31 research outputs found
Vagueness and Quantification
This paper deals with the question of what it is for a quantifier expression to be vague. First it draws a distinction between two senses in which quantifier expressions may be said to be vague, and provides an account of the distinction which rests on independently grounded assumptions. Then it suggests that, if some further assumptions are granted, the difference between the two senses considered can be represented at the formal level. Finally, it outlines some implications of the account provided which bear on three debated issues concerning quantification
Ambiguity tests, polysemy, and copredication
A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous.
These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some
phenomenon is disunified and its accompanying term is ambiguous. The tests have been used
to evaluate disunification proposals about causation, pain, and knowledge, among others.
These ambiguity tests, however, have come under fire. It has been alleged that the tests fail for
polysemy, a common type of ambiguity, and one that is at issue in philosophically interesting
cases. Furthermore, the objection that the tests fail for polysemy is often taken to be an
undeniable bit of linguistic data.
We argue that this is mistaken. The objection implicitly relies on controversial assumptions
about how to account for copredicational sentences, in which a single argument is ascribed
prima facie incompatible properties. Furthermore, on several viable theories of copredication,
the objection fails. However, our discussion also reveals that even if ambiguity tests are
preserved, they may be significantly harder to execute than previously thought.</p