Russia’s Eurasian past, present and future: rival international societies and Moscow’s place in the post-cold war world

The failure of post-Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became evident with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, leading Moscow to accelerate its declared “pivot to the East”. However, the increased dependence on China carries its own risks, such as the danger of becoming Beijing’s junior partner. For an erstwhile superpower that continues to declare and prize its autonomy in international affairs, this is a particularly unappealing prospect. Thus, it remains to be seen whether a genuinely balanced partnership can exist between both countries. This article uses insights from Adam Watson’s pendulum theory to explore Russia’s post-2014 Eurasian predicament. We argue that the rapid rightward swing of the pendulum in the Euro-Atlantic order following the end of the Cold War has proven indigestible for Moscow. The article then moves to discuss the Sino-Russian relationship in the context of the emerging Eurasian space. It concludes that the growing disillusionment of Russian leaders with the West since the 2000s, along with the normative convergence between Moscow and Beijing, has led to a closer partnership between the two. Yet the partnership is also riddled with a number of insecurities on Moscow’s side that could undermine the long-term prospects for cooperation between Russia and China

The Rho GDI Rdi1 regulates Rho GTPases by distinct mechanisms

© 2008 by The American Society for Cell Biology. Under the License and Publishing Agreement, authors grant to the general public, effective two months after publication of (i.e.,. the appearance of) the edited manuscript in an online issue of MBoC, the nonexclusive right to copy, distribute, or display the manuscript subject to the terms of the Creative Commons–Noncommercial–Share Alike 3.0 Unported license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0).The small guanosine triphosphate (GTP)-binding proteins of the Rho family are implicated in various cell functions, including establishment and maintenance of cell polarity. Activity of Rho guanosine triphosphatases (GTPases) is not only regulated by guanine nucleotide exchange factors and GTPase-activating proteins but also by guanine nucleotide dissociation inhibitors (GDIs). These proteins have the ability to extract Rho proteins from membranes and keep them in an inactive cytosolic complex. Here, we show that Rdi1, the sole Rho GDI of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, contributes to pseudohyphal growth and mitotic exit. Rdi1 interacts only with Cdc42, Rho1, and Rho4, and it regulates these Rho GTPases by distinct mechanisms. Binding between Rdi1 and Cdc42 as well as Rho1 is modulated by the Cdc42 effector and p21-activated kinase Cla4. After membrane extraction mediated by Rdi1, Rho4 is degraded by a novel mechanism, which includes the glycogen synthase kinase 3β homologue Ygk3, vacuolar proteases, and the proteasome. Together, these results indicate that Rdi1 uses distinct modes of regulation for different Rho GTPases.Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaf

1989 as a mimetic revolution: Russia and the challenge of post-communism

Various terms have been used to describe the momentous events of 1989, including Jürgen Habermas’s ‘rectifying revolution,’ and my own notion of 1989 as a type of ‘anti-revolution’: repudiating not only what had come before, but also denying the political logic of communist power, as well as the emancipatory potential of revolutionary socialism in its entirety. In the event, while the negative agenda of 1989 has been fulfilled, it failed in the end to transcend the political logic of the systems that collapsed at that time. This paper explores the unfulfilled potential of 1989. Finally, 1989 became more of a counter- rather than an anti-revolution, replicating in an inverted form the practices of the mature state socialist regimes. The paucity of institutional and intellectual innovation arising from 1989 is striking. The dominant motif was ‘returnism,’ the attempt to join an established enterprise rather than transforming it. Thus, 1989 can be seen as mimetic revolution, in the sense that it emulated systems that were not organically developed in the societies in which they were implanted. For Eastern Europe ‘returning’ to Europe appeared natural, but for Russia the civilizational challenge of post-communism was of an entirely different order. There could be no return, and instead of a linear transition outlined by the classic transitological literature, Russia’s post-communism demonstrated that the history of others could not be mechanically transplanted from one society to another

Stasis and Change: Russia and the Emergence of an Anti-Hegemonic World Order

This chapter argues that after a quarter century of stasis, the pattern of world order is changing and the inter-cold war period of the cold peace is giving way not to a thaw, but to the re-entrenchment of bipolar confrontation between the expansive liberal international order and the resistance of a group of states including Russia. Like the First Cold War, the second is also about the conflicting views of world order as the U.S.-led liberal international order is challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment between Russia, China and their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs – especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The clash between Russia and the West, in this sense, is only an early version – and ultimately perhaps not the most significant – of the challenges against the long-term stasis in international affairs. Although the sinews of a post-Western world are emerging, it remains to be seen whether bodies like SCO and BRICS will be able to sustain the multilateralism of the last seven decades in the absence of the hegemon that had provided the security and support for such multilaterialism to thrive

Understanding Russia's return to the Middle East

Over recent years, there has been a significant resurgence of Russian power and influence in the Middle East, which has been evident in the diplomatic and military intervention into Syria. This article identifies the principal factors behind Russia’s return to the region. First, there are domestic political influences with the coincidence of the uprisings in the Middle East, the so-called ‘Arab Spring,’ with large-scale domestic opposition protests within Russia during the elections in 2011–2012. Second, there is the role of ideas, most notably the growing anti-Westernism in Putin’s third presidential term, along with Russia’s own struggle against Islamist terrorism. These ideational factors contributed to Russia’s resolve to support the Assad government against both Western intervention and its domestic Islamist opposition. Third, Russia has benefited from a pragmatic and flexible approach in its engagement with the region. Moscow seeks to ensure that it is a critical actor for all the various states and political movements in the Middle East

Europe and the political: from axiological monism to pluralistic dialogism

“The political” represents a moment in which actors recognise autonomy and equality as constitutive values in the agonistic search for appropriate open-ended political outcomes. The tutelary, pedagogical and disciplinary practices of the depoliticised European Union (EU) undermine the foundations of equality in diplomatic and political engagement between continental actors. The relationship becomes axiological, where issues are deemed to have been resolved through some sort of anterior pre-political arrangement. This is a type of ahistorical political monism that ultimately claims to speak for all of Europe. The return of “the political” allows a more generous and pluralistic politics to emerge based on genuine dialogical foundations in which self and other engage as equals and are mutually transformed by that engagement

One Europe or None? Monism, Involution and Relations with Russia

The crisis in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) is part of the broader breakdown of the post-Cold War security order. This commentary focuses on structural interpretation and identifies four interlinked processes shaping the crisis: tension between the logic of the enlargement and transformation; a dynamic of involution and resistance; the problem of monism, whereby the expanding self is unable adequately to engage with the un-integrated other; and the recent emergence of ‘other Europes’ that may potentially overcome involution. The erosion of the Atlantic system provides an opportunity for delayed institutional and ideational innovation

The Transformation of Citizenship in Complex Societies

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. To this end, the paper is divided into six sections. The first section elucidates the main reasons for the renaissance of the concept of citizenship in the contemporary social sciences. The second section argues that a comprehensive sociological theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions: the content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. The third section suggests that in order to understand the sociological significance of T.H. Marshall’s account of legal, political, and social rights we need to explore the particular historical contexts in which citizenship rights became ideologically and institutionally relevant. The fourth section offers some critical reflections on the main shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship. The fifth section draws an analogy between the transformation of social movements and the transformation of citizenship. The sixth section sheds light on the fact that contemporary citizenship studies are confronted with a curious paradox: the differentiation of citizenship has led to both the relativistic impoverishment and the pluralistic enrichment of contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the political’.The paper concludes by arguing that, under conditions of late modernity, the state’s capacity to gain political legitimacy increasingly depends on its ability to confront the normative challenges posed by the ubiquity of societal complexity