Rapid evolution of A(H5N1) influenza viruses after intercontinental spread to North America

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b underwent an explosive geographic expansion in 2021 among wild birds and domestic poultry across Asia, Europe, and Africa. By the end of 2021, 2.3.4.4b viruses were detected in North America, signifying further intercontinental spread. Here we show that the western movement of clade 2.3.4.4b was quickly followed by reassortment with viruses circulating in wild birds in North America, resulting in the acquisition of different combinations of ribonucleoprotein genes. These reassortant A(H5N1) viruses are genotypically and phenotypically diverse, with many causing severe disease with dramatic neurologic involvement in mammals. The proclivity of the current A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b virus lineage to reassort and target the central nervous system warrants concerted planning to combat the spread and evolution of the virus within the continent and to mitigate the impact of a potential influenza pandemic that could originate from similar A(H5N1) reassortants

Long-term vaccine-induced heterologous protection against H5N1 influenza viruses in the ferret model

Background Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses reemerged in humans in 2003 and have caused fatal human infections in Asia and Africa as well as ongoing outbreaks in poultry. These viruses have evolved substantially and are now so antigenically varied that a single vaccine antigen may not protect against all circulating strains. Nevertheless, studies have shown that substantial cross-reactivity can be achieved with H5N1 vaccines. These studies have not, however, addressed the issue of duration of such cross-reactive protection. Objectives To directly address this using the ferret model, we used two recommended World Health Organization H5N1 vaccine seed strains - A/Vietnam/1203/04 (clade 1) and A/duck/Hunan/795/02 (clade 2.1) - seven single, double, or triple mutant viruses based on A/Vietnam/1203/04, and the ancestral viruses A and D, selected from sequences at nodes of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase gene phylogenies to represent antigenically diverse progeny H5N1 subclades as vaccine antigens. Results All inactivated whole-virus vaccines provided full protection against morbidity and mortality in ferrets challenged with the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain A/Vietnam/1203/04 5months and 1year after immunization. Conclusion If an H5N1 pandemic was to arise, and with the hypothesis that one can extrapolate the results from three doses of a whole-virion vaccine in ferrets to the available split vaccines for use in humans, the population could be efficiently immunized with currently available H5N1 vaccines, while the homologous vaccine is under production

Influenza Virus Surveillance in Coordinated Swine Production Systems, United States

To clarify the epidemiology of influenza A viruses in coordinated swine production systems to which no animals from outside the system are introduced, we conducted virologic surveillance during September 2012–September 2013. Animal age, geographic location, and farm type were found to affect the prevalence of these viruses

Experimental infection of pigs and ferrets with "pre-pandemic," human-adapted, and swine-adapted variants of the H1N1pdm09 influenza A virus reveals significant differences in viral dynamics and pathological manifestations.

Influenza A viruses are RNA viruses that cause epidemics in humans and are enzootic in the pig population globally. In 2009, pig-to-human transmission of a reassortant H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm09) caused the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. This study investigated the infection dynamics, pathogenesis, and lesions in pigs and ferrets inoculated with natural isolates of swine-adapted, human-adapted, and "pre-pandemic" H1N1pdm09 viruses. Additionally, the direct-contact and aerosol transmission properties of the three H1N1pdm09 isolates were assessed in ferrets. In pigs, inoculated ferrets, and ferrets infected by direct contact with inoculated ferrets, the pre-pandemic H1N1pdm09 virus induced an intermediary viral load, caused the most severe lesions, and had the highest clinical impact. The swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus induced the highest viral load, caused intermediary lesions, and had the least clinical impact in pigs. The human-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus induced the highest viral load, caused the mildest lesions, and had the least clinical impact in ferrets infected by direct contact. The discrepancy between viral load and clinical impact presumably reflects the importance of viral host adaptation. Interestingly, the swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus was transmitted by aerosols to two-thirds of the ferrets. Further work is needed to assess the risk of human-to-human aerosol transmission of swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 viruses

Experimental infection of pigs and ferrets with "pre-pandemic," human-adapted, and swine-adapted variants of the H1N1pdm09 Influenza A virus reveals significant differences in viral dynamics and pathological manifestations

Influenza A viruses are RNA viruses that cause epidemics in humans and are enzootic in the pig population globally. In 2009, pig-to-human transmission of a reassortant H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm09) caused the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. This study investigated the infection dynamics, pathogenesis, and lesions in pigs and ferrets inoculated with natural isolates of swine-adapted, human-adapted, and "pre-pandemic" H1N1pdm09 viruses. Additionally, the direct-contact and aerosol transmission properties of the three H1N1pdm09 isolates were assessed in ferrets. In pigs, inoculated ferrets, and ferrets infected by direct contact with inoculated ferrets, the pre-pandemic H1N1pdm09 virus induced an intermediary viral load, caused the most severe lesions, and had the highest clinical impact. The swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus induced the highest viral load, caused intermediary lesions, and had the least clinical impact in pigs. The human-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus induced the highest viral load, caused the mildest lesions, and had the least clinical impact in ferrets infected by direct contact. The discrepancy between viral load and clinical impact presumably reflects the importance of viral host adaptation. Interestingly, the swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 virus was transmitted by aerosols to two-thirds of the ferrets. Further work is needed to assess the risk of human-to-human aerosol transmission of swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 viruses

Multiple reassortment between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic influenza viruses in pigs, United States.

As a result of human-to-pig transmission, pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in pigs soon after it emerged in humans. In the United States, this transmission was quickly followed by multiple reassortment between the pandemic virus and endemic swine viruses. Nine reassortant viruses representing 7 genotypes were detected in commercial pig farms in the United States. Field observations suggested that the newly described reassortant viruses did not differ substantially from pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or endemic strains in their ability to cause disease. Comparable growth properties of reassortant and endemic viruses in vitro supported these observations; similarly, a representative reassortant virus replicated in ferrets to the same extent as did pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic swine virus. These novel reassortant viruses highlight the increasing complexity of influenza viruses within pig populations and the frequency at which viral diversification occurs in this ecologically important viral reservoir.As a result of human-to-pig transmission, pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in pigs soon after it emerged in humans. In the United States, this transmission was quickly followed by multiple reassortment between the pandemic virus and endemic swine viruses. Nine reassortant viruses representing 7 genotypes were detected in commercial pig farms in the United States. Field observations suggested that the newly described reassortant viruses did not differ substantially from pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or endemic strains in their ability to cause disease. Comparable growth properties of reassortant and endemic viruses in vitro supported these observations; similarly, a representative reassortant virus replicated in ferrets to the same extent as did pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and endemic swine virus. These novel reassortant viruses highlight the increasing complexity of influenza viruses within pig populations and the frequency at which viral diversification occurs in this ecologically important viral reservoir