Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932

It is widely assumed that after 1918 the British general staff ignored the experience it had gained from fighting a first-class European enemy and that it was not until the establishment of the Kirke committee in 1932 that it began to garner the lessons of the Great War and incorporate them into its doctrine. This article demonstrates that in fact British military doctrine underwent a continuous process of development in the 1920s. Far from turning its back on new military technologies, the general staff rejected the manpower-intensive doctrine that had sustained the army in 1914 in favour of one that placed modernity and machinery at the very core of its thinking. Between 1919 and 1931 the general staff did assimilate the lessons of the First World War into the army's written doctrine. But what it failed to do was to impose a common understanding of the meaning of that doctrine throughout the army

Effect of space environment on circadian rhythms of plants, for the purpose of defining and verifying an experiment suitable for use in a biosatellite final report, sep. 1, 1964 - feb. 28, 1965

Space environment effect on circadian rhythms of plants for use in biosatellit

A study of the durability of beryllium rocket engines

An experimental test program was performed to demonstrate the durability of a beryllium INTEREGEN rocket engine when operating under conditions simulating the space shuttle reaction control system. A vibration simulator was exposed to the equivalent of 100 missions of X, Y, and Z axes random vibration to demonstrate the integrity of the recently developed injector-to-chamber braze joint. An off-limits engine was hot fired under extreme conditions of mixture ratio, chamber pressure, and orifice plugging. A durability engine was exposed to six environmental cycles interspersed with hot-fire tests without intermediate cleaning, service, or maintenance. Results from this program indicate the ability of the beryllium INTEREGEN engine concept to meet the operational requirements of the space shuttle reaction control system

Neurophysiological and behavioral studies of chimpanzees Semiannual report, Jan. 1 - Jun. 30, 1966

Techniques and bioinstrumentation for behavioral and neurophysiological studies of chimpanzees and Apollo application

Neurophysiological and Behavioral Studies of Chimpanzees Semiannual Report, 1 Jul. - 31 Dec. 1966

Computer program for control of chimpanzee discrimination test analysis and electroencephalographic response dat

Quantum objects are vague objects

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] Is vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations of the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting that insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our representations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter. However, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all knowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking whether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or not. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe that vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is, equally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to the epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of ‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’: If two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of physical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely described with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts themselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely describable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201- 204) It is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in particular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness ‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus, it may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give a much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow by the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for reductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses the property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a definitely does not possess this property since it is surely not indeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the case that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978; Salmon 1982)

Computer analysis of EEG data for a normative library Final report, Sep. 24, 1963 - Jan. 31, 1966

Computer analysis of electroencephalographic data for development of normative criteri