Long-run Welfare under Externalities in Consumption, Leisure, and Production: A Case for Happy Degrowth vs. Unhappy Growth

In this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between growth and well-being by examining an endogenous growth model where we allow for externalities in consumption, leisure, and production. We analyze three regimes: a decentralized economy where each household makes isolated choices without considering their external effects, a planned economy where a myopic planner fails to recognize both leisure and consumption externalities but recognizes production externalities, and a planned economy with a fully informed planner. We first compare the balanced growth paths under the three regimes and then we numerically investigate the transition to the optimal balanced growth path. We provide a number of ndings. First, in a decentralized economy growth or labor (or both) are greater than in the regime with a fully informed planner, and hence are sub-optimal from a welfare standpoint. Second, a myopic intervention which overlooks consumption and leisure externalities leads to more growth and labor than in both the decentralized and the fully informed regime. Third, we provide a case for happy degrowth: a transition to the optimal balanced growth path that is associated with downscaling of production, a reduction in private consumption, and an ongoing increase in leisure and well-being.degrowth; endogenous growth; consumption externalities; leisure externalities; production externalities

Functional Distribution, Land Ownership and Industrial Takeoff

This paper investigates how the distribution of land property rights affects industrial take-off and aggregate income through the demand side. We study a stylized two sectors economy where the manufacturing sector is assumed to be constituted by a continuum of small markets producing distinct commodities. Following Murphy et al. [24] we model industrialization as the introduction of an increasing returns technology in place of a constant returns one. However, we depart from their framework by assuming income to be distributed according to functional groups’ membership (landowners, capitalists, workers). We carry out an equilibrium analysis for different levels of land ownership concentration proving that, under the specified conditions, there is a non-monotonic relation between the distribution of land property rights and both industrialization and income. We clarify that non-monotonicity arises because of the way land ownership concentration affects the level and the distribution of profits among capitalists. Our results suggest that i) both a too concentrated and a too diffused distribution of land property rights can be detrimental to industrialization, ii) landownership affects the economic performance of an industrializing country by determining industrial profits and iii) in terms of optimal land distribution there may be a tradeoff between income and industrialization.

Functional Distribution, Land Ownership and Industrial Takeoff

This paper investigates how the distribution of land property rights affects industrial take-off and aggregate income through the demand side. We study a stylized two sectors economy where the manufacturing sector is assumed to be constituted by a continuum of small markets producing distinct commodities. Following Murphy et al. (1989) we model industrialization as the introduction of an increasing returns technology in place of a constant returns one. However, we depart from their framework by assuming income to be distributed according to functional groups’ membership (landowners, capitalists, workers). We carry out an equilibrium analysis for different levels of land ownership concentration proving that, under the specified conditions, there is a non-monotonic relation between the distribution of land property rights and both industrialization and income. We clarify that non-monotonicity arises because of the way land ownership concentration affects the level and the distribution of profits among capitalists. Our results suggest that i) both a too concentrated and a too diffused distribution of land property rights can be detrimental to industrialization, ii) landownership affects the economic performance of an industrializing country by determining industrial profits and iii) in terms of optimal land distribution there may be a tradeoff between income and industrialization.income ditribution, land, industrialization

Trust and ethics: ambivalent foundations of relationship and sui generis forms of gift

Is there a circular relationship between trust and ethics? Is it possible to alter their relationship, changing the perception that social actors have of them? How has trust changed in the transition from modernity to post-modernity and how does it change in times of crisis?Starting from the epistemological assumption that progress in the social sciences is determined by the change in the theoretical horizon produced by “a reformulation of metaphysical assumptions”[1] and combining this path with the relational perspective, according to which “not the facts, but the relationship between the facts is what requires analysis”[2], we will examine definitions, meanings, functions and relationships between trust and ethics. Following the theoretical logical method, we will understand that trust and ethical behaviour are particular forms of gift[3] that co-own each other.As such, they are ambivalent in nature and their circle can also produce dysfunctional outcomes that depend on the ability of social systems to modify collective perceptions through forms of communication, in the awareness that distrust constitutes an ineliminable and, paradoxically, preparatory element for the restoration of the trust circle.The relational circle between gift, trust, collective ethics and personal morality does not end with distrust, but changes in a contingent way, determining perverse effects: correct behaviour could produce, unintentionally, a disaster; incorrect actions could generate unforeseen positive effects.The perverse effects cannot be defined as exceptional - as is believed in the theory of rational choice - but recurrent because daily practices are marked by an intuitive, emotional and moralistic trust circle that prevails over logical reasoning, as ascertained by both relational theory and behavioural economics. Functionalist paradigms cannot engineer and optimise the performance of trust. [1] See J. Alexander's strong programme in S. Segre, Le teorie sociologiche contemporanee, Carocci, Rome, 2019, p. 12. It is not enough to observe reality, it is necessary to interpret it, taking into account theories and traditions whose foundations have a metaphysical character.[2] F. Ferrarotti, La sociologia come analisi critica della società, in R. Cipriani (a cura di), Nuovo Manuale di Sociologia, Maggioli, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, 2018 p. 24.[3] The classical meaning in M. Mauss, Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques, 1ª ed. 1925, revisited by G. Satta, L’ambiguità del dono. Note su dono, violenza e potere nell’Essai di Mauss, in V. Rasini, Aggressività. Un’indagine polifonica, Mimesis, Milano 2011

Determination of the Lorentz Angle in Microstrip Silicon Detectors with Cosmic Muons

The microstrip silicon tracker of the CMS experiment will operate in a 4 T magnetic field in the harsh radiation environment of the Large Hadron Collider. The drift motion of the charge carriers will be therefore affected by the Lorentz force due to the high magnetic field. Furthermore, radiation damage will change in time the properties of this drift. In this note a method to measure the Lorentz angle from reconstructed tracks is presented and results obtained on Magnet Test and Cosmic Challenge data are compared to the values expected from a model, developed by the authors, which takes into account all the relevant parameters during the tracker lifetime (e.g. temperature and depletion voltage of the detectors)

A Social Heuristics Hypothesis for the Stag Hunt: Fast- and Slow-Thinking Hunters in the Lab

In this paper, we analyze the role of intuitive versus deliberative thinking in stag hunt games. To do so we, first, provide a conceptual framework predicting that, under the assumption that stag is the ruling social convention in real life interactions, players who make their choices fast and intuitively, relying on social heuristics, choose stag more often than other players. Second, we run a lab experiment and use a time pressure treatment to induce fast and intuitive thinking. We find that: (i) players under the time pressure treatment are more likely to choose stag than individuals in the control group; (ii) individual choices under the time pressure treatment are less sensitive to the size of the basin of attraction of stag; (iii) these results are largely driven by less experienced participants. Overall, our findings provide support to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al., 2012) applied to stag hunt interactions

The Institutional Dynamics of Colonial Exploitation

This paper focuses on the interaction between the legacy of institutional arrangements and incentives on long-term development. We recalled two studies focusing on the long term effects of geographic discontinuities in colonial practice in India and Peru and we confronted the two historical cases as to emphasise the role of capital accumulation and equality of distribution. Furthermore, we propose an evolutionary game model to capture the evolutionary dynamics of institutional assets defining egalitarian or iniquitous income divisions in a non-cooperative setting. This framework sheds light on the role of the colonial governments in the interaction between local institutions and foreign colonial rule in terms of distribution, resources extraction, social asymmetries and finalised investments

Child Labour and Inequality

This paper focuses on the evolution of child labour, fertility and human capital in an economy characterized by two types of workers, low- and high-skilled. This heterogeneity allows an endogenous analysis of inequality generated by child labour. More specifically, according to empirical evidence, we offer an explanation for the emergence of a vicious cycle between child labour and inequality. The basic intuition behind this result arises from the interdependence between child labour and fertility decisions. Furthermore, we investigate how child labour regulation policies can influence the welfare of the two groups in the short run, and the income distribution in the long run. We find that conflicts of interest may arise between the two groups

Transition to sustainability? Feasible scenarios towards a low-carbon economy

This paper analyses different policies that may promote the transition towards a low-carbon economy. We present a dynamic simulation model where three different strategies are identified: improvements in energy efficiency, the development of the renewable energy sector, and carbon capture and storage. Our aim is to evaluate the dynamics that the implementation of these strategies may produce in the economy, looking at different performance indicators, such as the GDP growth rate, unemployment, labour share, carbon emissions, and renewable energy production. Scenario analysis shows that a number of tradeoffs between social, economic and environmental indicators emerge. Such tradeoffs undermine an `objective' definition of sustainability

Child labour and inequality

This paper focuses on the evolution of child labour, fertility and human capital in an economy characterized by two type of individuals, low and high skilled workers. This heterogeneity allows for an endogenous analysis of inequality generated by child labour. More specifically, according to empirical evidence, we oer an explanation for the emergence of a vicious cycle between child labour and inequality. The basic intuition behind this result is the interdependence between child labour and fertility choices: unskilled parents tend to have a high number of children and to send them to work whereas skilled parents tend to have a low fertility rate and a high investment in education. The differential fertility between high and low skilled increases the fraction of unskilled workers in the labour market which in turns reduces unskilled wage. The fact that children can oers only unskilled labor reinforces such process creating a vicious cycle between child labour and inequality