238 research outputs found
Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks
Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [. âIntentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.â Analysis 63: 190â194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action â the âframe-of-mind conditionâ, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agentâs frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [. âIntentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.â The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630â641;. âNormativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.â Mind & Language 29: 51â72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his âNormative Reason account of Intentional Actionâ, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In..
The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical approaches
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the experimental philosophy of action, focusing on the various different accounts of the Knobe Effect
Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?
âFrankfurt-style casesâ are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners are inconsistent, and this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discus..
A validation and comparison of three measures of participantsâ disposition to feel moved (introducing the Geneva Sentimentality Scale)
Indexado en ScopusIn the past years, psychologists have been increasingly interested in feelings of âbeing movedâ (or âtouchedâ) and their impact on cognition and behaviour. However, to better understand their long-term impact, we need a validated measure of participantsâ disposition to feel âmovedâ. In this paper, we introduce the Geneva Sentimentality Scale (GSS), a measure of participantsâ disposition to feel moved. After describing its construction (Study 1) and confirming its structure and internal coherence (Study 2), we compare it to two other measures of participantsâ disposition to feel moved: the Kama Muta Frequency scale (KAMF) and a single-item measure (âI often feel movedâ). We show that all three measures reliably predict participantsâ response to moving stimuli (Study 2) and their feelings of being moved in the past week (Study 3) and next week (Study 5). Moreover, we show that the GSS and KAMF have good testâretest reliability (Studies 4 & 5). Overall, we conclude that all three measures provide experimenters with useful tools to investigate the role feelings of being moved play in our lives.RevisiĂłn por pare
On Doing Things Intentionally
Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology
The emotional shape of our moral life: Anger-related emotions and mutualistic anthropology
The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to "avoidanceâ emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to "punitiveâ emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidenc
On Doing Things Intentionally
Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology
Le statut intentionnel d'une action dépend-il de sa valeur morale ? Une énigme encore à résoudre
Dans cet article, nous introduisons le lecteur Ă une Ă©nigme qui a Ă©mergĂ© rĂ©cemment dans la littĂ©rature philosophique : celle de lâinfluence de nos Ă©valuations morales sur nos intuitions au sujet de la nature des actions intentionnelle. En effet, certaines donnĂ©es issues de la philosophie expĂ©rimentale semblent suggĂ©rer que nos jugements quant au statut intentionnel dâune action dĂ©pendent de notre Ă©valuation de ladite action. De nombreuses thĂ©ories ont Ă©tĂ© proposĂ©es pour rendre compte de ces rĂ©sultats. Nous dĂ©fendons la thĂšse selon laquelle aucune des thĂ©ories existantes nâest satisfaisante et que le mystĂšre reste pour lâinstant entier
Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support
âFrankfurt-style casesâ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223â239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two kinds of Frankfurt counter-arguments against the PAP: the direct and the indirect counter-arguments. I then argue that Levyâs argument, if valid, can shed doubt on the indirect argument but leaves the direct argument untouched. I conclude that FSCs can still do their job, even if we grant that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener can modify an agentâs abilitie
âIt was all a cruel angelâs thesis from the startâ: Folk intuitions about Zygote cases do not support the Zygote argument
Manipulation arguments that start from the intuition that manipulated agents are neither free nor morally responsible then conclude to that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The Zygote argument is a special case of Manipulation argument in which the manipulation intervenes at the very conception of the agent. In this paper, I argue that the Zygote argument fails because (i) very few people share the basic intuitions the argument rests on, and (ii) even those who share this intuition do so for reasons that are unrelated to determinism. Rather, I argue that intuitions about the Zygote argument (and Manipulation arguments in general) are driven by people's intuitions about the deep self, as shown by the fact that intuitions about manipulated agents depend on the moral value of the agent's behavior
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