past. It is committed to the existence of the past, but needs to say something about the difference between the past and present. I argue that we should resist Correia and Rosenkranzâ (Oxford studies in metaphysics, vol 8, pp 333â350, 2013) response to Braddon-Mitchellâs (Analysis 64:199â203, 2004) argument that the Growing-Block leads to scepticism about whether we are present. I consider an approach, similar to Peter Forrest (Analysis 64:358â362, 2004), and show it is not so counter-intuitive as Braddon-Mitchell suggests and further show that it requires no âsemantic and metaphysical gymnasticsâ, as Chris Heathwood (Analysis 65:249â251, 2005) has suggested. In doing these things I make the problem of the past on the Growing-Block view a problem in its history, not its present
Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle
Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily appreciated, and Ramsification requires a solution to the generalized form of Prior's puzzle. Without such a solution, a wide range of theories will either fail to imply their Ramsey sentences, or have Ramsey sentences that are ill-formed. As a consequence, definitions of theoretical terms given using the Ramsey sentence will be either incorrect or nonsensical. I present a partial solution to the puzzle that requires making use of a neo-Davidsonian language for scientific theorizing, but the would-be Ramsifier still faces serious challenges
Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?
Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive âmark of the cognitiveâ and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalismâempirical or commonsensicalâwe promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition
Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading
According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called âimplicitâ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances
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