Content, embodiment and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails

Frege was a powerful advocate of the explanatory priority of a theory of repre-sentation in thought over a theory of representation in experience.1 It is hard to overestimate the importance of this theoretical strategy. It has had ubiquitous consequences: for our conception of persons—and the relation of persons to other animals—for computational and other technologies, and for our modelling of psychological, social and semantic phenomena. Most systematic theories of rep-resentation since Frege, however divergent from each other they have been in other respects, have followed Frege in adopting the priority of thought over expe-rience. The principle exceptions to this have belonged to the empiricist or posi-tivist traditions; most impressively, perhaps, Camap's Aufbau. But theories in those traditions have been widely viewed to be failures in their own terms, and to make untenable assumptions of the "given " in experience, and of the duality of representational scheme and experiential content.2 In this paper I explore one way to do representational theory which adopts the converse of Frege's priority— i.e. which explains thought in terms of experience—but which nevertheless is not an empiricist theory. I shall call representational theory which takes experience to be prior to thought "nonconceptual and constructionist". It is nonconceptual because it does not take the atoms of representation to be concepts (the constituents of thoughts3) and it is constructionist because it attempts to explain thought in terms of non-conceptual atoms grounded in experience. (Experience is taken to be prior to thought, not merely independent of thought. I don't consider "eclectic " theo-ries—recently popular in the philosophy of psychology—that employ mutually independent theories of thought and experience.) The version of nonconceptual constructionist theory explored here is called "the theory of cognitive trails". It is, in addition4, neither empiricist nor materialist because it adheres to a symmet-ric metaphysics: it neither assumes (our conception of) the mind in order to 1 For brevity I shall normally omit "theory of representation " and speak simply of the priority of thought over experience

Conceiving time?: women who do or do not conceive

This article explores the importance of time for an understanding of women's experiences of reproductive identity. In order to do this we draw on data from two separate qualitative research projects. The first project is concerned with the experiences of conception, pregnancy, childbirth and early motherhood in primagravidae, whilst the second focuses on the experiences of individuals (especially women) who defined themselves (at the time of the fieldwork, or some time previously) as 'involuntarily childless' and/or 'infertile'. These two areas are usually treated as separate; however this article explores similarities between them in terms of time and medicalisation. Our central concern then is with exploring the similarities of experience for women who do or do not conceive

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position

Building resilience: A preliminary exploration of women's perceptions of the use of acupuncture as an adjunct to In Vitro Fertilisation

In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) is now an accepted and effective treatment for infertility, however IVF is acknowledged as contributing to, rather than lessening, the overall psychosocial effects of infertility. Psychological and counselling interventions have previously been widely recommended in parallel with infertility treatments but whilst in many jurisdictions counselling is recommended or mandatory, it may not be widely used. Acupuncture is increasingly used as an adjunct to IVF, in this preliminary study we sought to investigate the experience of infertile women who had used acupuncture to improve their fertility

Attitudes on the donation of human embryos for stem cell research among Chinese IVF patients and students

Bioethical debates on the use of human embryos and oocytes for stem cell research have often been criticized for the lack of empirical insights into the perceptions and experiences of the women and couples who are asked to donate these tissues in the IVF clinic. Empirical studies that have investigated the attitudes of IVF patients and citizens on the (potential) donation of their embryos and oocytes have been scarce and have focused predominantly on the situation in Europe and Australia. This article examines the viewpoints on the donation of embryos for stem cell research among IVF patients and students in China. Research into the perceptions of patients is based on in-depth interviews with IVF patients and IVF clinicians. Research into the attitudes of students is based on a quantitative survey study (n=427). The empirical findings in this paper indicate that perceptions of the donation of human embryos for stem cell research in China are far more diverse and complex than has commonly been suggested. Claims that ethical concerns regarding the donation and use of embryos and oocytes for stem cell research are typical for Western societies but absent in China cannot be upheld. The article shows that research into the situated perceptions and cultural specificities of human tissue donation can play a crucial role in the deconstruction of politicized bioethical argumentation and the (often ill-informed) assumptions about “others” that underlie socio-ethical debates on the moral dilemmas of technology developments in the life sciences

Embodying the mind and representing the body

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition)