Cosmologies with Two-Dimensional Inhomogeneity

We present a new generating algorithm to construct exact non static solutions of the Einstein field equations with two-dimensional inhomogeneity. Infinite dimensional families of $G_1$ inhomogeneous solutions with a self interacting scalar field, or alternatively with perfect fluid, can be constructed using this algorithm. Some families of solutions and the applications of the algorithm are discussed.Comment: 9 pages, one postscript figur

Race and Regulation Podcast Episode 9 - Board Diversity and Community Lending

The racial wealth gap in the U.S. is driven in part by a lack of access to credit among communities of color. But as Brian D. Feinstein of the Wharton School relays in this episode, new empirical research indicates that increasing the level of diversity on regional Federal Reserve Bank boards improves credit access for underbanked minority communities. He draws out the major implications of this research not only for narrowing the racial wealth gap, but for understanding the role that diversity in institutional leadership, including on corporate boards, can play in advancing racial equity more broadly

State Foreclosure Law: A Neglected Element of the Housing Finance Debate

Proponents of robust mortgage finance regulation would do well to look to the states, and specifically to the regulatory effects of state-mandated judicial foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in almost half of U.S. states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage file an action in state court. This not only provides borrowers with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior and obligations, but puts the onus on the lender to show that the requirements for foreclosure have been met. It also aids borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing them to remain in their homes for longer periods while in default. In this brief, Professor Brian Feinstein empirically examines the effects of judicial foreclosure on lender behavior and mortgage costs for consumers. The findings indicate that judicial foreclosure alters lender behavior in ways that are beneficial to borrowers, and that mirror regulatory goals. Lenders exhibit greater caution in loan-approval decisions and offer fewer subprime loans. These results are amplified for lower-income borrowers. Importantly, the costs imposed on lenders by judicial foreclosure do not appear to get passed on to borrowers in the form of higher rates.https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/1062/thumbnail.jp

The interaction between jets and clouds in the 3CR galaxies

From the HST/WFPC2 3CR Snapshot Survey, data taken with the filter F555W, F702W and narrow-ramp, a set of galaxies with noticeable extended structure were selected (e.g. 3C 79, 3C 135, 3C 234, etc). All of these objects show large regions of [OIII] λ 5007˚A emission (narrow ramp filter) and the broad-band filters data show similar structures indicating the presence of strong emission in several lines over these regions. The morphology observed seems to be related (e.g. same position angle, direct overlapping or similar shape) with the radio-jet. For some candidates with these properties GMOS/Gemini spectroscopy was taken. These data (both HST direct imaging and Gemini spectroscopy) can be tested with diagnostic diagrams and total UV photons budget to understand the source of energy that is ionizing the gas. This source of ionization was commonly believed to be the UV photons emitted by the powerful active galactic nuclei (AGN), but several of these objects show clearly that shocks produced by the radio jet are the main cause of the observed gas line emission. We show in this work, the results obtained over some of these radio-galaxies: 3C 135, 3C 180, 3C 234 and 3C 284.Fil: Hägele, G. F.. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid; EspañaFil: Feinstein Baigorri, Carlos. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Astronómicas y Geofísicas; ArgentinaFil: Macchetto, D. F.. Space Telescope Science Institute; Estados UnidosFil: Montero, F.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciónes Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Astronomía y Física del Espacio. - Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Astronomía y Física del Espacio; Argentin

Congress in the Administrative State

In an era of increased concern over presidential power, congressional oversight of the executive branch constitutes a substantial—but underappreciated—means of influencing agency decision-making. Scholars too often have overlooked it, and Congress is sub-optimally designed for its provision, but oversight has a significant impact on agency behavior. This Article provides a corrective. It presents the legal mechanisms that give oversight hearings their force and situates these hearings in their historical and legal context. In light of this framework and historical practice, the Article posits that ex post oversight hearings facilitate political control over the administrative state. Because oversight gets its bite from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions should an agency not change its behavior following hearings, however, committees’ decisions whether to pursue oversight hinge on the credibility of this threat. To test this theory, the Article introduces an original dataset of over 14,000 agency “infractions,” i.e., agency actions that are potential subjects of hearings. Analysis of these data reveals, first, that oversight is most likely to occur when the particular preference alignment of Congress, the relevant committee, and the agency make the threat of new legislation credible. A second empirical analysis finds that, when oversight hearings do occur, they can get results; infractions that are subject to hearings are 18.5% less likely to recur compared to otherwise similar infractions that are not subject to hearings. These findings call into question the received wisdom regarding Congress’s role in governance. Whereas scholars focused on the political branches’ formal powers see Congress as a branch in decline, a more nuanced picture emerges when one also considers “soft powers,” like oversight. These findings offer a blueprint for greater congressional involvement in administration: to increase Congress’s role in governance, committee membership rosters should be representative of the larger legislature and committees with overlapping jurisdictions should be established. By redesigning its internal structure, Congress can promote more frequent oversight and, because oversight can be consequential, thereby strengthens Congress as a check on presidential administration