Market Exchange and the Rule of Law:Confidence in predictability

Law and economics is a significant field of analysis in legal studies and in economics, although there have been a number of controversies about how best to understand the relationship between economic relations and the regulatory role of law. Rather than surveying this field and offering a criticism of various theories and engaging in the dispute between different perspectives on the relationship between the two, in this article I take an approach rooted in neither mainstream economics nor in formal legal philosophy. Rather drawing on a recent well-rounded statement of behavioural economics and a synthesis of previous work on the narrative of the rule of law, I seek to explore how and why contemporary capitalism seems to have become so tied up with the rule of law, and what this might tell us more generally about the role of law in market relations. This analysis goes beyond the relatively commonplace observation that capitalism requires property rights, contract law and market institutionalisation to function, to ask ‘what exactly is it about the rule of law that seems so necessary to establishing and maintaining market exchange(s)?

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice

Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice