"What's the Use of Having a Reputation If You Can't Ruin It Every Now and Then?" Regulatory Enforcement Actions on Banks and the Structure of Loan Syndicates

A decrease in the reputation of a loan syndicate's lead arranger, caused by a regulatory enforcement action for non-compliance with laws and regulations, disincentivizes potential syndicate participants from co-financing the loan. We formally argue that in such cases, the lead arranger must increase his share of the loan in order to make the loan sufficiently attractive to potential participants. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our theoretical argument, using the full sample of enforcement actions enacted on U.S. banks from 2000 through 2010 as well as syndicated loan-level data

Enforcement actions on banks and the structure of loan syndicates

We investigate the effect of regulatory enforcement actions on banks' reputation by estimating the effect of non-compliance with laws and regulations among lead arrangers on the structure of syndicated loans. Consistent with a regulatory reputational stigma, a punished lead arranger increases her loan share to entice participants to continue to co-finance the loan. Consequently, when punished lead arranger initiates a new syndicated loan, then this loan tends to be more concentrated and co-funded by participants with previous collaboration with the lead arranger. However, the observed share increases by punished lead arrangers are seemingly mitigated by extending the loan guarantees, performance pricing provisions, and covenants

Data for: Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

Data and do file regarding our laboratory experiment

Data for: Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization

Data and do file regarding our laboratory experiment.THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV

Waking Up the golden dawn: does exposure to the refugee crisis increase support for extreme-right parties?

Does exposure to the refugee crisis fuel support for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates about the political repercussions of the refugee crisis in Europe, there exists very little - and sometimes conflicting - evidence with which to assess the impact of a large influx of refugees on natives' political attitudes and behavior. We provide causal evidence from a natural experiment in Greece, where some Aegean islands close to the Turkish border experienced sudden and drastic increases in the number of Syrian refugees while other islands slightly farther away - but with otherwise similar institutional and socioeconomic characteristics - did not. Placebo tests suggest that precrisis trends in vote shares for exposed and nonexposed islands were virtually identical. This allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the electoral consequences of the refugee crisis. Our study shows that among islands that faced a massive but transient inflow of refugees passing through just before the September 2015 election, vote shares for Golden Dawn, the most extreme-right party in Europe, moderately increased by 2 percentage points (a 44 percent increase at the average). The finding that mere exposure to the refugee crisis is sufficient to fuel support for extreme-right parties has important implications for our theoretical understanding of the drivers of antirefugee backlash